PLAN OF THE CAMPAIGN.

This treaty with the Indians, who had been debauched from the interest of Great Britain, auspiciously paved the way for those operations which had been projected against the French settlements in Canada. Instead of employing the whole strength of the British arms in North America against one object, the ministry proposed to divide the forces, and make impressions on three different parts at once, that the enemy might be divided, distracted, and weakened, and the conquest of Canada completed in one campaign. That the success might be the more certain, the different expeditions were planned in such a manner as to co-operate with each other, and even join occasionally; so practicable was it thought for them to maintain such a correspondence as would admit of a junction of this nature. The project of this campaign imported, that general Wolfe, who had distinguished himself so eminently in the siege of Louis-bourg, should proceed up the river St. Laurence, as soon as the navigation should be clear of ice, with a body of eight thousand men, and a considerable squadron of ships from England, to undertake the siege of Quebec, the capital of Canada: that general Amherst, who commanded in chief, should, with another army of regular troops and provincials, amounting to twelve thousand men, reduce Ticonderoga and Crown Point, cross the lake Champlain, and, proceeding along the river Richelieu to the banks of the river St. Laurence, join general Wolfe in the siege of Quebec: that brigadier-general Prideaux, with a third body, reinforced with a considerable number of friendly Indians, assembled by the influence and under the command of sir William Johnston, should invest the French fort erected at the fall or cataract of Niagara, which was certainly the most important post of all French America, as it in a manner commanded all the interior parts of that vast continent. It overawed the whole country of the Six Nations, who were cajoled into a tame acquiescence in its being built on their territory: it secured all the inland trade, the navigation of the great lakes, the communication between Canada and Louisiana, and opened a passage for inroads into the colonies of Great Britain. It was proposed that the British forces, having reduced Niagara, should be embarked on the lake Ontario, fall down the river St. Laurence, besiege and take Montreal, and then join or co-operate with Amherst’s army. Besides these larger armaments, colonel Stanwix commanded a smaller detachment for reducing smaller forts, and scouring the banks of the lake Ontario. How far this project was founded on reason and military knowledge may be judged by the following particulars, of which the projectors were not ignorant. The navigation of the river St. Laurence is dangerous and uncertain. The city of Quebec was remarkably strong from situation, and fortification, from the bravery of the inhabitants, and the number of the garrison. Monsieur de Montcalm, an officer of great courage and activity, kept the field between Montreal and Quebec, with a body of eight or ten thousand men, consisting of regular troops and disciplined militia, reinforced by a considerable number of armed Indians; and another body of reserve hovered in the neighbourhood of Montreal, which was the residence of monsieur de Vaudreuil, governor-general of Canada. The garrison of Niagara consisted of above six hundred men; the march to it was tedious and embarrassed; and monsieur de Levi scoured the country with a flying detachment, well acquainted with all the woods and passes. With respect to general Amherst’s share of the plan, the forts of Ticonderoga and Crown-Point stood in his way. The enemy were masters of the lake Champlain, and possessed the strong fort of Chambly, by the fall of the river Richelieu, which defended the pass to the river St. Laurence. Even had these obstacles been removed, it was hardly possible that he and Mr. Wolfe should arrive at Quebec in the same instant of time. The first that reached it, far from being in condition to undertake the siege of Quebec, would have run the risk of being engaged and defeated by the covering army; in which case the other body must have been exposed to the most imminent hazard of destruction, in the midst of an enemy’s country, far distant from any place of safety to which it could retreat. Had these disasters happened (and, according to the experience of war, they were the natural consequences of the scheme), the troops at Niagara would in all probability have fallen an easy sacrifice, unless they had been so fortunate as to receive intelligence in time enough to accomplish their retreat before they could be intercepted. The design would, we apprehend, have been more justifiable, or at least not so liable to objection, had Mr. Amherst left two or three regiments to protect the frontiers of New-York, and, joining Mr. Wolfe with the rest, sailed by the river St. Laurence to besiege Quebec. Even in that case the whole number of his troops would not have been sufficient, according to the practice of war, to invest the place, and cope with the covering enemy. Nevertheless, had the enterprise succeeded, Montcalm must either have hazarded an engagement against great odds, or retired farther into the country; then the route would have been open by land and water to Montreal, which could have made little resistance. The two principal towns being taken, and the navigation of the river St. Laurence blocked up, all the dependent forts must have surrendered at discretion, except Niagara, which there was a bare possibility of supplying at an incredible trouble and expense, from the distant Mississippi; but even then, it might have been besieged in form, and easily reduced. Whatever defects there might have been in the plan, the execution, though it miscarried in some essential points, was attended with surprising success. The same good fortune that prospered the British arms so remarkably in the conquest of Guadaloupe, seemed to interpose still more astonishingly in their favour at Quebec, the siege of which we shall record in its proper place. At present, we must attend the operations of general Amherst, whose separate army was first in motion, though such impediments were thrown in his way as greatly retarded the progress of his operations; impediments said to have arisen from the pride, insolence, and obstinacy of certain individuals, who possessed great influence in that part of the world, and employed it all to thwart the service of their country. The summer was already far advanced before general Amherst could pass lake George with his forces, although they met with no opposition, and reached the neighbourhood of Ticonderoga, where, in the preceding year, the British troops had sustained such a terrible disaster. At first the enemy seemed determined to defend this fortress: but perceiving the English commander resolute, cautious, and well prepared for undertaking the siege; having, moreover, orders to retreat from place to place, towards the centre of operations at Quebec, rather than run the least risk of being made prisoners of war, they, in the night of July the twenty-seventh, abandoned the post, after having in some measure dismantled the fortifications; and retired to Crown -Point, a fort situated on the verge of lake Champlain, General Amherst having taken possession of this important post, which effectually covered the frontiers of New-York, and secured to himself a safe retreat in case of necessity, ordered the works to be repaired, and allotted a strong garrison for its defence. This acquisition, however, was not made without the loss of a brave accomplished young officer, colonel Boger Townshend, who, in reconnoitering the fort, was killed with a cannon-shot, and fell near the same spot which, in the former year, had been enriched with the blood of the gallant lord Howe, whom he strongly resembled in the circumstances of birth, age, qualifications and character.

GEORGE II. 1727-1760