CHAPTER XXXI. ASTORGA TAKEN BY THE FRENCH. SIEGE AND FALL OF CIUDAD RODRIGO.

♦1810.♦

♦Inactivity before Cadiz.♦

Hostilities were carried on before Cadiz with equal languor on both sides, the French making no attempt on the Isle of Leon, and the Spaniards none for breaking up the land-blockade. On the enemy’s part this inaction was occasioned by their knowledge of the strength of the works; on that of the Spaniards by want of energy in the government, and want of spirit ♦The Regency send for Cuesta.♦ in the people of Cadiz. The Regency, immediately upon their appointment, had sent for Cuesta to reside either in the city or the isle, that they might profit by his advice, regarding him, they said, as the main pillar of the country: they expressed their deep sorrow for some outrages which had been committed against his venerable age, and their determination to inflict exemplary punishment upon the offenders: they ordered that part of his appointments should forthwith be paid, and promised the whole arrears as soon as it should be possible to discharge them. The time, however, for Cuesta’s services, either in the field or the council, was past; and the old General employed his latter days in composing a vindictive attack upon the fallen Junta, which called forth on their part a complete justification of their conduct towards him. On that score they had nothing wherewith to reproach themselves; but they must have felt some self-condemnation in reflecting that the two generals, who in the hour of extreme danger had acted with promptitude and success, were the men in whom they had least confided. Alburquerque they had regarded with jealousy, and Romana they had deprived of his command in deference to the deputies of Asturias.

♦Badajoz secured by Romana.♦

The service which Romana had rendered at that crisis was only of less importance than the preservation of the Isle of Leon. He had secured Badajoz when a corps of 12,000 men from Seville thought to have obtained possession of it by a coup-de-main: some Portugueze had come to his assistance, and their artillerymen distinguished themselves when the enemy ventured to approach the walls. Baffled in this attempt, the French retired to Merida, Zafra, and S. Marta, where they were annoyed by the division of his army under D. Carlos O’Donnell, brother to the commander in Catalonia.

♦The British take a position on the frontiers of Beira.♦

Lord Wellington had nearly 9000 sick when his head-quarters were removed from Badajoz; but when, in clear anticipation of the enemy’s intentions, he took a position on the frontiers of Beira, they rapidly recovered strength in that salubrious country. On the side of Alentejo he knew that the invasion would not be attempted; attempts in that quarter had always proved unsuccessful: if Badajoz and Elvas had been reduced, Lisbon was secured by the Tagus, and there is no other part of Portugal in which an army would suffer so much from disease, and from want of water; this indeed Loison ♦See vol. ii. p. 181.♦ had experienced. On the side of Gallicia the French had so lately felt how difficult it was to retreat, that it was altogether unlikely they would risk the same danger again, even if it had not been necessary again to obtain possession of that province as a preliminary measure. It appeared certain, therefore, that the attempt would be made by way of Beira, the only remaining and most practicable route for an invading army. Their first step must be to besiege Ciudad Rodrigo. This, he knew, had been recommended by a council of war held in September at Salamanca; and its success, he then observed, would do more evil than the French could effect in any other way; for it would cut off the only communication of the Spanish government with the northern provinces, give the enemy the command of Castille, and probably draw after it the loss of Almeida. Looking, therefore, to Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida as the points of which the enemy must obtain possession before they could march either upon Lisbon or Porto, he chose a position in the segment of a circle, of which the convex part was opposed to the quarter from whence the invasion was expected. Guarda, Celorico, Pinhel, and the west bank of the Coa, were its four main points; the Coa, with its tributary streams, flowing in front of his line along the greater part of its extent. That river rises in the Sierra de Xalma, which is a part of the Serra da Gata, and enters Portugal by Folgosinho; another stream, which is also regarded as its source, rises near Sabugal; it receives many smaller rivers, and falls into the Douro near Villa Nova de Foscoa. Its waters are supposed to be excellent for dying wool and tempering steel, but unwholesome.

