As to the naval transactions in this country, though less infamous, they were not less unfortunate. Immediately on lord Loudon’s departure from Halifax, admiral Holbourn, now freed from the care of the transports, set sail for Louisbourg, with fifteen ships of the line, one ship of fifty guns, three small frigates, and a fire-ship. What the object of this cruise might have been can only be conjectured. Some imagine curiosity was the admiral’s sole motive, and the desire of informing himself with certainty of the enemy’s strength, while others persuade themselves that he was in hopes of drawing M. de la Mothe to an engagement, notwithstanding his superiority in number of ships and weight of metal. Be this as it may, the British squadron appeared off Louisbourg on the twentieth day of August, and approaching within two miles of the batteries, saw the French admiral make the signal to unmoor. Mr. Holbourn was greatly inferior in strength, and it is obvious that his design was not to fight the enemy, as he immediately made the best of his way to Halifax. About the middle of September, being reinforced with four ships of the line, he again proceeded to Louisbourg, probably with intention, if possible, to draw the enemy to an engagement; but he found de la Mothe too prudent to hazard an unnecessary battle, the loss of which would have greatly exposed all the French colonies. Here the English squadron continued cruising until the twenty-fifth, when they were overtaken by a terrible storm from the southward. When the hurricane began, the fleet were about forty leagues distant from Louisbourg; but were driven in twelve hours within two miles of the rocks and breakers on that coast, when the wind providentially shifted. The ship Tilbury was wrecked upon the rocks, and half her crew drowned. Eleven ships were dismasted, others threw their guns overboard; and all returned in a very shattered condition to England, at a very unfavourable season of the year. In this manner ended the expedition to Louisbourg, more unfortunate to the nation than the preceding designs upon Rochefort; less disgraceful to the commanders, but equally the occasion of ridicule and triumph to our enemies. Indeed, the unhappy consequences of the political disputes at home, the instability of the administration, and the frequent revolutions in our councils, were strongly manifested by that langour infused into all our military operations, and general unsteadiness in our pursuits. Faction, in the mother-country, produced divisions and misconduct in the colonies. No ambition to signalize themselves appeared among the officers, from the uncertainty whether their services were to be rewarded or condemned. Their attachment to particular persons weakened the love they ought to have entertained for their country in general, and destroyed that spirit of enterprise, that firmness and resolution which constitutes the commander, and without which the best capacity, joined to the most uncorruptible integrity, can effect nothing.
The French king not only exerted himself against the English in America, but even extended his operations to their settlements in Africa, where he sent one of his naval commanders with a small squadron, to reduce. This gentleman, whose name was Kersin, had scoured the coast of Guinea, and made prize of several English trading ships; but his chief aim was to reduce the castle at Cape-coast, of which, had he gained possession, the other subordinate forts would have submitted without opposition. When Mr. Bell, the governor of this castle, received intelligence that M. de Kersin was a few leagues to windward, and certainly intended to attack Cape-coast, his whole garrison did not exceed thirty white men, exclusive of a few mulatto soldiers: his stock of ammunition was reduced to half a barrel of gunpowder; and his fortifications were so crazy and inconsiderable, that, in the opinion of the best engineers, they could not have sustained for twenty minutes the fire of one great ship, had it been properly directed and maintained. In these circumstances, few people would have dreamed of making any preparation for defence; but Mr. Bell entertained other sentiments, and acquitted himself with equal courage and discretion. He forthwith procured a supply of gunpowder, and a reinforcement of about fifty men, from certain trading vessels that happened to be upon that part of the coast. He mounted some spare cannon upon an occasional battery, and assembling a body of twelve hundred negroes, well armed, under the command of their chief, on whose attachment he could depend, and ordered them to take post at the place where he apprehended the enemy would attempt a landing. These precautions were hardly taken, when the French squadron, consisting of two ships of the line and a large frigate, appeared, and in a little time their attack began; but they met with such a warm reception, that in less than two hours they desisted, leaving the castle very little damaged, and immediately made sail for the West Indies, very much to the disappointment and mortification of the Dutch officers belonging to the fort of Elmina, in the same neighbourhood, who made no scruple of expressing their wishes publicly in favour of the French commodore, and at a distance viewed the engagement with the most partial eagerness and impatience. M. de Kersin was generally blamed for his want of conduct and resolution in this attempt; but he is said to have been deceived in his opinion of the real state of Capecoast castle, by the vigorous and resolute exertions of the governor, and was apprehensive of losing a mast in the engagement; a loss which he could not have repaired on the whole coast of Africa. Had the fort of Cape-coast been reduced on this occasion, in all probability every petty republic of the negroes, settled under the protection of the forts on the Gold-coast, would have revolted from the British interest; for while the French squadron, in their progress along-shore, hovered in the offing at Annamaboe, an English settlement a few leauges to leeward of Cape-coast, John Corrantee, the caboceiro, chief magistrate and general of the blacks on that part of the coast, whose adopted son had a few years before been caressed, and even treated as a prince in England, taking it for granted that this enterprise of the French would be attended with success, actually sent some of his dependants, with a present of refreshments for their commodore; the delivery of which, however, was prevented by Mr. Brew, the English chief of the fort, who shattered in pieces the canoe before it could be launched, and threatened with his cannon to level the black town with the dust. The caboceiro, though thus anticipated in his design, resolved to be among the first who should compliment M. de Kersin on his victory at Cape-coast; and, with this view, prepared an embassy or deputation to go there by land; but understanding that the French had failed in their attempt, he shifted his design, without the least hesitation, and despatched the same embassy to Mr. Bell, whom he congratulated on his victory, assuring him he had kept his men ready armed, to march at the first summons to his assistance.
GEORGE II. 1727-1760