VII THE DISMEMBERMENT OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

The condition of affairs in the East now seemed all the more alarming and critical as the Allies, after dismembering Turkey, did not seem to have given up their plan of evicting the Turks. This policy, which had taken Armenia from Turkey, but had not succeeded in ensuring her a definite status, could only hurry on the Pan-Turkish and Pan-Arabian movements, drive them to assert their opposition more plainly, and thus bring them closer together by reinforcing Pan-Islamism.

Of course it had been said at the beginning of January, 1920, that the Turks were downhearted, that Mustafa Kemal was short of money, that he had to encounter the opposition of the other parties, and that his movement seemed doomed to failure. It was also asserted that his army was only made up of bands which began to plunder the country, and that anarchy now prevailed throughout Turkey-in-Asia. Yet the Nationalist generals soon managed to intercept the food-supply of Constantinople, and when the conditions of the Peace Treaty were made known the situation, as has just been seen, underwent a complete change. They held in check the English till the latter had called the Greeks to their help, and though at a certain stage it would have been possible to negotiate and come to terms with Mustafa Kemal, now, on the contrary, it was impossible to do so, owing to the amplitude and strength gained by the Nationalist movement.

It was soon known that many a parley had been entered into between Turkish and Arabian elements, that some Turkish officers had gone over to the Arabian Nationalists of Syria and had taken command of their troops, and though a political agreement or a closer connection between the two elements did not ensue, yet the Turks and the Arabs, dreading foreign occupation, organised themselves and were ready to help each other to defend their independence.

We should bear in mind what Enver Pasha, who was playing a questionable part in the East, and Fethy Bey had once done in Tripoli. Turkish officers might very well, if an opportunity occurred, impart to these bands the discipline and cohesion they lacked and instil into them a warlike spirit; or these bands might side with the Bolshevists who had invaded the Transcaspian isthmus; they would have been able to hinder the operations that the Allies had once seemed inclined to launch into, but had wisely given up, and they could always raise new difficulties for the Allies.

Lastly, the idea, once contemplated and perhaps not definitely given up, to send back to Asia the Sultans and viziers who, after their centuries-old intercourse with the West, had become “Europeanised” and to whom the ways and manners of our diplomacy had grown familiar, could only modify their foreign policy to our disadvantage, and give it an Asiatic turn; whereas now, having long associated Ottoman affairs with European affairs, they have thus been brought to consider their own interests from a European point of view. The influence of this intercourse with Europe on the Constantinople Government naturally induced it to exercise a soothing influence over the Mussulmans, which was to the advantage of both Europe and Turkey. It is obvious that, on the contrary, the eviction of the Sultan, at a time when the Arabian world and the Turkish world were being roused, would have left the Allied Powers face to face with anarchist elements which, being spurred on by similar religious and nationalist passions, would have grouped together; and one day the Powers would have found themselves confronted with the organised resistance of established governments. Even as things are now, who can foresee what will be all the consequences in the East of the clauses enforced on Turkey by the Sèvres Treaty?

1. The Turco-Armenian Question.

The Armenian question, which has convulsed Turkey so deeply and made the Eastern question so intricate, originated in the grasping spirit of Russia in Asia Minor and the meddling of Russia in Turkish affairs under pretence of protecting the Armenians. This question, as proved by the difficulties to which it has given rise since the beginning, is one of the aspects of the antagonism between Slavs and Turks, and a phase of the everlasting struggle of the Turks to hinder the Slavs from reaching the shores of the Mediterranean Sea, to which the Russians have always striven to get access either through Asia Minor or through Thrace, or through both countries at once.

Yet Mohammed II, after taking Constantinople, had in 1461 instituted a patriarchate in favour of the Armenians. Later on various rights were granted to them at different times by Imperial firmans.

