CHAPTER XX. OPERATIONS IN LA MANCHA AND EXTREMADURA. BATTLES OF CIUDAD REAL AND MEDELLIN.

♦1809.
March.♦

Marshal Soult imputed the failure of his expedition to a deviation from the plan which Buonaparte had prescribed, in not taking possession of Ciudad Rodrigo. Lapisse had been prevented from doing this when it might have been done without difficulty, by the unexpected appearance of Sir Robert Wilson in that quarter; and Victor, who might have taken the place in spite of any resistance which could then have been opposed, was employed in operations more likely to gratify the pride of the French, but of much less importance to the iniquitous cause in which they were engaged.

♦Plans of the intrusive government.♦

Reasons, however, were not wanting for this change of plan. The danger from the spirit of the people in Galicia and in Portugal had either not been foreseen, or disregarded; while the French, well knowing in how short a time men of any nation may be made efficient soldiers by good discipline, and seeing with what celerity, after so many severe defeats, the armies of La Carolina and Extremadura had been brought into the field, deemed it necessary to attack those armies before they should become formidable, and destroy them, as far as their destruction could be effected by the most merciless carnage, ... for such Buonaparte’s generals, to whose pleasure the government of Spain was in fact entrusted, were determined to make. They had been trained in the school of the Revolution, and the temper which they had acquired there fitted them for the service of such a master; and Joseph’s miserable ministers, who had penned their edicts of extermination in the hope of intimidating their countrymen, had the misery of knowing that those edicts were acted upon to the letter. Wrung with compunction their hearts were, for some of them had begun life with good hearts, generous feelings, and upright intentions; but having allowed themselves to be engaged in an evil cause, they were now so far in blood, that one deadly sin drew on another, in dreadful and necessary series.

♦Effect of the war upon the French soldiery.♦

By the letters which were intercepted at this time it appeared that mothers and wives in France congratulated themselves if the objects of their affection were employed in Spain, rather than in the Austrian war, so little did they apprehend the real and dreadful character of such a service. The armies in La Mancha were not better supplied than those in Galicia; weeks sometimes elapsed in which they received neither bread for themselves nor barley for their horses, having to subsist as they could by chance and by plunder. This mode of life had given them the ferocity and the temper of banditti, and would have led to the total subversion of discipline among any soldiers less apt for discipline than the French. The infantry sometimes murmured under their privations, delivered their opinions freely, and held sometimes towards their officers a language which might be deemed insolent; but a jest produced more effect upon them than a reprimand, a good-humoured reply brought them into good humour; and the prospect of action giving them a hope of discharging their ill feelings upon the Spaniards, always animated them, and made them alert in obedience. The cavalry had better means of providing for themselves, and more opportunities of plunder; they therefore were always respectful as well as submissive to their officers, lest they should be dismounted and deprived of these advantages. The character of the service in which they were incessantly employed gave both to men and horse a sort of Tartar-like sagacity which perhaps had never before been seen among the troops of a highly civilized people. Savages could scarcely have been more quick-sighted in discovering a pass, detecting an ambush, or descrying a distant enemy. And the attachment between horse and rider became such, that if a trooper waking from sleep saw by the condition of his beast that in a fit of drunkenness he had over-ridden or any ways abused it, he would in the first emotions of self-reproach abjure wine and shed tears, with imprecations upon himself, go on foot whenever he could to spare the horse, and give him the bread which should have been his own portion. And yet this humanizing feeling did not render them more humane toward their enemies. Since the religious wars in France no contest had been carried on with so ferocious a spirit on both sides. That cruelty which in the middle ages was common to all nations had been continued among the Spaniards by the effects of the Inquisition, and by their bull-fights, ... among the French by the inhuman character of their old laws, and afterwards by the Revolution; on both sides it was called into full action, retaliation provoking retaliation, and revenge. Even the cheerfulness of the French, which is their peculiar and happy characteristic, which if not a virtue itself, is connected with many virtues, and without which no virtue can have its proper grace, ... even that quality was corrupted by the dreadful warfare in which they were engaged. Light minds go beyond the point of fortitude in that disregard of death which the continual presence of danger necessarily induces. That which the wise and good regard with silent composure is to them a theme for bravados and heart-hardening mockery. It became common ♦Rocca, 84, 87.♦ for the French, when they recognised a comrade among the slain, to notice him not by any expression of natural feeling, but by some coarse and unfeeling jest. The evil here was to themselves alone; but their oppressions were rendered more intolerable, and their cruelties more devilish, because they were exercised mirthfully.

♦Temper of the Spanish generals in La Mancha and Extremadura.♦

The armies under Cartaojal and Cuesta were at this time in such a state that they deserved to have been better commanded, if the government had known where to look for better commanders. With all Cuesta’s good qualities, his popularity among the troops, his sure integrity, his courage, and the enterprising energy which in spite of age and infirmities he was capable of exerting, caprice, obstinacy, and a desperate rashness which no experience could correct, made him a most unfit man to be trusted with such a stake in such times. All his desire was to meet the enemy in fair battle, where he could draw out his men in full display; and if all his men had been as thoroughly brave as himself, the old man’s system would not have been erroneous. Cartaojal, on the contrary, was so convinced that discipline was every thing, and that the best thing which could be done with his troops was to drill them, that he let slip fair opportunities of exercising them in successful enterprise. It seems almost as if a fatality overruled the councils of the Spaniards, both in the cabinet and in the field; and that if these generals had merely been interchanged, Cartaojal’s caution might have saved the Extremaduran army, and Cuesta’s enterprise have seized the advantages which were presented to that of La Carolina.

If severe measures could have restored discipline, they were not wanting; and they were used with such effect as for a time to stop desertion. ♦Reforms in the Spanish army.♦ One essential reform was introduced. All the infantry officers were till this time mounted, and this practice occasioned a great consumption of forage when forage could hardly be obtained for the cavalry; it led also to these farther inconveniences, that the march of the columns was never conducted as it ought, for want of the immediate presence and attention of the officers; and that in case of retreat the mounted officer had a facility for expediting his escape which might operate as a dangerous temptation upon such officers in such times. No general could have ventured upon this needful reformation without drawing upon himself the ill-will of those whom it affected; the Junta, however, sent orders that no person in the infantry under the rank of major (except the adjutant) should be allowed a horse. This was done by British advice; and if there had been no more jealousy of the British in inferior agents than existed in the Central Junta, the cordial co-operation of the two nations would have met with no obstruction.

