The incidents of the war were much more important and decisive in the more northern parts of this great continent. The reader will remember that brigadier-general Murray was left to command the garrison of Quebec, amounting to about six thousand men; that a strong squadron of ships was stationed at Halifax, in Nova-Scotia, under the direction of lord Colville, an able and experienced officer, who had instructions to revisit Quebec in the beginning of summer, as soon as the river St. Laurence should be navigable; and that general Amherst, the commander-in-chief of the forces in America, wintered in New-York, that he might be at hand to assemble his troops in the spring, and re-commence his operations for the entire reduction of Canada. General Murray neglected no step that could be taken by the most vigilant officer for maintaining the important conquest of Quebec, and subduing all the Lower Canada; the inhabitants of which actually submitted, and took the oath of allegiance to the king of Great Britain. 550 [See note 4 M, at the end of this Vol.] The garrison., however, within the walls of Quebec, suffered greatly from the excessive cold in the winter, and the want of vegetables and fresh provisions; insomuch that, before the end of April, one thousand soldiers were dead of the scurvy, and twice that number rendered unfit for service. Such was the situation of the garrison, when Mr. Murray received undoubted intelligence that the French commander, the chevalier de Levis, was employed in assembling his army, which had been cantoned in the neighbourhood of Montreal; that from the inhabitants of the country he had completed his eight battalions, regimented forty companies of the troops de Colonie, and determined to undertake the siege of Quebec, whenever the river St. Laurence should be so clear of ice that he could use his four frigates, and other vessels, by means of which he was entirely master of the river.
The brigadier, considering the city of Quebec as no other than a strong cantonment, had projected a plan of defence, by extending lines, and intrenching his troops on the heights of Abraham, which at the distance of eight hundred paces, entirely commanded the ramparts of the city, and might have been defended by a small force against a formidable army. Fascines, and every other necessary for this work, had been provided; and in the month of April the men were set at work upon the projected lines: but the earth was so hardened by the frost, that it was found impracticable to proceed. Being informed on the night of the twenty-sixth, that the enemy had landed at Point-au-Tremble, to the number of ten thousand men, with five hundred savages, he ordered all the bridges over the river Cape Rouge to be broken down, secured the landing places at Sylleri and the Foulon; and next day, marching in person with a strong detachment, and two field-pieces, took possession of an advantageous situation, and thus defeated the scheme which the French commander had laid for cutting off the posts which the English had established. These being all withdrawn, the brigadier that same afternoon marched back to Quebec, with little or no loss, although his rear was harassed by the enemy. Here he formed a resolution which hath been censured by some critics in war, as a measure that savoured more of youthful impatience and overboiling courage than of that military discretion which ought to distinguish a commander in such a delicate situation; but it is more easy to censure with an appearance of reason, than to act in such circumstances with any certainty of success. Mr. Murray, in his letter to the secretary of state, declared, that, although the enemy were greatly superior to him in number, yet, when he considered that the English forces were habituated to victory, that they were provided with a fine train of field-artillery; that, in shutting them at once within the walls, he should have risked his whole stake on the single chance of defending a wretched fortification; a chance which could not be much lessened by an action in the field, though such an action would double the chance of success: for these reasons he determined to hazard a battle; should the event prove unprosperous, he resolved to hold out the place to the last extremity; then to retreat to the Isle of Orleans, or Coudres, with the remainder of the garrison, and there wait for a reinforcement. In pursuance of these resolutions he gave the necessary orders over night; and on the twenty-eighth day of April, at half an hour after six in the morning, marched out with his little army of three thousand men, which he formed on the heights in order of battle. The right brigade, commanded by colonel Burton, consisted of the regiments of Amherst, Anstruther, Webb, and the second battalion of Royal Americans; the left, under colonel Fraser, was formed of the regiments of Kennedy, Lascelles, Town-shend, and the Highlanders. Otway’s regiment, and the third battalion of Royal Americans, constituted the corps de reserve. Major Dalling’s corps of light infantry covered the right flank; the left was secured by captain Huzzen’s company of rangers, and one hundred volunteers, under the command of captain Donald Mac-donald; and each battalion was supplied with two field-pieces. Brigadier Murray, having reconnoitred the enemy, perceived their van had taken possession of the rising grounds about three quarters of a mile in his front; but that their army was on the march in one column. Thinking this was the critical moment to attack them before they were formed, he advanced towards them with equal order and expedition. They were soon driven from the heights, though not without a warm dispute; during which the body of their army advanced at a round pace, and formed in columns. Their van consisted of ten companies of grenadiers, two of volunteers, and four hundred savages; eight battalions, formed in four columns, with some bodies of Canadians in the intervals, constituted their main body; their rear was composed of two battalions, and some Canadians in the flanks; and two thousand Canadians formed the reserve. Their whole army amounted to upwards of twelve thousand men. Major Balling, with great gallantry, dispossessed their grenadiers of a house and windmill which they occupied, in order to cover their left flank; and in this attack the major and some of his officers were wounded: nevertheless, the light infantry pursued the fugitives to a corps which was formed to sustain them; then the pursuers halted, and dispersed along the front of the right; a circumstance which prevented that wing from taking advantage of the first impression they had made on the left of the enemy. The light infantry, being ordered to regain the flank, were, in attempting this motion, furiously charged, and thrown into disorder: then they retired to the rear in such a shattered condition, that they could never again be brought up during the whole action. Otway’s regiment was instantly ordered to advance from the body of the reserve, and sustain the right wing, which the enemy twice in vain attempted to penetrate. Meanwhile the left brigade of the British forces did not remain inactive: they had dispossessed the French of two redoubts, and sustained with undaunted resolution the whole efforts of the enemy’s right, until they were fairly fought down, overpowered by numbers, and reduced to a handful, notwithstanding the assistance they received from the third battalion of Royal Americans, which had been stationed with the body of the reserve, as well as from Kennedy’s regiment, posted in the centre. The French attacked with great impetuosity; and at length a fresh column of the regiment de Rousillon penetrating the left wing of the British army, it gave way; the disorder was soon communicated to the right; so that after a very obstinate dispute, which lasted an hour and three quarters, brigadier Murray was obliged to quit the field, with the loss of one thousand men killed or wounded, and the greater part of his artillery. The enemy lost twice the number of men and reaped no essential advantage from their victory.