GENERAL WOLFE ENCAMPS NEAR THE FALLS OF THE RIVER MONTMORENCI.

The works for the security of the hospital and the stores, on the island of Orleans, being finished, the British forces crossed the north channel in boats; and, landing under cover of two sloops, encamped on the side of the river Montmorenci, which divided them from the left of the enemy. Next morning a company of rangers, posted in a wood to cover some workmen, were attacked by the French Indians, and totally defeated; however, the nearest troops advancing, repulsed the Indians in their turn with considerable loss. The reasons that induced general Wolfe to choose this situation by the Falls of Montmorenci, in which he was divided from Quebec by this and another river called St. Charles, he explained in a letter to the secretary of state. He observed, that the ground which he had chosen was high, and in some measure commanded the opposite side on which the enemy was posted: that there was a ford below the Falls passable in every tide for some hours, at the latter part of the ebb and beginning of the flood; and he hoped that means might be found of passing the river higher up, so as to fight the marquis de Montcalm upon less disadvantageous terms than those of directly attacking his intrenchments. Accordingly, in reconnoitring the river Montmorenci, a ford was discovered about three miles above; but the opposite banks, which were naturally steep and covered with woods, the enemy had intrenched in such a manner, as to render it almost inaccessible. The escort was twice attacked by the Indians, who were as often repulsed; but these rencounters cost the English about forty men killed and wounded, including some officers. Some shrewd objections might be started to the general’s choice of ground on this occasion. He could not act at all without passing the river Montmorenci at a very great disadvantage, and attacking an enemy superior to himself in number, secured by redoubts and intrenchments. Had he even, by dint of extraordinary valour, driven them from these strong posts, the success must have cost him a great number of officers and men: and the enemy might have retreated behind the river St. Charles, which he also must have passed under the same disadvantages, before he could begin his operations against the city of Quebec. Had his good fortune enabled him to surmount all these difficulties, and after all to defeat the enemy in a pitched battle, the garrison of Quebec might have been reinforced by the wreck of their army; and he could not, with any probability of success, have undertaken the siege of an extensive fortified place, which he had not troops sufficient to invest, and whose garrison would have been nearly equal in number to the sum total of the troops he commanded. At any rate, the chance of a fair engagement in the open field was what he had little reason to expect in that situation, from the known experience, and the apparent conduct, of the French general. These objections appeared so obvious and important, that general Wolfe would not determine to risk an attack, until he had surveyed the upper part of the river St. Laurence, in hopes of finding some place more favourable for a descent.

On the eighteenth day of July, the admiral, at his request, sent two ships of war, two armed sloops, and some transports with troops on board, up the river; and they passed the city of Quebec, without having sustained any damage. The general, being on board of this little armament, carefully observed the banks on the side of the enemy, which were extremely difficult from the nature of the ground; and these difficulties were redoubled by the foresight and precaution of the French commander. Though a descent seemed impracticable between the city and Cape Rouge, where it was intended, general Wolfe, in order to divide the enemy’s force, and procure intelligence, ordered a detachment, under the command of colonel Carleton, to land higher up, at the Point au Tremble, to which place he was informed a great number of the inhabitants of Quebec had retired with their most valuable effects. This service was performed with little loss; and some prisoners were brought away, but no magazine was discovered. The general, thus disappointed in his expectation, returned to Montmorenci, where brigadier Townshend had, by maintaining a superior fire across that river, prevented the enemy from erecting a battery, which would have commanded the English camp; and now he resolved to attack them, though posted to great advantage, and everywhere prepared to give him a warm reception. His design was, first to reduce a detached redoubt close to the water’s edge, seemingly situated without gunshot of the intrenchment on the hill. Should this fortification be supported by the enemy, he foresaw that he should be able to bring on a general engagement: on the contrary, should they remain tame spectators of its reduction, he could afterwards examine their situation at leisure, and determine the place at which they could be most easily attacked. Preparations were accordingly made for storming the redoubt. On the last day of July, in the forenoon, part of brigadier Monckton’s brigade was embarked in the boats of the fleet, to be transported from the Point of Levi. The two brigades, commanded by the brigadiers Townshend and Murray, were drawn out in order to pass the ford when it should be necessary. To facilitate their passage, the admiral had stationed the Centurion ship of war in the channel, to check the fire of the lower battery, by which the ford was commanded: a numerous train of artillery was placed upon the eminence, to batter and enfilade the left of the enemy’s intrenchment; and two flat-bottomed armed vessels, prepared for the purpose, were run aground near the redoubt, to favour the descent of the forces. The manifest confusion produced among the French by these previous measures, and by the fire of the Centurion, which was well-directed and sustained, determined Mr. Wolfe to storm this intrenchment without further delay. Orders were issued that the three brigadiers should put their troops in motion at a certain signal, which was accordingly made at a proper time of the tide. Many of the boats from Point Levi ran aground upon a ledge that runs off a considerable distance from the shore; and this accident occasioned a disorderly which so much time was lost, that the general was obliged to stop the march of brigadier Townshend’s corps, which he perceived to be in motion. In the meantime, the boats were floated, and ranged in proper order, though exposed to a severe fire of shot and shells; and the general in person sounding the shore, pointed out the place where the troops might disembark with the least difficulty. Thirteen companies of Grenadiers, and two hundred men of the second American battalion, were the first who landed. They had received orders to form in four distinct bodies, and begin the attack, supported by the corps of brigadier Monckton, as soon as the other troops should have passed the ford, and be near enough to contribute to their assistance. These instructions, however, were entirely neglected. Before Mr. Monckton had landed, and while brigadier Townshend was on his march at a considerable distance, the grenadiers, without waiting to be drawn up in a regular form, impetuously rushed towards the enemy’s intrenchments in the utmost disorder. Their courage served only to increase their misfortune. The first fire they received did such execution among them, that they were obliged to shelter themselves under the redoubt which the French had abandoned at their approach. In this uncomfortable situation they remained some time, unable to form under so hot a fire, notwithstanding the utmost efforts of many gallant officers, who lavishly exposed, and even lost their lives in the honourable discharge of their duty. 511 [See note 3 Y, at the end of this Vol.] The general, seeing all their efforts abortive, ordered them to retreat, and form behind Monckton’s brigade, which was by this time landed, and drawn up on the beach in order. They accordingly retired in confusion, leaving a considerable number lying on the field, to the barbarity of the Indian savages, who massacred the living, and scalped the dead, even in the sight of their indignant companions. This unhappy accident occasioned a new delay, and the day was already far advanced. The wind began to blow with uncommon violence, and the tide to make; so that in case of a second repulse, the retreat of brigadier Townshend might have been rendered hazardous and uncertain; Mr. Wolfe, therefore, thought proper to desist, and returned without further molestation to the other side of the river Montmorenci. The admiral ordered the two vessels which were aground to be set on fire, that they might not fall into the hands of the enemy. The advantages that favoured an attack in this part, consisted of the following particulars:—All the artillery could be used with good effect; all the troops could act at once; and in case of a miscarriage, the retreat was secure and open, at least for a certain time of the tide. These, however, seemed to be over-balanced by other considerations. The enemy were posted on a commanding eminence; the beach was covered with deep mud, slippery, and broken into holes and gullies; the hill was steep, and in some places impracticable; the enemy were numerous, and poured in a very severe fire from their intrenchments. Had the attack succeeded, the loss of the English must have been very heavy, and that of the French inconsiderable, because the neighbouring woods afforded them immediate shelter. Finally, the river St. Charles still remained to be passed before the town could be invested.

GEORGE II. 1727-1760

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