HIS PRUSSIAN MAJESTY’S ANSWER TO THE SAXON MEMORIAL.

The king of Prussia did not passively bear all the imputations that were fixed upon his conduct. His minister at the Hague presented a memorial, in answer to that of the Saxon resident, in which he accused the court of Dresden of having adopted every part of the scheme which his enemies had formed for his destruction. He affirmed that the Saxon ministers had, in all the courts of Europe, played off every engine of unwarrantable politics, in order to pave the way for the execution of their project; that they had endeavoured to give an odious turn to his most innocent actions; that they had spared neither malicious insinuations, nor even the most atrocious calumnies, to alienate all the world from his majesty, and raise up enemies against him everywhere. He said, he had received information that the court of Saxony intended to let his troops pass freely, and afterwards wait for events of which they might avail themselves, either by joining his enemies, or making a diversion in his dominions; that in such a situation he could not avoid having recourse to the only means which were left him for preventing his inevitable ruin, by putting it out of the power of Saxony to increase the number of his enemies. He asserted, that all the measures he had pursued in that electorate were but the Accessary consequences of the first resolution he was forced to take for his own preservation; that he had done nothing but deprived the court of Saxony of the means of hurting him; and this had been done with all possible moderation; that the country enjoyed all the security and all the quiet which could be expected in the very midst of peace, the Prussian troops observing the most exact discipline; that all due respect was shown to the queen of Poland, who had been prevailed upon, by the most suitable representations, to suffer some papers to be taken from the paper office, of which his Prussian majesty already had copies; and thought it necessary, to ascertain the dangerous design of the Saxon ministry against him, to secure the originals; the existence and reality of which might otherwise have been denied. He observed, that every man has a right to prevent the mischief with which he is threatened, and to retort it upon its author; and that neither the constitutions nor the laws of the empire could obstruct the exertion of a right so superior to all others as that of self-preservation and self-defence; especially when the depository of these laws is so closely united to the enemy, as manifestly to abuse his power in her favour.

But the most important step which his Prussian majesty took in his own justification, was that of publishing another memorial, specifying the conduct of the courts of Vienna and Saxony, and their dangerous designs against his person and interest, together with the original documents adduced as proofs of these sinister intentions. As a knowledge of these pieces is requisite to form a distinct idea of the motives which produced the dreadful war upon the continent, it will not be amiss to usher the substance of them to the reader’s acquaintance. His Prussian majesty affirms, that to arrive at the source of the vast plan upon which the courts of Vienna and Saxony had been employed against him ever since the peace of Dresden, we must trace it as far back as the war which preceded this peace; that the fond hopes which the two allied courts had conceived upon the success of the campaign in the year one thousand seven hundred and forty-four, gave occasion to a treaty of eventual partition, stipulating that the court of Vienna should possess the duchy of Silesia and the county of Glatz; while the king of Poland, elector of Saxony, should share the duchies of Magdeburgh and Croissen; the circles of Zullichow and Swibus, together with the Prussian part of Lusatia; that after the peace of Dresden, concluded in the year one thousand seven hundred and forty-five, there was no further room for a treaty of this nature; yet the court of Vienna proposed to that of Saxony a new alliance, in which the treaty of eventual partition should be renewed; but this last thought it necessary, in the first place, to give a greater consistency to their plan, by grounding it upon an alliance between the empress-queen and the czarina. Accordingly, these two powers did, in fact, conclude a defensive alliance at Petersburgh in the course of the ensuing year; but the body, or ostensible part of this treaty, was composed merely with a view to conceal from the knowledge of the public six secret articles, the fourth of which was levelled singly against Prussia, according to the exact copy of it which appeared among the documents. In this article, the empress-queen of Hungary and Bohemia sets out with a protestation, that she will religiously observe the treaty of Dresden; but explains her real way of thinking upon the subject, a little lower, in the following terms: “If the king of Prussia should be the first to depart from this peace, by attacking either her majesty the empress-queen of Hungary and Bohemia, or her majesty the empress of Russia, or even the republic of Poland; in all these cases, the rights of the empress-queen to Silesia and the county of Glatz would again take place, and recover their full effect; the two contracting parties should mutually assist each other with sixty thousand men to achieve these conquests.” The king observes upon this article, that every war which can arise between him and Russia, or the republic of Poland, would be looked upon as a manifest infraction of the peace of Dresden, and a revival of the rights of the house of Austria to Silesia; though neither Russia nor the republic of Poland is at all concerned in the treaty of Dresden; and though the latter, with which the king lived in the most intimate friendship, was not even in alliance with the court of Vienna; that, according to the principles of the law of nature, received among all civilized nations, the