♦Astorga summoned by the French.♦

Before the French entered upon their operations in this quarter, they thought it necessary to obtain complete possession of Leon, that their communication might be open with Valladolid. They had been repulsed in an attempt upon Astorga, in the preceding September, by Santocildes, who remained as governor there. That city was surrounded with walls, which gave it an appearance of antiquity, not of strength. They had been erected many centuries ago, and were so massive, and at the same time considered as of so little consequence for purposes of defence, that the poor were permitted to dig holes in them which served for habitations. The garrison consisted of about 3000 men, of whom from 500 to 600 were on the hospital list. Some attempts had been made to render the city defensible, according to the system of modern warfare, by the enemy, after Buonaparte entered it in pursuit of Sir J. Moore; and when the Spaniards recovered it, they added to these works. Still the fortifications were such, that though the French might deem them sufficient against an armed peasantry, or a guerilla party, it was never expected that any resistance would be made there against a regular force. After the French had overrun Andalusia, and when they were proclaiming, that the brigands had been put to the sword, and the Napoleonic throne established in Cadiz, ... for this falsehood was in such phrase asserted in their Spanish gazettes, ... Loison, whose head-quarters were at Bañeza, the nearest town, wrote to the governor, telling him, that King Joseph had entered Seville amid the acclamations of the inhabitants; that Andalusia had submitted; the ♦Feb. 16.♦ Junta was dissolved; and almost all the people of Spain, awakened now to a sense of their true interest, had had recourse to the clemency of their sovereign, who received them like a father. He urged Santocildes to imitate so good an example, and appoint a place where they might meet and confer upon such terms as must needs persuade him to this wise and honourable course. Santocildes replied to this overture, that he knew his duty, and would do it.

♦Siege of Astorga.♦

On the 21st of March, Junot invested Astorga with 12,000 men, of whom about a tenth part were cavalry, by means of which he became master of the open country. The vigorous measures of Santocildes obstructed his operations so much, that a month elapsed before he opened his batteries. They began on three sides ♦1810.
March.♦ at once, at daybreak on the 20th of April, and soon effected a breach on the north, by the Puerta de Hierro; but immediately behind the breach the Spaniards pulled down a house, the foundations of which served as a formidable trench; they kept up their fire during the night, and at eleven the following morning Junot once more summoned the governor to surrender, declaring that, if he held out two hours longer, the city should be stormed, and the garrison put to the sword. The governor having returned a becoming answer, the batteries renewed their fire; the bombardment was recommenced; the cathedral was set on fire, with many other houses, and a whole street in the suburbs; and the French, thinking to profit by the confusion, assaulted the breach: 2000 men were appointed for this service: great part perished before they could reach the wall; the remainder mounted the breach; the works within impeded them, a destructive fire was poured upon them, and after an hour and a half they were repulsed. At the same time the suburb was assaulted, and with the same success; the enemy being three times baffled in their attempts. Their loss this day amounted to 1500 men.

♦Its surrender.♦

Had the city been well stored, it would have cost the besiegers still dearer; but after this signal success, Santocildes found himself with only thirty round of cartridges remaining for the men, and eight only for the artillery. Junot passed the night in making a covered way from the trenches to the foot of the breach, where he lodged a large body of picked men. Meantime a council of war was held; the impossibility of resisting with advantage for want of ammunition was admitted; some officers proposed that they should cut their way through the besiegers; ... the strength of the enemy’s cavalry was one impediment to this, but it was rejected on account of the inhabitants; for Astorga was not like Hostalrich, where the garrison had only themselves to provide for; and unless terms were made for the town’s-people, what they might expect from such conquerors as Junot and Loison was but too well known. Fresh works of defence were thrown up within the breach while this deliberation was going on, that nothing might be omitted, and at daybreak a capitulation was proposed. They demanded and obtained the honours of war for themselves; security for the inhabitants, both in person and property; that the men should keep their knapsacks, and the officers their horses, swords, and baggage. This part of the capitulation was broken, and the officers were plundered as they left the town. Even Junot, however, returned Santocildes his sword, saying, that so brave a man ought not to be without one. In the course of the siege the enemy lost 2500 in killed alone; so dearly was Astorga purchased. But the more gallant its resistance, the more was that misconduct to be regretted which had infected the provincial Juntas as strongly as the Central Government. Since July last Gallicia had been entirely delivered from the enemy; the population of that province, when the census of 1797 was taken, amounted to nearly a million and a half; the people had shown their spirit, and if due exertions had been made on the part of the civil and military authorities, an army might have been formed there, capable not only of preserving Astorga, but of essentially co-operating with the British and Portugueze in the subsequent operations.

♦Affair at Barba del Puerco.♦

After this conquest, Junot, leaving a small garrison in Astorga, marched into Old Castille, where Ney had previously been joined by the corps of Loison, Regnier, and Kellermann. The campaign had already begun here. In the beginning of March the French army were upon the Tormes, with their advanced posts upon the Agueda. Lord Wellington was at Viseu, and his advanced posts, under General Craufurd, were upon the Agueda also, and between ♦March 19.♦ that river and the Coa. The first time that the British and French troops met after the battle of Talavera was in an affair of outposts, at Barba del Puerco: four companies of the 95th, under Lieutenant-Colonel Beckwith, were posted at that place; the French had a strong party immediately opposite, on the other side the Agueda, in the village of St. Felices. The only bridge below Ciudad Rodrigo is between these villages, and as the river at this season was swollen with rain, this was the only passage. The country is rocky and mountainous, and though the advanced sentries of both parties were within a few yards of the bridge, it was not expected that either would attempt to annoy the other; so great were the obstacles which the nature of the ground presented. The French, however, collected a brigade in St. Felices, and after night had closed marched 600 men toward the bridge. About midnight they were all assembled there, and made the advanced sentries prisoners; a picquet of eighty men, posted behind the rocks, immediately fired upon them and retreated in excellent order; they pushed on up the mountain, hoping to surprise the remainder of the men, but were presently repulsed. The loss was trifling on either side. Marshal Ney, however, ventured to assert, that the English had been routed at the point of the bayonet, and that their transports were ready at Porto and Lisbon.