Some Armenian monks of Calcutta, availing themselves of the liberty they enjoyed in India, founded at the beginning of the eighteenth century the Aztarar (the Newsmonger), the first newspaper published in the Armenian language; and at the end of the same century the Mekhitharists published in Venice Yeghanak Puzantian (the Byzantine Season). About the middle of the nineteenth century, the same monks edited a review of literature and information, Pazmareb, which still exists. The Protestant Armenians too edited a review of propaganda, Chtemaran bidani Kidehatz, at Constantinople. Finally, in 1840, the first daily paper printed in the Armenian language, Archalouis Araradian (the Dawn of Ararat), was published at Smyrna.

In 1857, in the monastery of Varag, near Van, Miguirditch Krimian, who later on became Patriarch and Catholicos, established printing-works. Under the title of Ardziv Vaspourakani (the Eagle of Vaspourakan) he edited a monthly review to defend the cause of Armenian independence, and at the same time a similar review, Ardziv Tarono (the Eaglet of Taron), was published at Mush. About the same time the Armenians in Russia too began to publish various periodicals, such as Hussissapail (the Aurora Borealis), a review printed at Moscow in 1850, and several newspapers at Tiflis and Baku. In 1860 the Armenians were allowed to hold an Armenian National Assembly to discuss and settle their religious and national affairs.

From the fourteenth century till about 1860, the Armenian element lived on good terms with the Moslem element, and some Armenians persecuted in Russia even sought refuge in Turkey. The Turks, on their coming, had found Armenians, but no Armenia, for the latter country, in the course of a most confused history, had enjoyed but short periods of independence with ever-changing frontiers; and the Armenians who had successively been under Roman, Seljuk, Persian, and Arabian dominion lived quietly with the Turks for six centuries.

But in 1870 a group of young men revived and modified a movement which had been started and kept up by Armenian monks, and wrote books in Constantinople in favour of the Armenians.

In 1875, Portokalian established the first revolutionary Armenian Committee, and edited a newspaper, Asia. Soon afterwards the Araratian committee was formed, aiming at establishing a close connection between Turkish and Russian Armenians, followed by other committees such as Tebrotssassiranz, Arevelian, and Kilikia.

Other committees with charitable or economic purposes, such as “The Association of Kindness” and “The Association of Benevolence,” which were started in 1860 with a large capital to develop the natural resources of Cilicia, also played a part in the Armenian movement.

The Armenian question began really to arise and soon grew more and more acute in 1878, after the Turco-Russian war, at a time when Turkey had to face serious domestic and foreign difficulties. This question was dealt with in Article 16 of the San Stefano treaty of July 10, 1878, and Article 61 of the Berlin treaty. Article 16 of the San Stefano treaty, drawn up at the Armenians’ request, and supported by the Russian plenipotentiaries, stated that “the Sublime Porte pledges itself to realise without any more delay the administrative autonomy rendered necessary by local needs in the provinces inhabited by Armenians.” The Turks raised an objection to the words “administrative autonomy” and wanted them to be replaced by “reforms and improvements,” but the Russians then demanded the occupation of Armenia by the Tsar’s troops as a guarantee. The Berlin Congress did away with this clause of guarantee, and instead of the words proposed by Russia adopted those asked for by Turkey.

In order to acquire a moral influence over the Armenians living in Turkey and play a prominent part among them, the Orthodox Christians who were devoted to the Tsar endeavoured to get themselves recognised as a superior power by the patriarchate of Constantinople, and with the help of Russian political agents they succeeded in their endeavours. It was soon observed that the new connection between the Catholicos and the Constantinople Patriarchate aimed at, and succeeded in, starting an anti-Turkish movement within the Armenian populations of Russia and Asia Minor.

When the Russians arrived close to Constantinople, at the end of the Turco-Russian war, Nerses Varzabedian, who had succeeded Krimian, was received by the Grand Duke Nicholas, and handed him a memorandum, in which, after stating all the Armenian grievances against the Ottoman Government, he asked “that the Eastern provinces of Asia Minor inhabited by Armenians should be proclaimed independent or at least should pass under the control of Russia.” Four prelates were sent separately to Rome, Venice, Paris, and London to make sure of the Powers’ support, and met together at the Berlin Congress. Though they strongly advocated the maintenance of Article 16 of the San Stefano treaty, they only succeeded in getting Article 61 of the Berlin treaty.

