CONDUCT OF THE KING OF DENMARK.

With respect to the war that raged in Germany, the king of Denmark wisely pursued that course, which happily preserved him from being involved in those troubles by which great part of Europe was agitated, and terminated in that point of national advantage which a king ought ever to have in view for the benefit of his people. By observing a scrupulous neutrality, he enhanced his importance among his neighbours: he saw himself courted by all the belligerent powers: he saved the blood and treasure of his subjects: he received large subsidies, in consideration of his forbearance; and enjoyed, unmolested, a much more considerable share of commerce than he could expect to carry on, even in times of universal tranquillity. He could not perceive that the protestant religion had anything to apprehend from the confederacy which was formed against the Prussian monarch; nor was he misled into all the expense, the perils, and disquiets of a sanguinary war, by that ignis fatuus which hath seduced and impoverished other opulent nations, under the specious title of the balance of power in Germany. Howsoever he might be swayed by private inclination, he did not think it was a point of consequence to his kingdom, whether Pomeranians possessed by Sweden or Prussia; whether the French army was driven back beyond the Rhine, or penetrated once more into the electorate of Hanover: whether the empress-queen was stripped of her remaining possessions in Silesia, or the king of Prussia circumscribed within the original bounds of his dominion. He took it for granted that France, for her own sake, would prevent the ruin of that enterprising monarch; and that the house of Austria would not be so impolitic and blind to its own interest, as to permit the empress of Russia to make and retain conquests in the empire; but even if these powers should be weak enough to sacrifice all the maxims of sound policy to caprice or resentment, he did not think himself so deeply concerned in the event, as for the distant, prospect of what might possibly happen, to plunge headlong into a war that must be attended with certain and immediate disadvantages. True it is, he had no hereditary electorate in Germany that was threatened with invasion; nor, if he had, is it to be supposed that a prince of his sagacity and patriotism would have impoverished his kingdom of Denmark, for the precarious defence of a distant territory. It was reserved for another nation to adopt the pernicious absurdity of wasting its blood and treasure, exhausting its revenues, loading its own back with the most grievous impositions, incurring an enormous debt, big with bankruptcy and ruin; in a word, of expending above an hundred and fifty millions sterling in fruitless efforts to defend a distant country, the entire property of which was never valued at one twentieth part of that sum; a country with which it had no natural connexion, but a common alliance arising from accident. The king of Denmark, though himself a prince of the empire, and possessed of dominions in Germany almost contiguous to the scenes of the present war, did not yet think himself so nearly concerned in the issue, as to declare himself either principal or auxiliary in the quarrel; yet he took care to maintain his forces by sea and land upon a respectable footing; and by this conduct, he not only provided for the security of his own country, but overawed the belligerent powers, who considered him as a prince capable of making either scale preponderate, just as he might choose to trim the balance. Thus he preserved his wealth, commerce, and consequence undiminished; and instead of being harassed as a party, was honoured as an umpire.

The United Provinces, though as adverse as his Danish majesty to any participation in the war, did not, however, so scrupulously observe the neutrality they professed; at least, the traders of that republic, either from an inordinate thirst of lucre, or a secret bias in favour of the enemies of Great Britain, assisted the French commerce with all the appearance of the most flagrant partiality. We have, in the beginning of this year’s transactions, observed, that a great number of their ships were taken by the English cruisers, and condemned as legal prizes for having French property on board: that the Dutch merchants, exasperated by their losses, exclaimed against the English as pirates and robbers, petitioned the states for redress in very high terms, and even loudly clamoured for a war against Great Britain. The charge of violence and injustice, which they brought against the English for taking and confiscating the ships that transported to Europe the produce of the French islands in the West Indies, they founded on the tenth article of the treaty of commerce between Great Britain and the states-general of the United Provinces, concluded in the year one thousand six hundred and sixty-eight, stipulating, “That whatever shall be found on board the ships of the subjects of the United Provinces, though the lading, or part thereof, may belong to the enemies of Great Britain, shall be free and unmolested, except these be prohibited goods, which are to be served in the manner described by the foregoing articles.” From this article the Dutch merchants argued, that, if there be no prohibited goods on board, the English had no right to stop or molest any of their ships, or make the least inquiry to whom the merchandise belonged, whence it was brought, or whither bound. This plea the English casuists would by no means admit, for the following reasons,—a general and perpetual license to carry on the whole trade of their enemy would be such a glaring absurdity, as no convention could authorize: common sense has dictated, and Grotius declared, that no man can be supposed to have consented to an absurdity; therefore, the interpretation given by the Dutch to this article, could not be supposed to be its true and genuine meaning; which, indeed, relates to nothing more than the common course of trade, as it was usually carried on in time of peace. But even should this interpretation be accepted, the article, and the treaty itself, would be superseded and annulled by a subsequent treaty, concluded between the two nations in the year one thousand six hundred and seventy-five, and often confirmed since that period, stipulating, in a secret article, that neither of the contracting parties should give, nor consent, that any of their subjects and inhabitants should give any aid, favour, or counsel, directly or indirectly, by land or sea, or on the fresh waters; nor should furnish, or permit the subjects or inhabitants of their respective territories to furnish, any ships, soldiers, seamen, victuals, monies, instruments of war, gunpowder, or any other necessaries for making war, to the enemies of either party, of any rank or condition soever. Now, the Dutch have infringed this article in many instances during the present war, both in Europe and America; and, as they have so openly contravened one treaty, the English are not obliged to observe another. They, moreover, forfeited all right to the observance of the treaty in question, by refusing the succours with which they were bound, in the most solemn manner, to furnish the king of Great Britain, in case any of his territories in Europe should be attacked: for nothing could be more weak and frivolous than the allegation upon which this refusal was founded, namely, that the hostilities in Europe were commenced by the English, when they seized and confiscated the vessels of France; and they, being the aggressors, had no right to insist upon the succours stipulated in a treaty which was purely defensive. If this argument has any weight, the treaty itself can have no signification. The French, as in the present case, will always commence the war in America; and when their ships, containing reinforcements and stores for the maintenance of that war, shall be taken on the European seas, perhaps in consequence of their being exposed for that purpose, they will exclaim that the English were the aggressors in Europe, consequently deprived of all benefit accruing from the defensive treaty subsisting between them and the states-general of the United Provinces. It being impossible for the English to terminate the war, while their enemies derive the sinews of it from their commerce carried on in neutral bottoms, they are obliged to suppress such collusions, by that necessity which Grotius himself hath allowed to be a sufficient excuse for deviating from the letter of any treaty whatsoever. In time of peace no Dutch ships were permitted to carry the produce of any French sugar island, or even to trade in any of the French ports in America or the West Indies; consequently, the treaty which they quote can never justify them in carrying on a commerce, which, as it did not exist, and was not foreseen, could not possibly be guarded against when that convention was ratified. Grotius, whose authority is held in such veneration among the Dutch, has determined that every nation has a right to seize and confiscate the goods of any neutral power, which shall attempt to carry them into any place which is blocked up by that nation, either by land or sea. The French islands in the West Indies were so blocked up by the English cruisers, that they could receive no relief from their own government, consequently no neutral power could attempt to supply them without falling under this predicament.*