♦Massena appointed to the army of Portugal.♦

The French had learnt at Vimeiro, and Coruña, and Talavera, to respect British valour, but they had not yet been taught to respect English policy; and they fully expected that if they brought a superior force against him, Lord Wellington would fly through Portugal, and seek shelter in his ships. Preparations, therefore, were made for this third invasion, with an army far exceeding in number those which Junot and Soult had commanded, even if they had been united, and under Massena, a general ♦1810.
April.♦ of higher rank than either. No general in the French service had enjoyed so high a reputation since Hoche, and Pichegru, and Moreau had disappeared. Buonaparte, in his first campaigns, called him, in his own inflated style, the favourite Child of Victory; and after the late Austrian war, created him Prince of Essling, because his skill and exertions had contributed mainly to the escape of the French from utter destruction at the battle of Aspern. He was appointed commander-in-chief of the provinces of the north of Spain, including the kingdoms of Old Castille, Leon, and Asturias; the provinces of St. Andero, Soria, Valladolid and Palencia, Toro, Zamora, Salamanca and Avila; the army under him was named the army of Portugal; and, as Soult had done before him, it is believed that he went to make the conquest of Portugal, expecting to be rewarded with its crown for his success.

♦Ciudad Rodrigo.♦

In the later wars between Spain and Portugal, the three cities where the Spaniards used to collect their armies before they invaded the enemy’s country were Tuy, Ciudad Rodrigo, and Badajoz. Of these fortresses, Tuy, like Valença on the opposite frontier, is now of little strength or importance, Badajoz a strong place, Ciudad Rodrigo hardly to be ranked in the third order of fortresses. It was built some centuries ago, when the site was sufficiently convenient for a fortified town; but the situation is bad; the works were old and imperfect, and it had other local disadvantages. It is commanded from many points; and one height, within 500 toises of the city, exceeds by about fifty yards the highest of its buildings. There were no bomb-proofs; and the suburbs, in which there were four convents, and the number of gardens without the walls, materially assisted the operations of a besieging army. The population of the city had been estimated at about 10,000; but it appears not much to have exceeded half that number. The garrison amounted to 4950, including 600 townsmen; the greater part of the others being volunteers, or men newly raised. Camp Marshal D. Andres Perez de Herrasti was governor, an old man, who had been the friend and comrade of Mariano Alvarez.

♦The French besiege it.♦

On the 25th of April 6000 French appeared before the place, and encamped in the Termino of Pedro Toro, a league to the eastward. On the 30th, the second division, consisting of from 4000 to 5000, arrived and encamped in the Termino of Valde Carros, a league to the north. Five days afterwards another encampment was formed between the two. On May 15th, another division, of about 7000 men, encamped to the westward, upon Monte de Ibanrey. So large a force was necessary, because the English were near at hand. By the 4th of June the city was completely invested. This was not effected without repeated skirmishes, in which the enemy suffered considerable loss. In these ♦1810.
May.♦ affairs, D. Antonio Camargo, commandant of the volunteers of Avila, greatly distinguished himself; but the individual who, above all others, annoyed the enemy by his incessant enterprise, ♦D. Julian Sanchez.♦ was D. Julian Sanchez, the son of a farmer, near the banks of the Guebra. Till the invasion of his country, he had cultivated his father’s lands; but when his father, mother, and sister had been murdered by the French, he made a vow of vengeance, and, at the head of one of those bands which the Spaniards call guerrillas, well performed it. On one occasion he surprised, in his father’s house, a French colonel, infamous for his atrocities, and put him to death, first telling him who it was that inflicted his merited punishment in this world, and sent him to render account for his crimes in the next.

