BRAVERY OF CAPTAIN M’GINNES.

When baron Dieskau set out from Ticonderoga, his design was only to surprise and cut off the intrenched camp, now called Fort Edward, at the Carrying-place, where there were but four or five hundred men. If he had executed this scheme, our army would have been thrown into great difficulties; for it could neither have proceeded farther, nor have subsisted where it was, and he might have found an opportunity to attack it with great advantage in its retreat. But when he was within four or five miles of that fort, his people were informed that there were several cannon there, and none at the camp; upon which they all desired to be led on to this last, which he the more readily consented to, as he himself had been told by an English prisoner, who had left this camp but a few days before, that it was quite defenceless, being without any lines, and destitute of cannon; which, in effect, was true at that time; for the cannon did not arrive, nor was the breast-work erected, till about two days before the engagement. To this misinformation, therefore, must be imputed this step, which would otherwise be inconsistent with the general character and abilities of baron Dieskau. A less justifiable error seems to have been committed by general Johnson, in not detaching a party to pursue the enemy when they were defeated and fled. Perhaps he was prevented from so doing by the ill fate of the detachment he had sent out in the morning under colonel Williams. However that may be, his neglect in this respect had like to have been fatal the next day to a detachment sent from Fort Edward, consisting of an hundred and twenty men of the New Hampshire regiment, under captain M’Ginnes, as a reinforcement to the army at the camp. This party fell in with between three and four hundred men of Dieskau’s troops, near the spot where colonel Williams had been defeated the day before; but M’Ginnes, having timely notice by his scouts of the approach of an enemy, made such a disposition, that he not only repulsed the assailants, but defeated and entirely dispersed them, with the loss only of two men killed, eleven wounded, and five missing. He himself unfortunately died of the wounds he received in this engagement, a few days after he arrived at the camp with his party. It was now judged too late in the year to proceed to the attack of Crown Point, as it would have been necessary, in that case, to build a strong fort in the place where the camp then was, in order to secure a communication with Albany, from whence only the troops could expect to be reinforced, or supplied with fresh stores of ammunition or provisions. They therefore set out upon their return soon after this engagement, having first erected a little stockaded fort, at the hither end of Lake George, in which they left a small garrison, as a future prey for the enemy; a misfortune which might easily have been foreseen, because this whole army being country militia, was to be disbanded, and return to their respective homes, as they actually did soon after their retreat to Albany. This was all the glory, this all the advantage, that the English nation acquired by such an expensive expedition. But so little had the English been accustomed of late to hear of victory, that they rejoiced at this advantage, as if it had been an action of the greatest consequence. The general was highly applauded for his conduct, and liberally rewarded; for he was created a baronet by his majesty, and presented with five thousand pounds by the parliament.