While the king thus exerted himself, with a spirit altogether unexampled, in defending Silesia, general Hulsen, who commanded his troops in Saxony, was exposed to the most imminent danger. Understanding that the army of the empire had formed a design to cut off his communication with Torgau, he quitted his camp at Meissen, and marched to Strehla. The enemy having divided their forces into two bodies, one of them, on the twentieth clay of August, attacked an advanced post of the Prussians; while the other was disposed in such a manner, as to overawe Hulsen’s camp, and prevent him from taking any step for the relief of his battalions, who maintained their ground with difficulty against a superior number of assailants. In this emergency the Prussian general ordered his cavalry to make a circuit round a rising ground, and, if possible, charge the enemy in flank. This order was executed with equal vigour and success. They fell upon the imperial army with such impetuosity, as drove their battalions and horse upon each other in the utmost confusion. A considerable number of the enemy were slain, and forty-one officers, with twelve hundred men, made prisoners. By this advantage, which was obtained at a very small expense, general Hulsen opened for himself a way to Torgau, whither he instantly retreated, perceiving that the whole army of the imperialists was advancing to cut off his communication with the Elbe. This retreat furnished the enemy with a pretext for claiming the victory.