It was not until about 1885 that what was afterwards called the Armenian movement began to be spoken of, and then some Armenian revolutionaries who had sought shelter in England, France, Austria, and America began to edit periodicals, form committees, inveigh against the would-be Turkish exactions, and denounce the violation of the Berlin treaty.

These ideas of independence soon made more and more headway and the prelates who, after Nerses’ death, were known for their pro-Turkish feelings, as Haroutian Vehabedian, Bishop of Erzerum, made Patriarch in 1885, were forsaken by the Armenian clergy and soon found themselves in opposition to the committees.

In 1888 Khorene Achikian, who succeeded Vehabedian, was also accused of being on friendly terms with the Turks, and the committees strove to have him replaced by Narbey, who had been a member of the delegation sent to Europe for the Berlin Congress.

This Armenian movement naturally caused some incidents between the various elements of the population, which were magnified, brought by the bishops and consuls to the knowledge of the European Powers, and cited as the outcome of Turkish cruelty.

After the Turco-Russian war, the revolutionary agitation which stirred up Russia and the Caucasus had its repercussion among the Armenians, and the harsh measures of the Tsar’s Government only strengthened the agitation by increasing Armenian discontent.

Miguirditch Portokalian, a teacher living at Van, came to Marseilles, where in 1885 he edited a newspaper, Armenia. At the same time Minas Tscheraz started another newspaper in Paris under the same title. These publicists, both in their journals and in meetings, demanded that Article 61 of the Berlin treaty should be carried out.

In 1880 some revolutionary committees were formed in Turkey. In 1882 “The Association of the Armed Men” was founded at Erzerum; some of its members were arrested, and the association itself was dissolved in 1883.

A rising took place at Van in 1885 on the occasion of the election of a bishop, and some insurrectionist movements occurred at Constantinople, Mush, and Alashehr under various pretexts.

Next year, in 1886, one Nazarbey, a Caucasian by birth, and his wife Maro, formed in Switzerland the Huntchag (the Bell), a social-democrat committee that aimed at getting an autonomous administration for the Armenians, and published in London a monthly periodical bearing the same name. This committee meant to achieve its object not through the intervention or mediation of the European Powers—to which it thought it useless to make another appeal, as their individual interests were so much at variance—but solely by the action of its organisations throughout the country, which were to raise funds, equipment, foment troubles, weaken the Government, and take advantage of any opportunity that might occur.

The Huntchag committee found representatives in every great town—Smyrna, Aleppo, Constantinople, etc.—and its organisation was completed in 1889.

In 1890, at the instigation of the Huntchagists, a rebellion broke out at Erzerum, and incidents occurred in various places. At Constantinople a demonstration of armed men, headed by the Patriarch Achikian, repaired to the Sublime Porte to set forth their grievances, but were scattered; and the Patriarch, who was reproached with being too moderate, and whose life was even attempted, had to resign.

In fact the Huntchag committee, which enlisted the effective and moral support of the representatives of the Powers, especially those of Russia and England, carried on its intrigues without intermission, and increased its activity.

On Sunday, March 25, 1894, at Samsun, in the ground adjoining the church, one Agap, living at Diarbekir, who had been chosen by the Huntchag committee to kill the Patriarch Achikian because he was accused of being on friendly terms with the Ottoman Government, fired at the prelate with a revolver, but missed his mark. After this criminal attempt, Achikian resigned his office, and Mathew Ismirlian, supported by the committees, was elected Patriarch, owing to the pressure brought to bear on the National Assembly. The new Patriarch immediately became chairman of the Huntchag committee, which he developed, and soon after appointed President of the Ecclesiastical Council of the Patriarchate and later on Catholicos of Cilicia a certain priest, Kirkor Alajan, who had been dismissed and sent to Constantinople for insulting the Governor of Mush.

