KING OF PRUSSIA DEFEATED AT KOLIN.

On the thirteenth day of June, the king of Prussia quitted the camp before Prague, escorted by a few battalions and squadrons, with which he joined the prince of Bevern at Milkowitz, Mareschal Keith, it is said, strenuously opposed this measure, and advised either raising the siege entirely, and attacking the Austrians with the united forces of Prussia, or postponing the attack on the camp at Kolin, until his majesty should either gain possession of the city, or some attempts should be made to oblige him to quit his posts. From either measure an advantage would have resulted. With his whole army he might probably have defeated count Daun, or at least have obliged him to retreat. Had he continued within his lines at Prague, the Austrian general could not have constrained him to raise the siege without losing his own advantageous situation, and giving battle upon terms nearly equal. But the king, elated with success, impetuous in his valour, and confident of the superiority of his own troops in point of discipline, thought all resistance must sink under the weight of his victorious arm, and yield to that courage which had already surmounted such difficulties, disregarded the mareschal’s sage counsel, and inarched up to the attack undaunted, and even assured of success. By the eighteenth the two armies were in sight, and his majesty found that count Daun had not only fortified his camp with all the heavy cannon of Olmutz, but was strongly reinforced with troops from Moravia and Austria, which had joined him after the king’s departure from Prague. He found the Austrians drawn up in three lines upon the high grounds between Gen-litz, and St. John the Baptist. Difficult as it was to approach their situation, the Prussian infantry marched up with firmness, while shot was poured like hail from the enemy’s batteries, and began the attack about three in the afternoon. They drove the Austrians with irresistible intrepidity from two eminences secured with heavy cannon, and two villages defended by several battalions; but, in attacking the third eminence, were flanked by the Austrian cavalry, by grape-shot poured from the batteries; and, after a violent conflict, and prodigious loss of men, thrown into disorder. Animated with the king’s presence, they rallied, and returned with double ardour to the charge, but were a second time repulsed. Seven times successively did prince Ferdinand renew the attack, performing every duty of a great general and valiant soldier, though always with the same fortune. The inferiority of the Prussian infantry, the disadvantages of ground, where the cavalry could not act, the advantageous situation of the enemy, their numerous artillery, their intrenchments, numbers, and obstinacy, joined to the skill and conduct of their general, all conspired to defeat the hopes of the Prussians, to surmount their valour, and oblige them to retreat. The king then made a last and furious effort, at the head of the cavalry, on the enemy’s left wing, but with as little success as all the former attacks. Every effort was made, and every attempt was productive only of greater losses and misfortunes. At last, after exposing his person in the most perilous situations, his Prussian majesty drew off his forces from the field of battle, retiring in such good order, in sight of the enemy, as prevented a pursuit, or the loss of his artillery and baggage. Almost all the officers on either side distinguished themselves; and count Daun, whose conduct emulated that of his Prussian majesty, received two slight wounds, and had a horse killed under him. The losses of both armies were very considerable; on that of the Prussians, the killed and wounded amounted to eight thousand; less pernicious, however, to his majesty’s cause than the frequent desertion, and other innumerable ill consequences that ensued.

When the Prussian army arrived at Nimburgh, his majesty, leaving the command with the prince of Be-vern, took horse, and, escorted by twelve or fourteen hussars, set out for Prague, where he arrived next morning without halting, after having been the whole preceding day on horseback. Immediately he gave orders for sending off all his artillery, ammunition, and baggage; these were executed with so much expedition, that the tents were struck, and the army on their march, before the garrison were informed of the king’s defeat. Thus terminated the battle of Kolin and siege of Prague, in which the acknowledged errors of his Prussian majesty were, in some measure, atoned by the candour with which he owned his mistake, both in a letter to the earl mareschal, 419 [See note 3 I, at the end of this Vol.] and in conversation with several of his general officers. Most people, indeed, imagined the king highly blameable for checking the ardour of his troops to stop and lay siege to Prague. They thought he should have pursued his conquests, over-run Austria, Moravia, and all the hereditary dominions, from which alone the empress-queen could draw speedy succours. A body of twenty or thirty thousand men would have blocked up Prague, while the remainder of the Prussian forces might have obliged the imperial family to retire from Vienna, and effectually prevented count Daun from assembling another army. It was universally expected he would have bent his march straight to this capital; but he dreaded leaving the numerous army in Prague behind, and it was of great importance to complete the conquest of Bohemia. The prince of Prussia marched all night with his corps to Nimburgh, where he joined the prince of Bevern, and mareschal Keith retreated next day. Count Brown having died before, of the wounds he received on the sixth of May, prince Charles of Lorraine sallied out with a large body of Austrians, and attacked the rear of the Prussians; but did no further mischief than killing about two hundred of their men. The siege of Prague being thus raised, the imprisoned Austrians received their deliverer, count Daun, with inexpressible joy, and their united forces became greatly superior to those of the king of Prussia, who was in a short time obliged to evacuate Bohemia, and take refuge in Saxony. The Austrians harassed him as much as possible in his retreat; but their armies, though superior in numbers, were not in a condition, from their late sufferings, to make any decisive attempt upon him, as the frontiers of Saxony abound with situations easily defended.