HE ENGAGES M. DE LA GALISSONNIERE OFF MINORCA.

The admiral being strengthened by Mr. Edgecumbe, and reinforced by a detachment from the garrison, set sail from Gibraltar on the eighth day of May, and was joined off Majorca by his majesty’s ship the Phoenix, under the command of captain Hervey, who confirmed the intelligence he had already received, touching the strength and destination of the French squadron. When he approached Minorca, he descried the British colours still flying at the castle of St. Philip’s, and several bomb-batteries playing upon it from different quarters where the French banners were displayed. Thus informed, he detached three ships a-head, with captain Hervey, to reconnoitre the harbour’s mouth, and land, if possible, a letter for general Blakeney, giving him to understand the fleet was come to his assistance. Before this attempt could be made, the French fleet appearing to the south-cast, and the wind blowing strong off shore, he recalled his ships, and formed the line of battle. About six o’clock in the evening, the enemy, to the number of seventeen ships, thirteen of which appeared to be very large, advanced in order; but about seven tacked, with a view to gain the weather-gage. Mr. Byng, in order to preserve that advantage, as well as to make sure of the land-wind in the morning, followed their example, being then about five leagues from Cape Mola. At daylight the enemy could not be descried; but two tartanes appearing close to the rear of the English squadron, they were immediately chased by signal. One escaped, and the other being taken, was found to have on board two French captains, two lieutenants, and about one hundred private soldiers, part of six hundred who had been sent out in tartanes the preceding day, to reinforce the enemy’s squadron. This soon re-appearing, the line of battle was formed on each side, and about two o’clock admiral Byng threw out a signal to bear away two points from the wind and engage. At this time his distance from the enemy was so great, that rear-admiral West, perceiving it impossible to comply with both orders, bore away with his division seven points from the wind, and closing down upon the enemy, attacked them with such impetuosity, that the ships which opposed him were in a little time driven out of the line. Had he been properly sustained by the van, in all probability the British fleet would have obtained a complete victory; but the other division did not bear down, and the enemy’s centre keeping that station, rear-admiral West could not pursue his advantage without running the risk of seeing his communication with the rest of the line entirely cut off. In the beginning of the action, the Intrepid, in Mr. Byng’s division, was so disabled in her rigging that she could not be managed, and drove on the ship that was next in position; a circumstance which obliged several others to throw all aback in order to avoid confusion, and for some time retarded the action. Certain it is, that Mr. Byng, though accommodated with a noble ship of ninety guns, made little or no use of his artillery, but kept aloof, either from an overstrained observance of discipline, or timidity. When his captain exhorted him to bear down upon the enemy, he very coolly replied, that he would avoid the error of admiral Matthews, who, in his engagement with the French and Spanish squadrons off Toulon, during the preceding war, had broke the line by his own precipitation, and exposed himself singly to a fire which he could not sustain. Mr. Byng, on the contrary, was determined against acting, except with the line entire; and, on pretence of rectifying the disorder which had happened among some of the ships, hesitated so long, and kept at such a wary distance, that he never was properly engaged, though he received some few shots in his hull. M. de la Galissionniere seemed equally averse to the continuance of the battle; part of his squadron had been fairly obliged to quit the line; and though he was rather superior to the English in number of men and weight of metal, he did not choose to abide the consequence of a closer fight with an enemy so expert in naval operations: he therefore took advantage of Mr. Byng’s hesitation, and edged away with an easy sail to join his van, which had been discomfited. The English admiral gave chase; but the French ships being clean, he could not come up and close them again, so they retired at their leisure. Then he put his squadron on the other tack, in order to keep the wind of the enemy; and next morning they were altogether out of sight.

While he lay-to with the rest of the fleet, at the distance of ten leagues from Mahon, he detached cruisers to look for some missing ships, which joined him accordingly, and made an inquiry into the condition of the squadron. The number of killed amounted to forty-two, including captain Andrews of the Defiance, and about one hundred and sixty-eight were wounded. Three of the capital ships were so damaged in their masts, that they could not keep the sea with any regard to their safety; a great number of the seamen were ill, and there was no vessel which could be converted into an hospital for the sick and wounded. In this situation he called a council of war, at which the land-officers were present. He represented to them that he was much inferior to the enemy in weight of metal and number of men; that they had the advantage of sending their wounded to Minorca, from whence at the same time they were refreshed and reinforced occasionally; that in his opinion it was impracticable to relieve St. Philip’s fort, and, therefore, they ought to make the best of their way back to Gibraltar, which might require immediate protection. They unanimously concurred with his sentiments, and thither he directed his course accordingly. How he came to be so well acquainted with the impracticability of relieving general Blakeney, it is not easy to determine, as no experiment was made for that purpose. Indeed, the neglect of such a trial seems to have been the least excusable part of his conduct; for it afterwards appeared that the officers and soldiers belonging to the garrison might have been landed at the sally-port, without running any great risk; and a gentleman, then in the fort, actually passed and repassed in a boat, unhurt by any of the enemy’s batteries.

Mr. Byng’s letter to the admiralty, containing a detail of this action, is said to have arrived some days before it was made public; and when it appeared, was curtailed of divers expressions, and whole paragraphs, which either tended to his own justification, or implied a censure on the conduct of his superiors. Whatever use might have been made of this letter while it remained a secret to the public, we shall not pretend to explain; but sure it is, that, on the sixteenth day of June, sir Edward Hawke and admiral Saunders sailed from Spit-head to Gibraltar, to supersede the admirals Byng and West in their commands of the Mediterranean squadron; and Mr. Byng’s letter was not published till the twenty-sixth day of the same month, when it produced all the effect which that gentleman’s bitterest enemies could have desired. The populace took fire like a train of the most hasty combustibles, and broke out into such a clamour of rage and indignation against the devoted admiral, as could not have been exceeded if he had lost the whole navy of England, and left the coasts of the kingdom naked to invasion. This animosity was carefully fomented and maintained by artful emissaries, who mingled with all public assemblies, from the drawing-room in St. James’ to the mob at Charing-cross. They expatiated upon the insolence, the folly, the cowardice, and misconduct of the unhappy admiral. They even presumed to make their sovereign in some measure an instrument of their calumny, by suggesting, that his majesty had prognosticated Byng’s misbehaviour from the contents of his first letter, dated at Gibraltar. They ridiculed and refuted the reasons he had given for returning to that fortress, after his scandalous re-encounter with the French squadron; and, in order to exasperate them to the most implacable resentment, they exaggerated the terrible consequences of losing Minorca, which must now be subdued through his treachery or want of resolution. In a word, he was devoted as the scape-goat of the ministry, to whose supine negligence, ignorance, and misconduct, the loss of that important fortress was undoubtedly owing. Byng’s miscarriage was thrown out like a barrel to the whale, in order to engage the attention of the people, that it might not be attracted by the real cause of the national misfortune. In order to keep up the flame which had been kindled against the admiral, recourse was had to the lowest artifices. Agents were employed to vilify his person in all public places of vulgar resort, and mobs were hired at different parts of the capital to hang and burn him in effigy.