A few Armenians, dissatisfied with the programme of the Huntchagists, founded a new association in 1890 under the name of Troshak, which later on was called Tashnaktsutioun, and edited the Troshak newspaper. The members of this committee often resorted to threats and terror to get the funds they needed, and did not shrink from assassinating whoever refused to comply with the injunctions of the committee.

In 1896 the committees attempted to seize the Ottoman Bank. Some armed komitadjis, who had come from Europe with Russian passports, rushed into the Ottoman Bank, but were driven back by Government troops. But the promoters of the raid were not arrested, owing to their being protected by the Russian and French authorities. Attended by Maximof, an Armenian by birth, first dragoman of the Russian embassy, and Rouet, first dragoman of the French embassy, they were brought by the dispatch-boat of the latter embassy on board the Gironde, a packet-ship of the Messageries Maritimes. The adherents of the Troshak, entrenched in the churches of Galata, Samatra, and the Patriarchate, begged for mercy, while Armene Aktoni, one of the leaders of the committee, committed suicide after waiting for the coming of the English fleet on the heights of Soulou-Monastir, at Samatra.

The bishops continued to solicit, and to some extent obtained, the support of the Russian, English, and French consuls; yet Mgr. Ismirlian, who had sent an ultimatum to the Imperial Palace and never ceased to intrigue, was finally dismissed in 1896 and sent to Jerusalem.

At that time many Armenians set off to Europe and America, and the Catholicos of Etchmiadzin sent some delegates to the Hague Conference to lay before it the Armenian plight in Turkey. These committees, which displayed so much activity in Turkey, did not attempt anything on behalf of their fellow-countrymen in Russia.

The committees which had been founded during or before Nerses’ patriarchate under the names of Ararat, The Orient, The Friends of Education, Cilicia, were all grouped, in 1890, into one called Miatzal Anikeroutioun Hayotz, which association continued to organise committees even in the smallest villages, taking advantage of the tolerance of the Ottoman Government and its benevolence to the Armenians to carry on an active anti-Turkish propaganda.

This propaganda was supported by the Armenian bishops in the eastern provinces, where they endeavoured to bring about European intervention. On the other hand the Russians, as eager as ever to domineer over both the Orthodox Church and Armenia, incited the Armenians against the Turks by all possible means and urged them to fulfil their national aspirations, as they knew full well they would thus bring them more easily under Russian sovereignty.

The influence of these committees, as will be seen later on, had a very important bearing on the events that took place in Asia Minor at that time.

Risings, which may be traced back to 1545 and lasted till the proclamation of the 1908 constitution, were continually taking place in the mountainous area of Zeitun. They were partly brought about by the feudal system of administration still prevailing in that region. Each of the four districts of Zeitun was governed by a chief who had assumed the title of “ishehan” or prince, a kind of nobleman to whom Turkish villages had to pay some taxes collected by special agents. The action of the committees, of course, benefited by that state of things, to which the Ottoman Government put an end only in 1895.

The Armenians had already refused to pay the taxes and had rebelled repeatedly between 1782 and 1851, at which time the Turks, incensed at the looting and exactions of the Armenian mountaineers, left their farms and emigrated. Till that time the rebellions of Zeitun could be partly accounted for by the administration of the “ishehan.” But the leaders of the Armenian movement soon took advantage of these continual disturbances and quickly gave them another character. The movement was spurred on and eagerly supported by Armenians living abroad, and in 1865, after the so-called Turkish exactions, the Nationalist committees openly rebelled against the Government and demanded the independence of Zeitun. Henceforth rebellion followed rebellion, and one of them, fomented by the Huntchagists, lasted three months.