♦Marshal Ney summons the town.♦

This enterprising leader made repeated assaults upon the enemy, not hesitating, at the head of sixty, eighty, or an hundred of his lancers, to attack three or four times his own number. Camargo, and D. Jose Puente, commandant of the cavalry regiment of Ciudad Rodrigo, co-operated ably with him, and the French suffered daily and hourly losses from their indefatigable activity. They suffered also greatly from the artillery of the town, which was excellently served. Ney carried on his operations in a manner which the Spaniards thought prodigal of the lives of his men, beginning his approaches where, in their judgement, a general more sparing of his army would ♦1810.
June.♦ have terminated them. To protect these works, he ordered a great number of holes to be dug, where he posted sharpshooters, by whom the garrison were greatly annoyed. On the 24th of June, Massena arrived and took the command, and at three on the following morning the batteries opened, and a constant fire from six-and-forty pieces of heavy artillery was kept up day and night till the evening of the 28th, when, having made a breach of about five-and-twenty yards in length, Ney required the governor to surrender, “sending him,” he said, “this last summons by order of the Prince of Essling, commander-in-chief of the army of Portugal, then present, whose honour and humanity were well known, but who, if the defence were uselessly prolonged, would be compelled to treat him with all the rigour authorized by the laws of war. If he had any hope of being succoured by the English, he was doubtless by that time undeceived; for if such had been their intention, they would not have waited till the city was reduced to its present deplorable state. He had, therefore, to choose between an honourable capitulation, and the terrible vengeance of a victorious army; and a positive answer was requested.” Herrasti replied, “that after forty-nine years’ service, he could not but know the laws of war and his military duties; the fortress was not in a state to capitulate; and whenever circumstances made it his duty, he would then apply for terms, after securing his honour, which was dearer to him than life.”

♦Situation of Lord Wellington.♦

How galling it must have been for Lord Wellington to witness the progress of the siege, knowing his inability to relieve the town, may well be conceived. His outposts were near enough to hear even the musketry; but with so large a proportion of his troops half-disciplined and untried, he could not act upon the offensive against an enemy greatly superior in numbers, without incurring the most imminent danger. The only possible plan by which Portugal could be saved he had laid down for himself, and from that plan no circumstances, however painful to his own feelings, or however derogatory in appearance to his reputation, could induce him to swerve. He was in communication with Romana at Badajoz; but in the state of the Spanish armies, any plan of co-operation for the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo was impossible. It was, however, of great importance that the place should be resolutely defended to the last extremity, and in this hope Romana and the English general were not disappointed. ♦Spirit of the inhabitants.♦ The minds of the people had been prepared for this extremity; they had their patriotic writers and their poets; the exploits of Julian Sanchez excited the emulation of the youth, and the conduct of the old governor gave confidence to all. The examples of Zaragoza, and Gerona, and Hostalrich, and Astorga, animated the women and children, as well as those who bore arms; for in a cause like theirs they had seen their countrymen acquire a glory when unsuccessful, which could not have been greater had they been victorious. The women and children, when they saw their houses burning, gave way neither to fear nor lamentation, but exerted themselves to quench the flames, and carried refreshment and ammunition to the troops amid the hottest fire. There were two blind beggars in the city: no one supposed that these unfortunate men could render any service during the siege, but zeal taught them how to be serviceable; they carried water to the walls by day, and ammunition by night, with such unwearied activity, that it was the intention of the governor and the Junta, if the town had been saved, to have rewarded them with pensions for life.

♦The nunnery of S. Cruz attacked.♦

It was of great consequence to the Spaniards to keep possession of those buildings without the walls, which would otherwise afford protection to the besiegers, but which also afforded such means for annoying them while they could be defended, that it had not been thought advisable to demolish them before the siege. The nunnery of Santa Cruz was the most important of these buildings. D. Ramon Castellanos was posted there with a company of sixty men, when three hundred of the enemy’s grenadiers, with a party of sappers, assailed it in the night, half the party attacking it in the rear, the other in ♦1810.
July.♦ the front. They blew up the first and second gates; hand grenades were thrown on both sides; the Spaniards, having the advantage of the building, kept up a most destructive discharge of musketry; the commander of the one party was killed, the captain of engineers, who commanded the other, wounded, but he did not retire till he had set fire to the convent. Seeing the flames, the governor made signal for Castellanos to abandon the post, who accordingly let down his men from a window into one of the inner courts of the convent, and descending himself the last, they forced their way with the bayonet. It was a little after midnight when they reached the gate of La Colada: but seeing, while they took food and rested after the action, that the enemy had extinguished the flames, Castellanos went to the governor, and represented to him that his honour was concerned in recovering the post. He led his men at three in the morning, after only two hours’ respite, to the assault, and surprising the French, drove them from their dearly purchased conquest, where they left 158 dead, and 45 wounded behind them, the remainder of the wounded having been removed during the short time that they retained possession.

