ADMIRAL HAWKE DEFEATS M. DE CONFLANS.

While these measures were taken with equal vigour and deliberation, sir Edward Hawke steered his course directly for Quiberon, on the coast of Bretagne, which he supposed would be the rendezvous of the French squadron: but, notwithstanding his utmost efforts, he was driven by a hard gale considerably to the westward, where he was joined by two frigates, the Maidstone and the Coventry. These he directed to keep ahead of the squadron. The weather growing more moderate, the former made the signal for seeing a fleet on the twentieth day of November, at half an hour past eight o’clock in the morning, and in an hour afterwards discovered them to be the enemy’s squadron. They were at that time in chase of captain Duff’s squadron, which now joined the large fleet, after having run some risk of being taken. Sir Edward Hawke, who, when the Maidstone gave the first notice, had formed the line abreast, now perceiving that the French admiral endeavoured to escape with all the sail he could carry, threw out a signal for seven of his ships that were nearest the enemy to chase, and endeavour to detain them, until they could be reinforced by the rest of the squadron, which were ordered to form into a line-of-battle ahead, as they chased, that no time might be lost in the pursuit. Considering the roughness of the weather, which was extremely tempestuous; the nature of the coast, which is in this place rendered very hazardous by a great number of sand-banks, shoals, rocks, and islands, as entirely unknown to the British sailors as they were familiar to the French navigators; the dangers of a short day, dark night, and lee-shore—it required extraordinary resolution in the English admiral to attempt hostilities on this occasion: but sir Edward Hawke, steeled with the integrity and fortitude of his own heart, animated by a warm love for his country, and well acquainted with the importance of the stake on which the safety of that country in a great measure depended, was resolved to run extraordinary risks in his endeavours to frustrate, at once, a boasted scheme projected for the annoyance of his fellow-subjects. With respect to his ships of the line, he had but the advantage of one in point of number, and no superiority in men or metal; consequently, M. de Conflans might have hazarded a fair battle on the open sea, without any imputation of temerity; but he thought proper to play a more artful game, though it did not succeed according to his expectation. He kept his fleet in a body, and retired close in shore, with a view to draw the English squadron among the shoals and islands, on which he hoped they would pay dear for their rashness and impetuosity, while he and his officers, who were perfectly acquainted with the navigation, could either stay and take advantage of the disaster, or, if hard pressed, retire through channels unknown to the British pilots. At half an hour after two, the van of the English fleet began the engagement with the rear of the enemy, in the neighbourhood of Belleisle. Every ship, as she advanced, poured in a broadside on the sternmost of the French, and bore down upon their van, leaving the rear to those that came after. Sir Edward Hawke, in the Royal George, of one hundred and ten guns, reserved his fire in passing through the rear of the enemy, and ordered his master to bring him alongside of the French admiral, who commanded in person on board the Soliel Royal, a ship mounted with eighty cannon, and provided with a complement of twelve hundred men. When the pilot remonstrated that he could not obey his command without the most imminent risk of running upon a shoal, the veteran replied, “You have done your duty in showing the danger; now you are to comply with my order, and lay me alongside the Soleil Royal.” His wish was gratified: the Royal George ranged up with the French admiral. The Thesée, another large ship of the enemy, running up between the two commanders, sustained the fire that was reserved for the Soliel Royal; but in returning the first broadside foundered, in consequence of the high sea that entered her lower deck-ports, and filled her with water. Notwithstanding the boisterous weather, a great number of ships on both sides fought with equal fury and dubious success, till about four in the afternoon, when the Formidable struck her colours. The Superb shared the fate of the Thésée in going to the bottom. The Hero hauled down her colours in token of submission, and dropped anchor; but the wind was so high that no boat could be sent to take possession, By this time day-light began to fail, and the greater part of the French fleet escaped under cover of the darkness. Night approaching, the wind blowing with augmented violence on a lee-shore, and the British squadron being entangled among unknown shoals and islands, sir Edward Hawke made the signal for anchoring to the westward of the small island Dumet; and here the fleet remained all night in a very dangerous riding, alarmed by the fury of the storm, and the incessant firing of guns of distress, without their knowing whether it proceeded from friend or enemy. The Soliel Royal had, under favour of the night, anchored also in the midst of the British squadron; but at day-break M. de Conflans ordered her cable to be cut, and she drove ashore to the westward of Crozie. The English admiral immediately made signal to the Essex to slip cable and pursue her; and, in obeying this order, she ran unfortunately on a sand-bank called Lefour, where the Resolution, another ship of the British squadron, was already grounded. Here they were both irrecoverably lost, in spite of all the assistance that could be given; but all their men, and part of their stores, were saved, and the wrecks were set on fire by order of the admiral. He likewise detached the Portland, Chatham, and Vengeance, to destroy the Soleil Royal, which was burned by her own people before the English ships could approach; but they arrived in time enough to reduce the Hero to ashes on the Lefour, where she had been also stranded; and the Juste, another of their great ships, perished in the mouth of the Loire. The admiral, perceiving seven large ships of the enemy riding at anchor between Point Penvas and the mouth of the river Vilaine, made the signal to weigh, in order to attack them; but the fury of the storm increased to such a degree, that he was obliged to remain at anchor, and even ordered the top-gallant masts to be struck. In the meantime, the French ships being lightened of their cannon, their officers took advantage of the flood, and a more moderate gale under the land, to enter the Vilaine, where they lay within half a mile of the entrance, protected by some occasional batteries erected on the shore, and by two large frigates moored across the mouth of the harbour. Thus they were effectually secured from any attempts of small vessels; and as for large ships, there was not water sufficient to float them within fighting distance of the enemy. On the whole, this battle, in which a very considerable number of lives was lost, may be considered as one of the most perilous and important actions that ever happened in any war between the two nations; for it not only defeated the projected invasion, which had hung menacing so long over the apprehensions of Great Britain; but it gave the finishing blow to the naval power of France, which was totally disabled from undertaking anything of consequence in the sequel.*