♦The Duque de Alburquerque.♦

The most efficient arm of Cartaojal’s force was the cavalry. It had been under the Marquez de Palacios, who had the reputation of being the best cavalry officer in Spain, and was at this time commanded by the Duque de Alburquerque, D. Jose Maria de la Cueva. This nobleman, then in his thirty-fifth year, united in his own person many of those names which are most illustrious in Spanish history, and he had inherited also in no diminished portion the best and noblest qualities of that proud ancestry. His education had been neglected, so that his mind was not stored like Romana’s, neither was it equally under self-government. But his military talents were such as to impress upon all who knew him the belief that if experience and opportunity had been afforded, he would have ranked among the great captains of the age: for he was ardent without being incautious, capable alike of planning with clear forethought and executing with celerity, far-sighted, prompt in decision, and above all endowed with that true and rare nobility of soul which is essential to true greatness.

♦He proposes offensive operations.♦

A man of this stamp wins the love of the soldiery as certainly as he obtains their confidence. Hope became their ruling passion when Alburquerque was present; and their success in some enterprises, and the skill with which their commander baffled the movements of the enemy in others, gave the fairest prospect of success if the system of enterprise were persevered in. In pursuance of that system, and with the intention of making a diversion in favour of Cuesta, against whom there was reason to believe that the French were preparing a serious attack, the Duke proposed to advance upon Toledo, where they had 4000 foot and 1500 horse, with 12,000 or 15,000 infantry, 4000 horse, and twenty pieces of horse artillery; and perceiving but too well that his reputation and popularity were regarded with jealous eyes, he advised that the expedition should be not under his own command, but that of a superior officer; and he represented to Cartaojal that the object of forming and disciplining the raw troops would be carried on more certainly and securely while that part of the army which was fit for service occupied the enemy by harassing and keeping them on the alarm. The plan was too bold for one of Cartaojal’s temper; he saw the necessity of training the army, and did not consider that enterprise is the best training, and the only, that can be carried on within reach of an active enemy. He ordered him, however, to advance with 2000 horse and four pieces of artillery; and the Duke felt that, as an attempt made with such a force could only end in a precipitate retreat, the intention must be to wreck his reputation by exposing him to certain failure.

♦They are undertaken when too late.♦

His representations, however, to the Junta were so well seconded, that instructions came for advancing upon Toledo with all the disposable force of the army. But when Cartaojal communicated this to the Duke, he ordered him to deliver up the command of the vanguard to D. Juan Bernuy, and march himself immediately with Bassecourt’s and Echavarri’s divisions of 3500 men and 200 cavalry for Guadalupe, to reinforce Cuesta. It was sufficiently mortifying ♦The Duke sent to join Cuesta.♦ for the Duke to be removed from the cavalry which had acquired credit and confidence while he was at their head, and this too at the moment when the measure which he had so strenuously urged was about to be undertaken; but it was more painful to know that the attempt had been delayed till there was no longer any reasonable prospect of success. With the little body of new-raised infantry which was now placed under his command he began his march for Extremadura, and the ill-fated army of La Carolina commenced its operations at a moment when it was thus deprived of the only General who possessed its confidence.

♦Cartaojal advances against the French.♦

The head-quarters of that army were at Ciudad Real, the cavalry occupying a line from Manzanares to that city through Damiel, Torralva, and Carrion, and the infantry in the towns to the left and in the rear of Valdepenas. Cartaojal thought this a most advantageous position, having the Sierra Morena behind him as a sure refuge if he were defeated, whereas the enemy, were they to be repulsed in an attack, would be exposed in the open plains, and have to cross the Zeucara and the Guadiana in their flight. Having advanced to Yebenes, and found the French ready to advance themselves, Cartaojal retreated upon Consuegra; that place, to his surprise, was occupied by the enemy in great strength: he fell back, therefore, to his former position, in the advantage of which he trusted, ... and there, eight and forty hours after he had commenced this useless and harassing movement, the French appeared in pursuit, drove in his cavalry, and prepared to attack him in force on the following morning. They were commanded by General Sebastiani, who had superseded Marshal Lefebvre. The action which ♦Rout of the Carolina army at Ciudad Real.♦ ensued is, even upon their own accounts, disgraceful to both parties; to the Spaniards, because ♦March 17.♦ they were successively driven from every point where they attempted to stand, and pursued to the entrance of the Sierra; to the conquerors, because Sebastiani stated in his official report that the Spaniards fled on the first charge without resistance, and that he had sabred more than 3000 of them in their flight. Eighteen pieces of cannon, and 4000 prisoners, including nearly 200 officers, were, according to the same report, taken. The fugitives felt a confidence in the Sierra which they had not done in their General, and collected in considerable numbers at Despeñaperros, Venta Quemada, and Montizon; head-quarters were established in the village of S. Elena, two leagues in advance of Carolina, and the French, without pursuing them into the mountains, halted at Santa Cruz, awaiting there the success of Victor’s operations against Cuesta.

♦Operations of Marshal Victor.♦

Marshal Victor’s corps, leaving La Mancha about the middle of the preceding month, occupied a line upon the Tagus from Talavera to Almaraz; his head-quarters were at the latter place, where he was preparing materials for a floating bridge, Cuesta having blown up the arches of the Puente de Almaraz. A bridge was necessary here, because, though they could have crossed the river at two other points, there was no road from either of those points practicable for artillery. But the bridge could not be constructed while the Spaniards occupied a post which effectually commanded the passage. Cuesta was aware of these preparations, and also that there was an intention of passing over a detachment higher up to attack him on that flank; accordingly he reinforced it, and removed his head-quarters from Jaraicejo to Puerto de Miravete, that he might be near the scene of operations.