♦Convent of St. Domingo recovered.
July 2.♦

They were driven from the convent of St. Domingo in a manner not less worthy of remembrance. After they had won the building, Herrasti was very desirous of recovering it, and yet hesitated at giving orders for the attempt, knowing the exhausted state of the garrison, and how ill any loss of men could be afforded. A serjeant, by name Manuel Martin, happened to hear what was the state of the governor’s feelings upon this subject. This man, who was a native of Zamora, had made himself well known to the French: they called him agua y vino, water and wine, the words which he always used when engaged in action with them; wine being his signal for attack, and water that for retreat. He had distinguished himself greatly during the siege, and had at this time a wound in his arm, which however did not prevent him from going to the governor, and soliciting permission to make an attack upon the enemy in this convent, saying, that if he could not drive them out, at least he could annoy them there. Accordingly, choosing out five-and-twenty comrades, he attacked the convent with such well-directed vigour, that the enemy, though greatly superior in numbers, were terrified and took to flight, many of them leaving their knapsacks and muskets behind them. This was so signal an exploit, that Manuel Martin was deservedly promoted for it, and a badge of distinction was given to each of the soldiers.

♦Julian Sanchez effects his escape from the city.♦

But against such a force as surrounded them, all that the Spaniards could do was to hold out to the uttermost, and sell the fortress as dearly as possible. Massena boasted of having 100,000 men in the field; he had 66,000 infantry and 6000 horse, of whom as many as could be advantageously employed carried on the siege, while the others kept the British army in check, Lord Wellington having only 51,000 under his command, including 3000 cavalry, and half this force composed of Portugueze, who were as yet untried, and consequently in whom little reliance could then be placed. They were, however, brigaded with the British in the proportion of one battalion to two, and were every day acquiring confidence and character. The siege was less murderous than that of Zaragoza, because the city was much smaller and less populous, and, having the advantage of regular works, did not require the same kind of defence. When Herrasti and the Junta saw that it was not possible to hold out much longer, they ordered Julian Sanchez and his lancers to make their escape while it was yet practicable, reminding Sanchez how important it was that his services should still be continued, and telling him he would be of more assistance to Ciudad Rodrigo in the field than he could now be within the walls. A little before midnight Sanchez collected his troops in the plaza; the two of his company who were married men took their wives behind them; they sallied out, and their leader, in the spirit of Scanderbeg, instead of contenting himself with merely effecting his own retreat, charged a post of cavalry, routed them, and carried away eight prisoners with their horses. The two women were armed with pistols, and one of them, by name Marta Fraile, saved her husband, by shooting a dragoon who was about to attack him on one side.

♦State of the British army.♦

The British army meantime, though it could render no assistance, was far from being idly or ill employed. There had been a prevailing feeling of despondency before the siege began, and an expectation that the town would surrender as soon as the enemy should have opened their fire. The progress of the siege produced more respect for the Spaniards, and the active service in which the men soon found themselves engaged produced cheerfulness and hope. The picquets occupied the line of the Azava from Carpio on the right to its junction with the Agueda; the enemy had 8000 men on the left bank of the Agueda, behind that river and the Azava, which was fordable in many places. The head-quarters of the light division, under Major-General Craufurd, were at Gallegos, a short league distant, in an open country; the greatest alertness, therefore, was necessary, and the men slept at their horses’ heads, the horses bridled and the reins in hand. The Germans were selected for the outpost duty, being at that time the only troops in the army who were acquainted with it: the 16th light dragoons requested to be intermixed with them on duty, men and officers; a compliment which gratified the brave men to whom it was paid, and the greatest harmony was always preserved. The picquets were brought to the greatest perfection, and the division soon attained that alertness which could only be learnt in such service. The Portugueze behaved well on the first opportunity which was afforded, and obtained the good opinion of their allies; so that every thing went on satisfactorily in the allied army, except that in a trifling and ill-executed affair Colonel Talbot fell, a gallant officer, who had distinguished himself at Talavera, and was deservedly and greatly lamented.

♦A practicable breach made.♦

The French general, to whom time was of more consequence than any cost of lives, pressed the siege with the utmost vigour, but with heavy loss, owing to the repeated sallies of the garrison, and the excellent manner in which the artillery of the Spaniards was served. In hope of forcing the governor to surrender by the cries of the inhabitants, he bombarded the town, and almost destroyed it; but the people were not to be shaken in their purpose, the names of Numantia and Zaragoza were in every mouth, and they were resolved in their turn to transmit a memorable example to posterity. Meantime the regular advances of the besiegers were carried on without intermission, and by the 2d of July a practicable breach had been opened in the Baluarte del Rey. The Spaniards made every exertion to defend it with sacks of earth, estacades, and whatever other obstacles they could oppose to the enemy; but the French did not yet venture an assault; they had so severely experienced the valour of their opponents, that they had determined not to storm the town till the works should be reduced to such a state, that they might avail themselves of the whole advantage of their numbers. They made three mines, one under the counterscarp, the other two under the curtain of the wall and part of the Calle del Seminario, or College-street, near the Cathedral. The besieged were aware of their progress, but all efforts at impeding it were useless, and at three in the morning of the 10th, the counterscarp was blown up, forming not only an open breach, but such a way to it that carts might ascend from the glacis.