most the court of Vienna could be authorized to do in such cases, would be to send those succours to her allies which are due to them by treaties, without her having the least pretence on that account, to free herself from the particular engagements subsisting between her and the king: he appealed, therefore, to the judgment of the impartial world, whether in this secret article the contracting powers had kept within the bounds of a defensive alliance; or whether this article did not rather contain a plan of an offensive alliance against the king of Prussia. He affirmed it was obvious, from this article, that the court of Vienna had prepared three pretences for the recovery of Silesia; and that she thought to attain her end, either by provoking the king to commence hostilities against her, or to kindle a war between his majesty and Russia, by her secret intrigues and machinations. He alleged that the court of Saxony, being invited to accede to this alliance, eagerly accepted the invitation; furnished its ministers at Petersburgh with full powers for that purpose; and ordered them to declare that their master was not only ready to accede to the treaty itself, but also to the secret article against Prussia; and to join in the regulations made by the two courts, provided effectual measures should be taken, as well for the security of Saxony, as for its indemnification and recompence, in proportion to the efforts and progress that might be made; that the court of Dresden declared, if upon any fresh attack from the king of Prussia, the empress-queen should, by their assistance, not only reconquer Silesia and the county of Gratz, but also reduce him within narrow bounds, the king of Poland, as elector of Saxony, would abide by the partition formerly stipulated between him and the empress-queen. He also declared that count Loss, the Saxon minister at Vienna, was charged to open a private negotiation for Settling an eventual partition of the conquest which might be made on Prussia, by laying down, as the basis of it, the treaty of Leipsic, signed on the eighteenth day of May, in the year one thousand seven hundred and forty-five, as would appear by the documents affixed. He owned it had been supposed, through the whole of this negotiation, that the king of Prussia should be the aggressor against the court of Vienna; but he insisted, that even in this case the king of Poland could have no right to make conquests on his Prussian majesty. He likewise acknowledged, that the court of Saxony had not yet acceded in form to the treaty of Petersburgh; but he observed, its allies were given to understand again and again, that it was ready to accede without restriction, whenever this could be done without risk; and the advantages to be gained should be secured in its favour. Circumstances proved by divers authentic documents, particularly by a letter from count Fleming to count de Bruhl, informing him that count Uhlefield had charged him to represent afresh to his court, that they could not take too secure measures against the ambitious views of the king of Prussia; that Saxony in particular ought to be cautious, as being the most exposed; that it was of the highest importance to strengthen their old engagements, upon the footing proposed by the late count de Harrach, in the year one thousand seven hundred and forty-five; a step which might be taken on occasion of his Polish majesty’s accession to the treaty of Petersburgh. The answer of count Bruhl to this despatch imported, that the king of Poland was not averse to treat in the utmost secrecy with the court of Vienna about succours, by private and confidential declarations relating to the fourth secret article of the treaty of Petersburgh, on condition of reasonable terms and advantages, which in this case ought to be granted to his majesty. He quoted other despatches to prove the unwillingness of his Polish majesty to declare himself until the king of Prussia should be attacked, and his forces divided; and that this scruple was admitted by the allies of Saxony. From these premises he deduced this inference, that the court of Dresden, without having acceded in form to the treaty of Petersburgh, was not less an accomplice in the dangerous designs which the court of Vienna had grounded upon this treaty; and that having been dispensed with from a formal concurrence, it had only waited for that moment when it might, without running any great risk, conquer in effect, and share the spoils of its neighbour. In expectation of this period, he said, the Austrian and Saxon ministers laboured in concert and underhand with the more ardour to bring the casus fæderus into existence; for it being laid down as a principle in the treaty, that any war whatever between him and Russia would authorise the empress-queen to take Silesia, there was nothing more to be done but to kindle such a war; for which purpose no method was found more proper than that of embroiling the king with the empress of Russia; and to provoke that princess with all sorts of false insinuations, impostures, and the most atrocious calumnies, in laying to his majesty’s charge a variety of designs, sometimes against Russia, and even the person of the czarina; sometimes views upon Poland, and sometimes intrigues in Sweden. By these and other such contrivances, he affirmed they had kindled the animosity of the empress to such a degree, that in a council held in the month of October, in the year one thousand seven hundred and fifty-three, she had resolved to attack the king of Prussia, without any further discussion, whether he should fall upon any of the allies of Russia, or one of them should begin with him; a resolution which for that time was frustrated by their want of seamen and magazines; but the preparations were continued under pretence of keeping themselves in a condition to fulfil their engagements, contracted in the last subsidiary convention with England; and when all were finished, the storm would fall on the king of Prussia.