♦The French cross the Puente del Arzobispo.♦

The French detachment, as he had foreseen, effected their passage at Puente del Arzobispo, or the Archbishop’s Bridge, so called from its founder, D. Pedro Tenorio. A wooden bridge ♦March 16.♦ which existed in his days had been swept away by a flood; and as it was there that pilgrims from the western side of the river passed to pay their devotions to the famous image of our Lady of Guadalupe, he built the present edifice of stone, and founded an hospital for their accommodation, and a town, which he named Villa Franca, but which soon took its appellation more conveniently from the bridge. It became a point of considerable importance in the campaigns of this year. The enemy crossed ♦March 17.♦ with little or no resistance, and the advanced parties of the Spaniards fell back upon the division which was stationed at La Mesa de Ibor, and thence, after an unsuccessful stand, to the village of Campillo, but in good order; their whole conduct having been such as to satisfy the Commander-in-chief, who occupied a strong position, and expected that he should well be able to repel this division of the enemy, while Camp-Marshal Henestrosa, with the vanguard, would prevent their main body from establishing their bridge at Almaraz.

♦Cuesta retreats from the Puerto de Miravete.♦

But the French, who had crossed at Arzobispo, after dislodging the Spaniards from their positions at Mesa de Ibor and Fresnedoso, divided into two columns; the one proceeded by the circuitous way of Deleitosa and Torrecillas, with the intent of getting into Cuesta’s rear, between Jaraicejo and Miravete, and thus to cut off his communication and supplies; the other marched by Valduaña toward the bridge of Almaraz, to dislodge Henestrosa, and thereby free the passage of the river. Cuesta’s army consisted of about 16,000 men; the French were little if at all superior in numbers, but he believed that they had 20,000 foot and 3000 cavalry; and learning that Henestrosa, under the belief that his right was threatened by a superior force, had withdrawn from his post, and that the enemy had already begun to cross the Tagus, he determined to retreat toward Truxillo, lest he should be attacked at the same time both in the front and in the rear. This ♦March 18.♦ brave old man was cautious when he ought to have been bold, and rash in enterprise when he ought to have been cautious. Had Henestrosa been supported in time (for there had been time enough to support him), the ground was so strong, and the Spaniards in such a temper, that the French could hardly have reached the position at Miravete without sustaining a loss severe enough to have crippled them. In pursuance of this unwise resolution, on the night of the 18th he began his retreat, with the intention of forcing his way through the French corps, which he expected to fall in with, and of taking up the best position he could find for his own subsistence, and for covering the frontiers of Andalusia. But by thus abandoning an excellent position, he left Extremadura open to a hungry enemy.

♦Skirmishes at Truxillo and Miajadas.♦

When the Central Junta were informed of these movements, they imputed the disastrous measure to Henestrosa’s abandonment of his post, and ordered Cuesta to proceed against him with all the rigour of the law. But the old General, though disposed at first to condemn him, was too generous to do this. He replied that the Camp-Marshal had in all other cases behaved well, and with a courage amounting to rashness, and that in this he had acted only under an error of judgement. He met with no enemies on his night march, and halting in the morning beyond the Rio Monte, learnt that the detachment which he had expected to encounter was taking a direction for Truxillo. To Truxillo he proceeded on his retreat, and, leaving Henestrosa to cover that city, took up a position at the Puerto de Santa Cruz, forty miles from the stronger pass whence he had retreated. There it was his intention to wait till it should be seen whether Alburquerque’s division could effect its junction, and whether it ♦March 20.♦ would make him equal to the enemy. On the following morning Henestrosa was attacked, and driven to a little bridge on the other side of Truxillo: there he repulsed the enemy, and the skirmishing continued all day, with equal loss on either side, the Spaniards behaving in such a manner as to increase the General’s confidence in his troops. Cuesta expected now to be attacked on the morrow, either in front or on his left toward the village of Abertura, and had made up his mind to abide an action. But Cuesta’s resolutions were sometimes changed with as little consideration as they had been taken, for he was a man who acted more frequently upon the impulse of the moment than upon reflection. The whole of Victor’s force was collected at Truxillo; his advanced parties kept the Spaniards upon the alarm as well as the alert, and Cuesta then began to apprehend that the Puerto de S. Cruz was not defensible against the superior force that would be brought against him, especially as the ground was not favourable for cavalry. In the morning, therefore, he recommenced his retreat, evidently not knowing whither, and with no determined purpose, but in good order and in good heart, for, injudicious and ruinous as all the late movements had been, the men were not yet dispirited. While he was halting near Miajadas to refresh the troops, the chasseurs of the enemy’s advanced guard approached near enough to expose themselves; the advantage was well taken, and the French Colonel tore his hair in an agony of grief when he saw some hundred and fifty of his ♦Rocca, 93.♦ finest men cut down. This success was obtained by the regiments of Infante and Almanza. It raised the spirits of the men, a feeling of useful emulation was showing itself, and Cuesta formed the wise resolution (if he had been steady enough in his purposes to have kept it) of exercising them in various movements from one position to another, without exposing them in battle, and thus detaining the enemy till Cartaojal’s advance upon Toledo should operate as a diversion in his favour. That same evening, therefore, he retired to Medellin; and the next day, thinking it probable that if he remained the French would attack him on the morrow, he marched for Campanario, to join Alburquerque, who with his little division was coming by way of Aguda and Garbayuela. He did not, however, remain there till the junction was effected, but moved to Valle de la Serena, chiefly for the sake of facilitating his supplies. Some magazines had fallen into the enemy’s hands at Truxillo, one of the ill consequences arising from his rash retreat; there was no want of food in that as yet unravaged country, but he complained to the government of the incapacity and irregularity of all the persons employed in that department, and protested that unless this evil was remedied it would be impossible for him to maintain discipline, or prevent dispersion.