Immediately afterwards the French renewed the fire from all their batteries, and kept it up without intermission for twelve hours. During this time the cry of the soldiers and the inhabitants, women and boys, as well as their husbands and fathers, was, that they would beat off the enemy or die; but the officers and the Junta were well aware, that any farther resistance would only afford the French a pretext for carrying their threats into execution, and putting all to the sword. Thirty thousand men were ready to storm the city that evening. It was not without much difficulty that the people could be induced to hear of a council of war, nor would they have suffered one to be held, had they not seen such undoubted proofs of the patriotism and courage of those who now told them that a surrender was become inevitable. There were some in the council who proposed to follow the example of Julian Estrada at Hostalrich, and force their way with the bayonet through their enemies; but here, as at Astorga, it was urged that they were in different circumstances, and had therefore different duties; their business now was to preserve 5000 inhabitants, who would else be exposed to the unrestrained vengeance and brutality of the enemy. Finally, it was resolved to capitulate, but not till the latest moment, when there was no longer the slightest hope or possibility of relief.

♦The town capitulates.
July 10.♦

Massena’s orders to Ney were to assault the town that evening; the French advanced for this purpose, and were at the foot of the breach, in the act of mounting, when the white flag was hoisted: the officer who planted it in the breach descended with the terms of capitulation, and presented them to Ney, who sternly told him it was now too late for any thing. The Spaniard, however, had recourse to Massena, who was at that time supposed to be more humane than Ney. The first article was, that the garrison should march out with the honours of war; the rest were in like manner such as are usual in the like circumstances. Massena having cast his eye over them, said, “Tell your governor, this is no time to ratify the terms in writing; but I grant all which he requires, and am going to give orders accordingly.” He then sent his adjutant-general to bid Ney suspend the assault. Loison immediately marched through the breach, and took possession of the town; and General Simon, notwithstanding Massena’s pledged word, made the garrison deposit their arms in the arsenal.

♦Conduct of the French.♦

The other terms were at the moment fulfilled; and when Herrasti, the next day, requested that the capitulation might be signed, in order that he might transmit it to his own government, Massena replied, that as he saw the articles observed, he neither could nor ought to require more. The people had escaped the horrors of an assault; but in other respects they soon found they were at the mercy of a conqueror who acknowledged no other law than his own pleasure. Herrasti had stipulated for the liberty of the civil officers; they, however, were declared prisoners of war. The members of the Junta were thrown into the vilest dungeon of the public gaol, from whence, after having endured for eight-and-forty hours every kind of insult and ill treatment, they were marched on foot to Salamanca, in company with the governor, who alone was permitted to retain his horse. The clergy were arrested and shut up for two days in the church of St. Juan; the old and infirm were then suffered to go to their houses, but forbidden the exercise of their functions; the lay brethren were ordered to serve in the hospitals, and all the others sent prisoners to Salamanca. The next measures were, to impose a contribution of 1,800,000 reales, and to set from six to eight hundred men at work to destroy the batteries, fill up the trenches, and repair the works, compelling them to labour like slaves, giving them no provisions, and allowing them little rest.

The account which the French published of their conquest was, according to their system, full of falsehoods. They asserted that the garrison had surrendered at discretion, which could only be contradicted, not disproved, because Massena had broken his word. This falsehood is worthy of remark, because it shows so strikingly the characteristic baseness of Buonaparte’s generals. Ciudad Rodrigo was evidently at their mercy; a generous enemy would have rejoiced to show his sense of the merits of those who had opposed him, and would have known that in refusing them the honours of war, he deprived them only of a barren form; for the merit of their gallant and heroic defence it was not in his power to efface. Massena, not satisfied with thus injuring Herrasti’s honour, cast upon him a fouler aspersion, making him say, that he and the garrison would have surrendered sooner, if they had not been intimidated by the inhabitants. In reality, such had been the noble spirit of the soldiers, that it was only by the entreaties, as well as the arguments of the superior Junta of Castille, whose residence was in that city, that they were prevailed upon to give up their intention of attempting to cut their way through the besiegers. The French general did not forget to insult the English, and endeavour by his falsehoods to exasperate the Spaniards against them. “Ciudad Rodrigo,” he said, “fell in their presence; they promised to succour it; made the inhabitants prolong their defence by this deceitful hope; and suffered the place to fall without making the slightest effort for its relief. Thus they had excited against them the universal indignation of the garrison and the people, who united in exclaiming against their perfidy.”