* In the reign of king William, when the English and Dutch
were engaged in a war against France, the northern powers of
Sweden and Denmark attempted to carry on the French
commerce, under the shade of neutrality; but the Dutch and
English joined in seizing the vessels that were thus
employed. Complaints of these captures were made at London
and the Hague, and the complainants were given to understand
at both places, that they should not be allowed to carry on
any trade with France, but what was usual in time of peace.
In consequence of this declaration, Mr. Groning formed the
design of writing a treatise on the freedom of navigation,
and communicated the plan of his work to the celebrated
Puffendorff, who signified his sentiments in a letter, which
is preserved by the learned Barbeyrac in his notes upon
that author’s treatise on the Law of Nature and Nations.

It was for these reasons that the king of England declared, by the mouth of Mr. Yorke, his minister plenipotentiary at the Hague, in a conference held in the mouth of August with the deputies of the states-general, that though he was ready to concur in every measure that should be proposed for giving satisfaction to their high mightinesses, with whom he had always studied to live in the most perfect union, he was nevertheless determined not to suffer the trade of the French colonies in America to be carried on by the subjects of other powers, under the specious pretext of neutrality: nor to permit words to be interpreted as a license to drive a trade with his enemies, which, though not particularly specified in the articles of contraband, was nevertheless rendered such in all respects, and in every sense, by the nature of the circumstances. It is not at all more surprising that the Dutch merchants should complain, than that the English government should persist in confiscating the ships that were found to contain the merchandise of their enemies. The individual traders of every mercantile nation will run considerable risks in extending their particular commerce, even when they know it must be detrimental to the general interest of their country. In the war maintained by the confederates against Louis XIV. of France, the merchant ships of the Dutch carried on an uninterrupted trade to the French ports; and, notwithstanding the repeated solicitations of England, the states-general could never be prevailed upon to prohibit this commerce, which undoubtedly enabled France to protract the war. The truth is, they gave the British ministry to understand, that unless they connived at this traffic, their subjects could not possibly defray their proportion of the expense at which the war was maintained. It is well known through all Europe, that the subjects of the United Provinces reaped considerable advantage, not only from this branch of illicit trade, but also by providing for both armies in Flanders, and by the practice of stock-jobbing in England; consequently, it was not the interest, either of the states-general, or the English general, between whom there was a very good understanding, to bring that war to a speedy conclusion: nor indeed ought we to fix the imputation of partiality upon a whole nation, for the private conduct of individuals, influenced by motives of self-interest, which co-operate with the same energy in Holland, and among the subjects of Great Britain. In the course of the former war, such a scandalous appetite for gain prevailed in different parts of the British dominions, that the French islands were actually supplied with provisions, slaves, and lumber, from Ireland and the British colonies in North America; and Martinique, in particular, must have surrendered to the commander of the English squadron stationed in those seas, had it not been thus supported by English subjects. Certain it is, the Dutch had some reason to complain that they were decoyed into this species of traffic by the article of a treaty, which, in their opinion, admitted of no limitation; and that the government of Great Britain, without any previous warning, or explaining its sentiments on this subject, swept the sea at once of all their vessels employed in this commerce, and condemned them, without mitigation, to the entire ruin of many thousand families. Considering the intimate connexion of mutual interest subsisting between Great Britain and the states of the United Provinces, they seem to have had some right to an intimation of this nature, which, in all probability, would have induced them to resign all prospect of advantage from the prosecution of such traffic.

GEORGE II. 1727-1760