♦Junction with Alburquerque’s division.♦

The information which Cuesta received at this time, that a train of heavy artillery had been sent from Madrid toward Extremadura, made him apprehend the chief object of the enemy was to lay siege to Badajoz. The possession of that fortress was so important toward the success of their operations against Portugal, that this design had been apprehended as soon as they became masters of the field, and the Governor had been repeatedly charged to omit no means for putting it in a good state of defence. Forming a new plan in consequence of this, Cuesta informed the Central Junta that he should annoy the besiegers, and cut off their communication with Madrid. But he had no sooner effected his junction with Alburquerque than he determined upon seeking the enemy, and offering battle in the first favourable situation. It was not the addition of strength which induced him to this measure, for he had expected to meet 6000 men, and had found little more than half that number; ... but long irresolution usually ends in some rash resolve.

♦Cuesta offers battle at Medellin.♦

Having forsaken that strong ground, which, if it had been defended as well as it was wisely chosen, would have covered Extremadura, it was as much Cuesta’s policy to have avoided an action now as it had been then to have stood an attack, for he knew that he might expect a British army to co-operate with him. Sometimes as facile and vacillating as he was obstinate and impracticable at others, no man was more unfit to command an army in critical times; and yet the honest originality of his character, his fearless and buoyant spirit which nothing could cast down, his energy which neither age nor infirmity had abated, and the warmth of his heart as well as his temper, had won for him in no common degree the attachment not of the soldiers alone, but of those even who perceived and lamented his errors. The enemy at this time occupied Merida and Medellin: the latter town, memorable as having been the birth-place of Hernan Cortes, stands on the left bank of the Guadiana, in a wide and open plain, without tree or cover of any kind. ♦March 28.♦ On that plain Cuesta formed his whole force in one line, of about a league in extent, without any reserve, disdaining all advantage of ground, as if he had desired nothing but a fair field and mere individual courage were to decide the day. His army consisted of 20,000 infantry and 2000 cavalry. The vanguard, under Henestrosa, and the Duque del Parque’s division, formed the left, which Cuesta took under his own charge, as being placed on the highest ground, from whence he could overlook the field. The centre was under D. Francisco de Trias. D. Francisco de Eguia, who was second in command, was with the right wing, which consisted of the Marques de Portago’s division and Alburquerque’s, the Duke having with him his own horse. The cavalry were on the left, that being the point where the French presented the greatest force.

♦Battle of Medellin.♦

Victor’s army consisted of about 18,000 foot and 2500 horse. He had collected his whole force there, for the purpose of striking an efficient blow, and destroying, if that were possible, the Spanish army, in pursuance of the murderous system upon which he had been instructed to act. They were formed in an arc between the Guadiana and a cultivated ravine which extends from Medellin to the village of Mengabril; Lasalle’s division of light cavalry on the left, the division of German infantry in the centre, in large close columns; the dragoons under General Latour-Maubourg on the right, the divisions of Villate and Ruffin in reserve; their front was covered by six batteries of four guns each. The action began about eleven o’clock. These batteries opened on the Spanish infantry, who were ordered by Cuesta to charge with the bayonet and take them. The order was bravely obeyed; two regiments of French dragoons charged the foot, and were repulsed with loss: the German division formed itself into a square, and resisted with such difficulty the resolute attack of the Spaniards, that Cuesta was in full hope of a complete victory, and Victor not without apprehensions of a defeat, till part of his reserve succeeded in enabling his infantry to keep their ground. The Spaniards on the left had taken the first battery; a strong body of horse, protected by a column of infantry, advanced to recover it, and at that moment the whole of the Spanish cavalry on the ♦Misconduct of the Spanish cavalry.♦ left took panic, and without facing the foe, without attempting to make the slightest stand, fled in the greatest disorder from the field, most of them to the distance of many leagues. Instances of such scandalous panic were but too frequent in the Spanish armies during the war, but in no instance was it more fatal or more unaccountable than in this; for the day was going on well, the infantry were in good heart, the advantage was on their side; and the regiments which at that crisis disgraced themselves, and betrayed their country, had displayed both skill and courage during the retreat from the Tagus, and had distinguished themselves in the affair near Miajadas.

Cuesta, who was at the other end of the wing when he saw this shameful abandonment, clapped spurs to his horse in the hope of rallying them; his staff followed, ... but in vain; the enemy, quick in seizing opportunity, turned the left, which was thus exposed, and as there was no second line or reserve, defeat then became ♦Cuesta thrown, and wounded.♦ inevitable. The old General was thrown, and wounded in the foot, and not without great difficulty rescued and saved from capture by the exertion of his two nephews and some other brave and faithful officers. But the day was irrecoverably lost; and the French, having routed the left wing, turned upon the centre and the right.

♦Dispersion of the Spanish army.♦

The right wing of the Spaniards, meantime, had made the enemy give ground, and were following up their success; but Alburquerque, seeing what had occurred in the other flank, proposed to form in close columns of battalions, and begin their retreat. Eguia overruled this, saying he had no instructions to that effect, and not daring even in this evident emergence to act upon his own responsibility. Indeed it is affirmed, that not one of Cuesta’s officers knew his intention of giving battle an hour before the action began. Affairs were every moment growing worse, and Eguia having left the right of the line, the Duke gave the necessary command; but it had been delayed too long; the whole force of the French artillery was concentred upon these columns, who were now the only troops that remained unbroken; a total dispersion took place; and the enemy, forming a chain of cavalry all round the routed army, executed their orders, which were to give no quarter. They had suffered enough in the action to make them obey this atrocious command with good will. They had themselves 4000 men killed and wounded, ... nearly a fifth of their whole force; their official statement of the Spanish loss made it 7000 killed; other accounts carried it to 12,000. Cuesta could only state that it was very great, and ascertain that a hundred and seventy officers of infantry and ten of cavalry were killed, wounded, or missing.