This justice, however, Massena did to Ciudad Rodrigo, that he admitted the defence had been most obstinate. It was impossible, he said, to form an idea of the state to which it was reduced. Every thing had been battered down; not a single house remained uninjured. The killed he estimated at more than 2000. The Spaniards stated it at only sixty-three of the inhabitants, and 237 of the garrison. Seven thousand soldiers, he said, laid down their arms: ... the number at the commencement of the siege was 4950. Six hundred made their escape on the night of the capitulation, and more than 1500 before they reached Salamanca. Above two-and-forty thousand shells were thrown into the city, and nearly five-and-twenty thousand from it. The quantity of powder consumed by the garrison during the last sixteen days was 893 quintales, ... the quintal being 132 lbs. The French gave no statement of their own loss; it was probably very considerable; ♦Speculations upon the campaign.♦ the Spaniards estimated it at 3400. The capture, however, occasioned the greatest exultation in Paris, and the Moniteur mingled with its own insults the echoes of our factious journalists. “The good sense of the English people,” it said, “enabling them to foresee the dishonour and destruction of their army in Portugal, they are convinced that the most fortunate event which could befal it would be a catastrophe like that of Moore’s. They are too much accustomed to calculate chances and events not to know, that alone against France they can, in such a contest, meet nothing but disaster, and obtain nothing but disgrace.” “Men of sound judgement, like Grenville or Grey, are numerous in England,” said the Moniteur, “but they are at present without any influence there.” Then, returning to its natural tone of insult, it ridiculed the strength of Lord Wellington’s army, amounting to the dreadful number of 24,000 English. “The cries of the inhabitants of Ciudad Rodrigo,” it said, “were heard in his camp, which was only six leagues distant: but all ears were shut against them; the English made no attempt to succour that city: ... they were the laughing-stock of Europe; every coffee-house waiter knew their weakness on land, as well as their influence at sea. Ciudad Rodrigo was one of the last bulwarks of the insurrection; its capture made the catastrophe more imminent for England, who would now find it necessary to call to the helm more prudent men, better acquainted with the nature of the resources and of the strength of their country, and therefore more moderate.”

In England, too, we were told, that if Ciudad Rodrigo were taken, the efforts of the English might be considered to be at an end; the French would then be able to advance without fear of a check; the harvest also being now begun, whatever grain there was in the country they would be able to secure for themselves, and so form magazines, the want of which had hitherto chiefly retarded their advance. At one time these politicians cried out, “that Lord Wellington could not permit the enemy quietly to prosecute the siege of so important a fortress.” At another, “they would not suppose him capable of fighting a useless battle: for they trusted he was not so prodigal of the blood of his followers. They trusted that his operations would be justified by the event.” Then again “they were not competent to speak from their own knowledge, yet certainly it did appear a doubtful policy to be patiently waiting till Massena had time to concentrate his troops, and make all his arrangements for an attack on the British position.” “The plan of overwhelming Lord Wellington, by bringing an immense superiority to bear upon him, was one which obviously presented itself; there seemed no insurmountable difficulty in the execution; obstacles there might be, from want of provisions and other circumstances, but the skill and perseverance of the French in combating them forbade us to place much reliance upon such grounds.” In this manner, always presaging evil, and consistent in nothing but despondency, sometimes borrowing the tone of the Moniteur, and sometimes setting it, did these journalists of a disappointed party labour to deaden the hearts and hopes of their countrymen; while their more daring, but hardly more mischievous coadjutors addressed their weekly invectives to the readers and auditors in pot-houses and tap-rooms, abusing their ignorance, appealing to, and inflaming their worst passions, and crying out against the measures of their own government, while upon the crimes of Buonaparte they observed a silence which sufficiently indicated their sympathy with his system, their wishes for the extension of his tyranny, and their hopes of his eventual success.

♦La Puebla de Sanabria occupied by the French.♦

The fall of Ciudad Rodrigo enabled Massena to detach a force for the relief of Astorga, where General Mahy, who commanded in Galicia, was blockading the French garrison. This object was easily effected. General Taboada at this time occupied Puebla de Sanabria, where he was exerting himself to organize a body of troops for the field: General Echavarria was engaged in like manner at Alcañizas. In such feeble, uncombined efforts the spirit of the country was spent, and its resources frittered away; for as soon as men enough were brought together to attract the enemy’s attention, they were either dispersed or destroyed. This was the fate of Echavarria’s corps; it was surprised by a French detachment under General La Croix, and nearly annihilated. The alarm spread to Silveira’s head-quarters at Braganza, and Colonel Wilson (his second in command) hastened with the advanced guard to Echavarria’s support; but he arrived only to find the ground covered with dead and wounded Spaniards, the enemy having retired to Carvales, after completely accomplishing the purpose of their expedition. Massena boasted soon afterwards of a like success at Sanabria; but the results were very different. The French magnified the importance of this post, saying that it commanded the entrance into Portugal, and shut up the communication with Galicia. They said also, that Lord Wellington had enjoined the Spanish governor to make an obstinate defence; but that the governor reproached him in reply for having deceived the commandant of Ciudad Rodrigo, and broken his word with him; told him it was evident he intended to do nothing for Spain, but only, for the sake of fomenting divisions, held out hopes of assistance which were never realized; yet nevertheless offered to shut himself up in the fortress, and bury himself in its ruins, if the English general would send him one Englishman for two Spaniards, to assist in its defence. The answer of Lord Wellington, the French papers said, might easily be conceived; and the Spanish general therefore abandoned the town, where General Serras found twenty pieces of artillery, and provisions for 3000 men for six months. After this the French made no farther mention of the Puebla de Sanabria.