* During this war, the English had already taken and
destroyed twenty-seven French ships of the line, and thirty-
one frigates: two of their great ships and four frigates
perished; so that their whole loss, in this particular,
amounted to sixty-four: whereas, the loss of Great Britain
did not exceed seven sail of the line and five frigates. It
may be easily conceived how the French marine, at first
greatly inferior to the naval power of Britain, must have
been affected by this dreadful balance to its prejudice.

By this time, indeed, Thurot had escaped from Dunkirk, and directed his course to the North Sea, whither he was followed by commodore Boys, who nevertheless was disappointed in his pursuit; but the fate of that enterprising adventurer falls under the annals of the ensuing year, among the transactions of which it shall be recorded. As for sir Edward Hawke, he continued cruising off the coast of Bretagne for a considerable time after the victory he had obtained, taking particular care to block up the mouth of the river Vilaine, that the seven French ships might not escape and join M. Conflans, who made shift to reach Rochefort with the shattered remains of his squadron. Indeed, this service became such a considerable object in the eyes of the British ministry, that a large fleet was maintained upon this coast, apparently for no other purpose, during a whole year; and, after all, the enemy eluded their vigilance. Sir Edward Hawke, having undergone a long and dangerous conflict with tempestuous weather, was at length recalled, and presented to his sovereign, who gratified him with a considerable pension, for the courage and conduct he had so often and so long displayed in the service of his country; and his extraordinary merit was afterwards honoured with the approbation of the parliament. The people of France were so dispirited by the defeat of their army at Minden, and the disaster of their squadron at Lagos, that the ministry of Versailles thought proper to conceal the extent of their last misfortunes under a palliating detail published in the gazette of Paris, as a letter from M. Conflans to the count de St. Florentin, secretary of the marine. In this partial misrepresentation, their admiral was made to affirm, that the British fleet consisted of forty ships of the line of battle, besides frigates; that the Soleil Royal had obliged the Royal George to sheer off; that the seven ships which retreated into the river Vilaine had received very little damage, and would be soon repaired; and that, by the junction of Bompart’s squadron, he should be soon able to give a good account of the English admiral. These tumid assertions, so void of truth, are not to be imputed to an illiberal spirit of vain glory, so much as to a political design of extenuating the national calamity, and supporting the spirit of the people.