♦No quarter given.♦

Weariness, rather than compunction, on the part of the French, at length put a stop to the carnage, and the account of prisoners is variously stated from three thousand to seven; but it is certain that not two ever reached Madrid. A wounded Spanish officer was brought into the room where Victor was at supper, and the French Marshal said to him, “If my orders had been obeyed, sir, you would not have been here.” Those orders had been obeyed too well. The dragoons that night in the French camp were rubbing their sword arms with soap and spirits, to recover the muscles from the strains of that day’s slaughter. Their cruelty was not satiated even with this success. A peasant in one of the near villages had a son who was in Cuesta’s army, where he had served for some time. When the army drew near Medellin, this Juan went to his father’s house, and his conversation induced his two brothers, Antonio and Carlos, to go with him as volunteers. Juan was never seen after the battle; but the father upon searching the field found Antonio’s body, and the other brother, wounded, and weeping over it. He removed the dead son and the living one to his cottage, that the one might receive Christian burial, and the other such help as might have restored him. A party of the French, in their work of pillage, entered the house, and finding a wounded Spaniard there, deliberately shot him, before his father’s face.

♦Escape of Alburquerque.♦

When the dispersion of his columns took place, the Duke of Alburquerque found his retreat completely cut off. Four officers were with him; with these he advanced upon the French cordon of cavalry, and when at the distance of about an hundred yards, turning to one of his companions, he said, “You see that officer of chasseurs so gaily caparisoned? I will have him down in a moment.” He then spurred his horse, and rode at him full speed: of course his companions followed; ... the French officer was startled, and moved rapidly on one side, several of the chasseurs imitated his movement, and Alburquerque with his friends got through the opening they had thus made. D. Miguel de Alava was one of those friends; he had behaved with distinguished gallantry that day, and just before the dispersion of the last battalions, sword in hand, singly retook a Spanish nine-pounder from two French dragoons who had taken possession of it. Soon after they had broken through, and were still hotly pursued, a wounded artilleryman besought Alava to save him from the general massacre. “Get up behind me,” was the answer, “and I will carry you off, or we will perish together.” This little party, happily for Spain, effected their escape. About midnight they arrived at a lone farm-house, far enough from the field to feel themselves in safety; and having got some wood upon the fire, and lighted their cigars, they agreed unanimously that the loss of the battle was of no11 importance. Such was the spirit of the Spaniards; a spirit which no misfortunes could abate, which no defeats could subdue.

♦The remains of the Spanish army collect.♦

The battle itself, most unfortunate as it was, afforded Cuesta some vindication for the error which he had committed in risking it. It had been fought so well by the infantry, that they had obtained, and that for a considerable time, a decided advantage, till the horse took fright, and abandoned them. But it was after the defeat that the strength of the old man’s character appeared with full effect; and certainly on that memorable occasion both the General and the government proved themselves worthy of their country and their cause. The advance of the French was impeded by the weather, a storm of wind and heavy rain having raged uninterruptedly for three days after the battle, and swollen the brooks so as to render them like rivers. A mishap also had befallen them at Almaraz, where their bridge gave way while some ammunition carts were passing: many lives were lost, and the operations of the army were delayed in consequence. They collected, however, in and about Merida, and their advanced parties appeared at Almendralejo and Villa Franca. This seemed to indicate an intention of entering Andalusia; and Cuesta was of opinion, that, knowing the total dispersion of his army, they would not hesitate at dividing their own force, and execute this design with one part, while they laid siege with the other to Badajoz, which was not in a state for making a long military defence. He urged the government to send all the disposable force in Andalusia to S. Olalla without delay; between that place and Ronquillo, he said, was the only position where they could resist the enemy with good probability of success, provided there were troops, and artillery and subsistence.

♦Cuesta disgraces those who had behaved ill.♦

He had appointed Llerena as the rallying point for the fugitives. The infantry came slowly in, but when Cuesta arrived he found that the cavalry had collected there with little diminution. He thanked the army in his general orders for their good conduct at Medellin, excepting by name the horse regiments which had so disgracefully taken flight, and thereby occasioned that to be a defeat, which, if they had done their duty like the foot, would have proved a most glorious and important victory. For this offence he suspended three Colonels from their rank. It does not appear that any heavier punishment was inflicted: ... the fault had been too general to fix it upon individuals; ... and if recourse had been had to lot, it might have fallen upon men who, with the best heart and will, had not been able in that precipitate ♦1809.
April.♦ movement to check either their companions or their horses. The privates were disgraced by having one of their pistols taken from them, till by some good service they should regain the honour which they had lost.

♦The Junta act wisely and generously upon these defeats.♦

It was reported that the Central Junta upon the first intelligence of the defeat had fled from Seville. The danger was considered so imminent, that they had deliberated concerning their removal; and the Junta of Seville, who had been consulted, proposed that if such a measure were adopted, absolute power should be left in their hands. But the government did nothing precipitately, and on no occasion throughout the war did it display more magnanimity or so much energy as at this time of trial. The same day brought them tidings of the defeat at Ciudad Real and of that at Medellin; the same gazette communicated both to the people. There was nothing to qualify the disgrace and loss which Cartaojal had sustained; he was therefore quietly removed from the command. Whatever errors the Central Junta may have committed, no other government ever exercised its power with such humanity in such times, no other government ever made such just and humane allowances for inexperience and weakness, nor dealt so generously with the unfortunate. They decreed pensions to the widows and orphans of all who had fallen at Medellin, in proportion to their rank and circumstances, and a badge of distinction to those corps which the General should commend; and they promoted all the officers who had distinguished themselves. They pronounced that the General and the body of the army had deserved well of their country. Knowing that Cuesta had been lamed by his fall, they required him in all his dispatches to report the state of his own health; and though they appointed D. Francisco de Venegas to succeed Cartaojal, they placed both armies under Cuesta’s orders, giving him the rank of Captain-general. In the preamble to this decree they said that all the details of the battle tended to console them for its loss, and that the spirit of Hernan Cortes might have beheld with joy the courage which his countrymen had manifested upon the scene of his childhood. The example of that day, they said, might make them hope that with perseverance they might form an infantry capable of defending the national independence; an infantry that should be the worthy rival and successor of those famous Tercios which under the best captains in the world had supported the glory of Spain in Flanders and in Italy and in Germany.