In 1890 the Huntchag and Tashnaktsutioun committees stirred up riots at Erzerum, and in 1894 at Samsun, where the Patriarch Ashikian was fired at, as has just been seen. In 1905 the Tashnakists started a new insurrection. The rebellion extended to Amasia, Sivas, Tokat, Mush, and Van, and the committees endeavoured to spread and intensify it. In 1905-06 the manœuvres of the Armenian committees succeeded in rousing hostile feelings between Kurds and Armenians, which no reform whatever seemed able to soothe. And in 1909-10, when new troubles broke out, the revolutionary leaders openly attacked the Government troops.

Two years after the confiscation and handing over to the Ottoman Government of the Armenian churches on June 21, 1903, massacres took place at Batum on February 6, 1905, and later on at Erivan, Nakhitchevan, Shusha, and Koshak. In 1908 the Tsar’s sway in the whole of Caucasus became most oppressive, and a ukase prescribed the election of a new catholicos to succeed Mgr. Krimian, who had died in October, 1907. Mgr. Ismirlian was appointed in his stead in 1908. By that time the Russian sway had become so oppressive that the Tashnakists took refuge in Constantinople, where the Young Turks openly declared in favour of the Russian Armenians.

It might have been expected that after the proclamation of the Constitution the committees, who had striven to hurry on the downfall of the Empire through an agitation that might have brought about foreign intervention, would put an end to their revolutionary schemes and turn their activity towards social and economic questions. Sabah-Gulian, a Caucasian by birth, president of the Huntchag, at a meeting of this committee held in 1908 in Sourp-Yerourtoutioun church at Pera, speaking of the Huntchagists’ programme and the constitutional régime, declared: “We, Huntchagists, putting an end to our revolutionary activity, must devote all our energy to the welfare of the country.” On the other hand Agnoni, a Russian by birth, one of the presidents of the Tashnaktsutioun, stated that “the first duty of the Tashnakists would be to co-operate with the Union and Progress Committee in order to maintain the Ottoman Constitution and ensure harmony and concord between the various elements.”

The union of the committees did not last long, as they held widely different views about the new condition of the Turkish Empire; but soon after the Tashnaktsutioun, the Huntchag, and the Veragaznial-Huntchag committees were reorganised and new committees formed throughout Turkey. The Ramgavar (the Rights of the People) committee was instituted in Egypt by M. Boghos Nubar after the proclamation of the Constitution, and displayed the greatest activity. This committee, in March, 1914, agreed to work on the same lines with the Huntchag, the Tashnaktsutioun, and the Veragaznial-Huntchag. Another committee, the Sahmanatragan, was also constituted. They made sure of the support of the Patriarchate and the bishops to reassert their influence and spread a network of ramifications all over the country in order to triumph at the elections. They carried on an active propaganda to conciliate public opinion, by means of all kinds of publications, school books, almanacs, postcards, songs, and so on, all edited at Geneva or in Russia.

As early as 1905 the Armenian committees had decided at a congress held in Paris to resort to all means in order to make Cilicia an independent country. Russia, on the other hand, strove hard to spread orthodoxy in the districts round Adana, Marash, and Alexandretta, in order to enlarge her zone of influence on this side and thus get an outlet to the Mediterranean. At the same time, the Bishop of Adana, Mosheg, did his best to foment the rebellion which was to break out soon after.

In this way the Armenian Christians contributed to the extension of the Russian Empire. In 1904-05, the Nestorians asked for Russian priests and expressed their intention to embrace the Orthodox Faith. The Armenians of Bitlis, Diarbekir, and Kharput in 1907 handed the Russian consul a petition bearing over 200,000 signatures, in which they asked to become Russian subjects.

The Huntchagist leader, Sabah-Gulian, even owned in the Augah Hayassdan (Independent Armenia) newspaper that the members of the committee had taken advantage of the Turks’ carelessness to open shops, where rifles were being sold at half-price or even given away.

The Armenian committees took advantage of the new parliamentary elections to stir up a new agitation. They increased their activity, and, contrary to their engagements, corresponded with the members of the opposition who had fled abroad.