♦The Portugueze retake it.♦

D. Francisco Taboada Gil, the officer who was thus falsely represented as insulting the English general, had communicated not with him but with the Portugueze commander, Silveira, at Braganza, with whom it was agreed that he should evacuate the place if it were attacked by a superior force. Taboada accordingly ♦July 29.♦ fell back upon the Portillas de Galicia; Silveira, having ascertained that Serras had returned with the greater part of his troops to Mombuey, concerted measures with the Spanish general for surprising the garrison which the French had left in Sanabria, and on the fourth day after they had taken possession of their boasted conquest, the enemy found themselves ♦Aug. 3.♦ invested in the fort. They were summoned; but the commander replied, that he had men and ammunition to defend himself with, and that he expected speedily to be succoured by Marshal Massena. On the following morning a detachment of about seventy French cavalry came on to attack the advanced guard of the Portugueze, under Captain Francisco Texeira Lobo, whose force was about equal; but while he charged them in front, another small party of Portugueze, by his instructions, wheeled round and attacked them in the rear: they were instantly broken, and twenty-eight were left upon the field, thirty prisoners, and ♦1810.
August.♦ forty horses taken. The remainder of that day was spent in vain endeavours to force an entrance into the fort: the assailants burnt the gates, but the enemy blocked them up effectually with stones; the Portugueze and Spaniards then got possession of a house adjoining, from whence they attempted to make a way through, but the enemy soon battered it down. On the morrow, one mortar and one three-pounder were planted against them; the first became useless after a few discharges, and Silveira, the next morning, sent for a six-pounder from Braganza. He was now apprized that Serras was advancing in force to relieve the garrison. Silveira left the Spaniards to maintain the blockade, and drew up in order of battle upon the river Tera; but Serras, having reconnoitred his force, thought proper to retire upon Mombuey. The six-pounder, from Braganza, was an iron gun, in such a state, that when it arrived it was of no avail; and a twelve-pounder, which on the 8th was brought from the same place, proved in the same condition: this was a serious disappointment, for Silveira was now apprized that Serras was collecting reinforcements. Six hundred horse had entered Zamora, on their way to him, and two battalions of Italian troops were joining him from Benevente, ♦Aug. 9.♦ Leon, and Astorga. Unable to batter the place, because of the wretched state of his artillery, which had been long left to rust in a dilapidated fortress, he tried the effect of mining; here experience and skill were wanting, and only the face of the curtain was thrown down. The garrison, however, who were Swiss, dreaded that a second attempt might prove more successful; and their commandant, pleading that he and his men were not French, proposed and obtained good terms, delivering up the place on condition that they should be allowed to embark from Coruña, and return to their own country, on their parole, not to bear arms against the allied powers. The artillery of the place, and the stores, were restored to the Spaniards; but Silveira retained for the Portugueze an eagle, the first which they had taken from their enemy. Sixty of the Swiss entered into the service of the allies.

Serras was in sight of Silveira’s advanced posts when this capitulation was concluded; he had with him from 4000 to 5000 foot, and about 800 cavalry. The allied Portugueze and Spaniards were inferior in number, and still more in discipline, and with this unequal force pressing hard upon them they broke up from Sanabria, at a time when the prisoners were come three hours march on the way to Coruña. Colonel Wilson, who had been ordered on an important duty to head-quarters, returned in time to assume the command of the rear-guard, and with it cover their retrograde movement. He checked the French in a sharp affair of cavalry, after which he took the open road to Braganza, Silveira retreating with the foot upon the heights of Calabor, where the enemy, if they should continue the pursuit, could derive no advantage from their horse. But having arrived too late for saving the garrison, they advanced no farther than Pedralva, and from thence returned to Sanabria, then to Mombuey. This was the termination of General Serras’s success at the Puebla de Sanabria; the whole of the garrison which he left there were taken prisoners, and the eagle which was taken with them was deposited with proper triumph in the cathedral at Lisbon, as the first trophy of the regenerated Portugueze.