♦Their appeal to the people.♦

The Junta felt it necessary to defend themselves at this time against the base enemies who charged the late calamities upon their misconduct, and who were agitating the people of Seville by false alarms, reporting that the French were within five leagues of that city, and that the nation was betrayed and sold by its Government. In reply to these senseless accusations the Junta appealed to the fact, that in the course of two months it had set on foot two armies for the defence of the Andalusias, consisting of 50,000 men and nearly 12,000 horse. This they had done beside the assistance which they had afforded to other provinces; and when was it known that the injuries which the ship sustains in a storm had been imputed to the pilot? The Junta had issued an abominable edict, whereby, after denouncing the punishment of death against all persons who should endeavour to raise distrust of the existing Government, or to overturn it by exciting popular commotions, they invited informers to denounce such persons to ♦Tribunal of public safety.♦ the Tribunal of Public Safety which they had instituted, holding out the promise of secresy and reward. When this decree appeared Mr. Frere saw to what an atrocious system of tyranny it might lead. Judging of the Junta by their individual characters, he felt assured that they would each have shrunk from carrying such measures into effect; but he was well aware how little the personal characters of any men placed in such circumstances are to be relied on, and apprehended that after some natural hesitation the majority might either yield to the guidance of one or two members, more violent and less scrupulous, or abandon themselves to the direction of this Tribunal of Public Safety; the very name of which, he said, must remind us of the worst revolutionary horrors. But though the State Papers of the Junta were on most occasions wiser than their actions, in this instance their conduct was better than their language; and it now appeared, most honourably for the national character, that, notwithstanding this public encouragement to the nefarious practice of delation, not a single secret information had been laid. If any person, said the Junta, had complaint to make, or suspicion to allege against any of the public functionaries, let him lay his proofs before this Tribunal. But this has not been done, and all the processes which that Tribunal has instituted have been public prosecutions, not one upon the accusation of an individual.

♦Correspondence on the Intruder’s part with the Junta.♦

The Intruder and his partizans hoped at this time that the defeat and dispersion of two armies on two succeeding days would break the spirit of the Government, if not of the nation, and that the Junta might be induced to secure themselves and their own possessions by submission. Accordingly a Spanish traitor, by name Joaquim ♦April 12.♦ Maria Sotelo, addressed a letter from Merida to the vice-president, saying, that the greater number of the provinces of Spain had sufficiently suffered from the effects of war and conquest, and now the rest were threatened with the same calamities. Filled with consternation, he said, at the defeats of Cartaojal and Cuesta, the honourable Spaniards at the court of Madrid, who could not contemplate without the most poignant grief the desolation of their country, had implored the King to alleviate the distresses of such provinces as were occupied by the French troops, and to prevent them in those which were not yet in their possession. To these prayers the King had attended, had ordered him to announce his compliance to the Junta, and authorized him to confer with such deputies as the Junta might appoint, on the best means of fulfilling his wishes. He could not suppose that they would refuse to take steps on which the salvation of Andalusia and the happiness of the whole kingdom depended. And, as the business was most important and most urgent, Sotelo represented, that it would be improper to conduct it in writing, but that all the disputes and irregularities and doubts which it would otherwise cause might be obviated by a personal conference. On this ground, he hoped that deputies would be named to confer with him.

The Junta replied, not to this traitor himself, but to Cuesta. “They had not forgotten,” they said, “the character with which they were invested, and the oath which they had taken, in unison with the wishes of the nation. If Sotelo were the bearer of powers sufficiently extensive to treat for the restitution of their King, and for the immediate evacuation of the Spanish territory by the French troops, let him publish them in the usual form, and they would be announced to the allies of Spain. The Junta had no authority to listen to any treaty, or terminate any transaction, which was not founded on the basis of eternal justice. Any other principle of negotiation, without benefiting the empire, would only tend to degrade the Junta, which had entered into the most awful engagements to bury itself beneath the ruins of the monarchy, rather than sanction any proposition which should diminish the honour and independence of the Spanish people.” This answer they desired Cuesta to transmit to the Intruder’s agent, and they published the proposal and the reply. Perceiving, however, of what importance the safety of the government was to the national cause, and the danger therefore of associating it in the minds of the people with any particular place of residence, in times when no place was secure, they published a decree upon this subject. It began by an avowal, that in their anxiety to provide immediate remedy for the calamities which had befallen the armies of La Mancha and ♦April 18.♦ Extremadura, they had imprudently hazarded their own safety by remaining at Seville. But having provided for the reinforcement and equipment of the troops, and furnished all the supplies which were requisite for the defence of Andalusia, they had in cool consideration reflected, that their security was inseparable from that of the state; that the preserval of the deposit of the sovereignty entrusted into their hands was the first of their obligations; and that they could not again expose it to the danger of being destroyed, without doing wrong to the nation which had confided it to them. The Speed with which the tyrant of Europe advanced against Madrid in November, and sent troops towards Aranjuez, made it apparent that a principal object of his policy was to strike a blow at the government, and, seizing the body which administered it, cut all the bonds of political association, and thus throw the nation into confusion. These were still his objects: trusting more to his cunning than his force, he still pursued the government, hoping to get its members in his power, and then renew the infamous scenes of Bayonne, by compelling them to authorize his usurpation, or sacrificing them to his rage if they resisted his seductions and his menaces. Thus to degrade the government in the eyes of the nation itself would, he thought, be the best means of degrading the nation also, and reducing it to that servitude, which, in the insolence of his fortune, this tyrant designed to inflict upon Spain. To frustrate these aims, they decreed, that, whenever the place of their residence might be threatened, or when any other reason should convince them of the utility of so doing, they would transfer the seat of government elsewhere, where they might preserve the august deposit of the sovereignty, and watch over the defence, the well-being, and the prosperity of the nation. And they declared, that, whatever the accidents of the war might be, the Junta would never abandon the continent of Spain, while a single spot could be found in it where they could establish themselves for defending the country against the force and fraud of its perfidious enemy, as they had solemnly sworn to do.