During the Balkan war in 1913 the Tashnakist committees issued manifestoes against the Ottoman Government and the Union party. The Russian consuls at Erzerum and Bitlis did not conceal their sympathy, and at Van the Russian consul threatened to the vali to ask Russian troops to come through Azerbaïjan under the pretext of averting the fictitious dangers the Armenians were supposed to run, and of restoring order.

Now, whereas Russia at home unmercifully stifled all the attempts of the Armenian committees, she encouraged and energetically supported the agitators in Turkey. Moreover, in the report addressed by the Russian consul at Bitlis to the Russian ambassador in Constantinople, dated December 24, 1912, and bearing number 63, the Russian Government was informed that the aim of the Tashnakists was, as they expressly said, “to bring the Russians here,” and that, in order “to reach this end, the Tashnakists are resorting to various means, and doing their best to bring about collisions between Armenians and Moslems, especially with Ottoman troops.” In support of this statement he mentioned a few facts that leave no doubt about its veracity.

This report contained the following lines, which throw considerable light on the Allies’ policy:

“Your Excellency will understand that the future collisions between Armenians and Moslems will partly depend on the line of conduct and activity of the Tashnaktsutioun committee, on the turn taken by the peace negotiations between Turkey and the Slavonic States of the Balkans, and on the eventuality of an occupation of Constantinople by the Allies. If the deliberations of the London Conference did not bring about peace, the coming downfall of the Ottoman capital would certainly influence the relations between Moslems and Armenians at Bitlis.

“Both in towns and in the country the Armenians, together with their religions leaders, have always displayed much inclination and affection for Russia, and have repeatedly declared the Turkish Government is unable to maintain order, justice, and prosperity in their country. Many Armenians have already promised to offer the Russian soldiers their churches to be converted into orthodox places of worship.

“The present condition of the Balkans, the victory of the Slav and Hellenic Governments over Turkey, have delighted the Armenians and filled their hearts with the cheerful hope of being freed from Turkey.”

Of course, the coming to Bitlis of a mixed Commission of Armenians and Turks under the presidency of an Englishman, in order to carry out reforms in the Turkish provinces near the Caucasus, did not please the Armenians and Russians who had sacrificed many soldiers to get possession of these regions.

Taking advantage of the difficulties experienced by the Ottoman Government after the Balkan war, the committees agreed together to raise anew the question of “reforms in the Eastern provinces.” A special commission, presided over by M. Boghos Nubar, was sent by the Catholicos of Etchmiadzin to the European Governments to uphold the Armenian claims. At the same time a campaign was started by the Armenian newspapers of Europe, Constantinople, and America, especially by the Agadamard, the organ of the Tashnaktsutioun committee, which had no scruple in slandering the Turks and announcing sham outrages.

In 1913 Russia proposed a scheme of reforms to be instituted in Armenia. It was communicated by M. de Giers to the Six Ambassadors’ Conference, which appointed a commission to report on it. As the German and Austrian representatives raised objections to the Russian scheme before that Commission of Armenian Reforms, which met from June 20 to July 3, 1913, at the Austrian embassy at Yeni Keui, Russia, after this defeat, strove to bring over Germany to her views.

In September, 1913, M. de Giers and M. de Wangenheim came to terms on a programme to which the Porte opposed a counter-proposal. Yet the Russian representatives succeeded in concluding a Russo-Turkish agreement, January 26 to February 8, 1914.

When the scheme of reforms was outlined, and the powers and jurisdiction of the inspectors and their staff were settled, the Catholicos sent a telegram of congratulation to M. Borghos Nubar and the latter sent another to M. Sazonov, for the Armenian committees considered the arrangement as a first step towards autonomy. Encouraged by this first success, the committees exerted themselves more and more. The Tashnaksutioun transferred its seat to Erzerum, where it held a congress. The Huntchag committee sent to Russia and Caucasus several of its most influential members to raise funds in order to foment a rising to attack the Union and Progress party especially, and to overthrow the Government. Such was the state of things when war broke out.