This is the substance of that famous memorial published by his Prussian majesty, to which the justifying pieces or authentic documents were annexed; and to which a circumstantial answer was exhibited by the partisans of her imperial majesty. Specious reasons may, doubtless, be adduced on either side of almost any dispute, by writers of ingenuity; but, in examining this contest, it must be allowed that both sides adopted illicit practices. The empress-queen and the elector of Saxony had certainly a right to form defensive treaties for their own preservation; and without all doubt, it was their interest and their duty to secure themselves from the enterprises of such a formidable neighbour; but at the same time, the contracting parties seem to have carried their views much farther than defensive measures. Perhaps the court of Vienna considered the cession of Silesia as a circumstance altogether compulsive, and therefore not binding against the rights of natural equity. She did not at all doubt that the king of Prussia would be tempted by his ambition and great warlike power, to take some step which might be justly interpreted into an infraction of the treaty of Dresden; and in that case she was determined to avail herself of the confederacy she had formed, that she might retrieve the countries she had lost by the unfortunate events of the last war, as well as bridle the dangerous power and disposition of the Prussian monarch; and in all probability the king of Poland, over and above the same consideration, was desirous of some indemnification for the last irruption into his electoral dominions, and the great sums he had paid for the subsequent peace. Whether they were authorised by the law of nature and nations to make reprisals by an actual partition of the countries they might conquer, supposing him to be the aggressor, we shall not pretend to determine; but it does not at all appear, that his Prussian majesty’s danger was such as entitled him to take those violent steps which he now attempted to justify. By this time the flame of war was kindled up to a blaze that soon filled the empire with ruin and desolation; and the king of Prussia had drawn upon himself the resentment of the three greatest powers of Europe, who laid aside their former animosities, and every consideration of that balance which it had cost such blood and treasure to preserve, in order to conspire his destruction. The king himself could not but foresee this confederacy, and know the power it might exert; but probably he confided so much in the number, the valour, and discipline of his troops; in the skill of his officers; in his own conduct and activity; that he hoped to crush the house of Austria by one rapid endeavour at the latter end of the season, or at least establish himself in Bohemia, before her allies could move to her assistance. In this hope, however, he was disappointed by the vigilance of the Austrian councils. He found the empress-queen in a condition to make head against him in every avenue to her dominions; and in a fair way of being assisted by the circles of the empire. He saw himself threatened with the vengeance of the Russian empress, and the sword of France gleaming over his head, without any prospect of assistance but that which he might derive from his alliance with Great Britain. Thus the king of England exchanged the alliance of Russia, who was his subsidiary, and the friendship of the empress queen, his old and natural ally, for a new connexion with his Prussian majesty, who could neither act as an auxiliary to Great Britain, nor as a protector to Hanover; and for this connexion, the advantage of which was merely negative, such a price was paid by England as had never been given by any other potentate of Europe, even for services of the greatest importance.

GEORGE II. 1727-1760