♦Measures for securing Badajoz.♦

When the news of Cuesta’s defeat at Medellin reached Paris, it was affirmed in the Moniteur, that by this battle Seville was laid open to the French armies, and that probably by that time Lisbon also was once more in their possession, ... so confident was the French government of speedy and complete success. In the same confidence, and with the hope of subduing the spirit of the Aragoneze, the French Governor of Zaragoza ordered mass to be celebrated in the Church of the Pillar, for the capture of Lisbon and Seville, as events which had taken place. Soult would undoubtedly have advanced upon the Portugueze capital, if he could have relied upon Victor’s movements; but that General found that the battle of Medellin had rather raised the hopes of the Spaniards than depressed them. His views were upon Badajoz. Aware of this, the Government, with that promptitude which characterised all their measures at this crisis, supplied the place with money and arms, and addressed public letters to the Junta of that city and the Governor, reminding them that Zaragoza had held out two months not against the enemy alone, but against hunger and pestilence; and that her defenders would be held in grateful and everlasting remembrance, while the names of those who had so basely delivered up Coruña would be handed down for lasting infamy from generation to generation. To the General, D. Antonio Arce, they said, that true glory was to be gained by overcoming great dangers, and an opportunity for such glory was now afforded him. The Extremadurans were not less brave than the Aragoneze, and Badajoz possessed a defence in her fortifications which had not existed at Zaragoza. The soldier fought with best hope, and sacrificed himself with most alacrity, when he saw his commander set the example; and such an example would not be wanting in one whose ancestors filled a distinguished place in the annals of their country. At all times Extremadura had produced heroes. There had the Pizarros, and there had Cortes been born, to be examples now for their countrymen.

♦A crusade proclaimed there against the invaders.♦

Marshal Victor sent to summon Badajoz, though he was not prepared to lay siege to it; but the pitiable state of the country rendered it always possible that a governor might be found weak enough in principle or in mind to betray his trust. A spirit however such as the time required prevailed there, and the parties which he sent out in that direction were attacked at advantage and driven back with loss. The Junta informed the Government, that, in consideration of the sacrileges which the enemy committed wherever they went, they were enlisting the peasantry under the banner of the Crusade with which the misbelievers in old times had been pursued and conquered. The Government approved this measure, saying that if their forefathers had proclaimed crusades for the recovery of the Holy Land, with much more reason now might they have recourse to the same means for defending their religion in the bosom of their own country against profanations more impious than had been heard of in the darkest ages or among the most barbarous people. And they directed that the persons who should be embodied in these new corps should be distinguished by wearing a red cross on the breast. The Central Junta entertained a thought that this might be extended with good effect; but it did not spread; the feeling and the enthusiasm denoted by such a badge would not have been partaken by the officers, and it might have raised a temper in the men unfavourable to any expected co-operation with their British allies.

♦Regulations concerning the ejected Religioners.♦

Another measure which the Government adopted at this time was intended to lessen the ill effect that the dispersion of so many monks and friars was likely to produce. The same calamities which had set them loose in every part of the country which the enemy had overrun, deprived them also of their accustomed means of subsistence; and it was but too probable that among those who took arms, as was very generally done by those who were able to bear them, the licence of a military life might lead to scandals which on every account it was desirable to prevent. A Junta therefore was formed of persons holding high stations in the different Religious Orders, the Prior of Zamora, who was one of the members of the Government, being appointed President. The business of this Junta was to dispose of those Religioners who, having been driven from their cloisters (the edict said), were crying night and day before the throne of a terrible God to revenge the blood of their innocent brethren, which had so wantonly been shed. They were to be distributed in towns, hospitals, and armies, as they might be deemed most qualified; and the Generals were instructed not to receive any persons of their profession unless they produced credentials or commissions from this board.

♦Plans of the Intrusive Government.♦

Six thousand men had been detached from La Mancha to reinforce Victor after the battle ♦April 9.♦ of Medellin. His instructions were to remain between Merida and Badajoz till he should receive advices of Soult’s movements, and till Lapisse should join him. The Intrusive Government persuaded themselves that the struggle would soon be over, and Joseph waited only to hear from Marshal Ney of the total destruction of Romana’s army, to give orders for marching against Valencia. But the tide had now turned in Galicia; there came no intelligence from Ney but what was disastrous; and Soult could neither communicate with Victor nor with Lapisse, neither could they at this time communicate with each other. Soult’s communication was cut off by Silveira on the Tamega, by Trant on the Vouga, ... and Sir Robert Wilson, by his position at Ciudad Rodrigo, cut off Lapisse equally from co-operating with his countrymen in Portugal or in Extremadura.

♦Sir Robert Wilson’s conduct at Ciudad Rodrigo.♦

Of how great importance that position was likely to become Mr. Frere had perceived as soon as Sir John Moore’s army began their dolorous retreat; and he had obtained from the Spanish Government such reinforcement for the garrison as could be spared at a time when demands for aid came upon them from all quarters. The command which they conferred upon Sir Robert Wilson, disposed as the Spaniards were to act heartily with him, was of more consequence than any succour which they could then afford. He meantime had spared no exertions for increasing his little force, and continuing to impose upon the enemy that useful opinion of its strength which they were known to entertain: for it was seen by their intercepted letters that they had applied for reinforcements under the fear of being attacked by him in Salamanca, where, they said, the inhabitants were as much to be dreaded as the enemy. Sir Robert circulated addresses inviting the Germans and Poles and Swiss in the French service to abandon an iniquitous cause into which they had been forced, and in which they had no concern. There was no press in the city, but the parochial clergy throughout the line of country which he occupied multiplied copies by transcription: many men were brought over by these means, and the enemy suffered not only from this continual drain, but from the suspicion and inquietude which was thus produced. Some stragglers from Sir John Moore’s army, and some prisoners from it who had effected their escape, joined him, having every where received from the peasantry every possible assistance and kindness; for that retreat had not lessened in the Spanish people their sense of gratitude towards Great Britain, nor their respect for the British character. Some convalescents also from Almeida were added to his numbers, and he obtained two reinforcements, each of a more extraordinary kind. A captain of banditti, with five-and-twenty followers, who had exercised their vocation in the country about Segovia, repaired to him, as men who preferred risking their lives in a legal and honourable way, and were desirous of doing good service in a good cause. The other party told a sadder tale. They were South Americans from the Plata, who having been made prisoners at Montevideo in the ill-advised and worse conducted expedition of the English to that province, had been landed in Spain, there to be neglected and left destitute by their own government. More than 200 had perished through want and misery, and the survivors were almost naked and pitiably emaciated with the privations and sufferings which they had endured. There were seven officers among them, who were all men of polished manners; and the soldiers were willing and well disposed, though deeply sensible of the cruelty and injustice with which they had been neglected.

♦Attempt to surprise that fortress.♦

Suspecting that the enemy would endeavour to reach Extremadura, get in Cuesta’s rear, and menace Portugal on that side, Sir Robert occupied the Puerto de Baños with a small force under Colonel Mayne. This was effected just in time, Lapisse having marched the greater part of his force to Alva de Tormes on the way thither, but finding it occupied, and not knowing in what strength, the French returned. This was a month before the battle of Medellin, at which time Sir Robert had gone to confer with General Cuesta, no one except the Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo being informed of his absence. Immediately after his return the French, having been reinforced at Salamanca, attempted to ♦March 2.♦ surprise Ciudad Rodrigo. A plan had been concerted with some traitors in the town, who, from an outwork that might easily be stormed, had thrown a bridge to the body of the place, so solidly constructed that Sir Robert had remonstrated against it as promoting their own destruction in case of an assault. Timely advice, however, came from the Corregidor of Salamanca; and the enemy, apprehending from the movements of Sir Robert’s troops that a counterplot had been formed with the intent of attempting Salamanca, and cutting off their retreat, fell back hastily, and not without loss. Treachery there had been; but as there was no proof who had been the traitors, Sir Robert took measures for removing the suspected persons without discrediting them.

♦The French summon it.♦

After it was known that Cuesta had fallen back from the Tagus to the Guadiana, and before tidings of his defeat had arrived, Sir Robert, who had been urging him to form a corps on the Tietar, and thereby preserve from the enemy a fertile part of the country which had not yet been overrun, withdrew his troops from the Puerto de Baños to collect them at Ciudad Rodrigo. Lapisse now brought together the whole remaining force under his command, which had been reduced to about 7000 men, advanced against that city, and summoned it. The officer by whom the summons was sent wished to enter the place with it, but a detachment of the Lusitanian Legion with four guns, under Lieutenant-Colonel Grant, had been stationed outside the works, and he was not permitted to proceed. Before the Governor’s answer could be given, the French, in disregard of the custom of war, continued advancing toward the gates, upon which a fire was opened upon them, and continued with effect till they halted. The Governor’s reply was, that he should not think of surrendering, even under a greater necessity than then appeared to exist. Some skirmishing took place, to the advantage of the garrison, and on the following day the enemy retreated, with some loss both in men and in reputation.

This movement of the French had been so little serious, that it was supposed they had expected some co-operation from Soult’s army. Soon afterwards, however, a second summons came in the name of the Intruder, holding out ♦March of Lapisse to unite with Victor.♦ threats to the garrison and inhabitants if they suffered themselves longer to be misled by a few British officers, and promising them King Joseph’s favour if they would open their gates. A verbal reply was returned, stating that the proper answer to such a summons was from the cannon’s mouth, and there the enemy would receive it if they chose to advance. At this time the peasantry, encouraged by the example of this brave garrison, had risen throughout a wide extent of country; and the situation of Lapisse was becoming critical, when by a movement ♦April 7.♦ which ought not to have been unexpected, he moved rapidly toward the Puerto de Perales. That pass he could hardly have forced, if it had been occupied; but Colonel Mayne could not reach it in time after the intention of the enemy was ascertained, and all that Sir Robert could do was to dispatch advices into Portugal, and harass their march by pursuing them with all speed, in the hope that when they arrived at Alcantara, where they must cross the Tagus, they would find it occupied by a sufficient force of Portugueze.

♦The French enter Alcantara.♦

The bridge at that point, which was then one of the durable monuments of Roman magnificence, has given name to a city of some renown, as the chief seat of one of the military orders famous in old times. The town is on the left bank, and the inhabitants, aware of danger, thought to avert it by defending the entrance of the bridge with a kind of abbatis, and breaking up the road to a depth of eighteen or twenty feet. These rude works not being defended by any regular force, nor with any skill or military means, were soon forced, and the town was entered. Lapisse had marked his whole route by the most wanton cruelties, in return for which every straggler who fell into the hands of the peasantry was put to death. He remained only during the night in Alcantara; but that night was employed in plunder, and in the commission of every crime by which humanity can be disgraced and outraged. Lieutenant-Colonel Grant and Don Carlos d’España (officers whose names appear often during the war, and always honourably), arrived near the town with a small body of cavalry in pursuit during the night, and entered it in the morning just after the enemy had left it. They found the houses in flames, and the streets literally obstructed with mutilated bodies, some lying in heaps, and others thrown upon piles of furniture and valuable goods, which the ruffians, having no means of removing, had brought out in front of the houses and set on fire. Dogs had been murdered like their masters, swine butchered for the mere pleasure of butchery, and their bodies heaped together in mockery with those of the human victims. The churches ♦Campaigns of the Lusitanian Legion, 65–68.♦ had been polluted as well as plundered, images mutilated, pictures, the value of which was not suspected by these destroyers, cut to pieces, graves opened in the hope of finding money or plate concealed there, even the very coffins violated, and the dead exposed.

♦Junction with Victor.♦

Victor’s force, after he had been joined by this division, amounted to 23,000 foot and 5800 horse. It was apprehended from some intercepted letters that he would immediately make for Seville, and Cuesta had formed his plan of defence accordingly. Portugal, however, was the object of the French, as a point of more importance at that time; but they had let the hour go by, and the English were now once more in the field.