The Patriarch, who passed himself off as representing the Armenian people, gathered together under his presidency the leaders of the Tashnaktsutioun, the Huntchag, the Ramgavar, and the Veragaznial-Huntchag, and the members of the National Assembly who were affiliated to these committees to decide what attitude they were to take in case the Ottoman Government should enter into the war. No decision was taken, the Huntchagists declining to commit themselves and the Tasknakists stating they preferred waiting to see how things would turn out. Yet these committees carried on their activities separately, and sent instructions to the provinces that, if the Russians advanced, all means should be resorted to in order to impede the retreat of the Ottoman troops and hold up their supplies, and if, on the contrary, the Ottoman army advanced, the Armenian soldiers should leave their regiments, form themselves into groups, and go over to the Russians.

The committees availed themselves of the difficulties of the Ottoman Government, which had recently come out of a disastrous war and had just entered into a new conflict, to bring about risings at Zeitun, in the sandjaks of Marash and Cesarea, and chiefly in the vilayet of Van, at Bitlis, Talori, and Mush in the vilayet of Bitlis, and in the vilayet of Erzerum.

In the sandjaks of Erzerum and Bayazid, as soon as the decree of mobilisation was issued, most of the Armenian soldiers went over to the Russians, were equipped and armed anew by them, and then sent against the Turks. The same thing occurred at Erzindjan, where three-fourths of the Armenians crossed the Russian frontier.

The Armenians of the vilayet of Mamouret’ ul Azig (Kharput), where the Mussulmans were also attacked and where depots of arms had been concealed, provided with numerous recruits the regiments dispatched by Russia to Van and the Persian frontier. Many emissaries had been sent from Russia and Constantinople to Dersim and its area to raise the Kurds against the Ottoman Government. So it was in the vilayet of Diarbekir, though the Armenians were in a minority. Depots of arms of all descriptions were discovered there, together with many refractory soldiers.

In the Karahissar area, where several revolutionary movements had broken out during and after the Balkan war, the Armenians refused to obey the decree of mobilisation and were only waiting for the coming of the Russians to rebel.

Similar incidents—such as mutinous soldiers, attacks against the Turks, threats to families of mobilised Ottomans—occurred in the vilayet of Angora.

In the vilayet of Van, when the Russians, reinforced by Armenian volunteers, started an offensive, some Armenian peasants gathered together and prepared to attack the Ottoman officials and the gendarmerie. At the beginning of 1915 rebellions took place at Kevash, Shatak, Havassour, and Timar, and spread in the kazas of Arjitch and Adeljivaz. At Van over five thousand rebels, seven hundred of whom attacked the fortress, blew up the military and Government buildings, the Ottoman Bank, the offices of the Public Debt, the excise office, the post and telegraph offices, and set fire to the Moslem quarter. When this insurrection subsided about the end of April, numerous Armenian bands, led by Russian officers, attempted to cross the Russian and Persian frontiers.

After the capture of Van, the Armenians gave a great dinner in honour of General Nicolaiev, commander-in-chief of the Russian army in Caucasus, who made a speech in which he said: “Since 1826, the Russians have always striven to free Armenia, but political circumstances have always prevented their success. Now, as the grouping of nations has been quite altered, we may hope Armenians will soon be free.” Aram Manoukian, known as Aram Pasha, soon after appointed provisional Governor of Van by General Nicolaiev, replied: “When we rose a month ago, we expected the Russians would come. At a certain moment, our situation was dreadful. We had to choose between surrender and death. We chose death, but when we no longer expected your help, it has suddenly arrived.”36

The Armenian bands even compelled the Ottoman Government to call back troops from the front to suppress their revolutionary manœuvres in the vilayet of Brusa and the neighbourhood. At Adana, as in the other provinces, all sorts of insurrectionary movements were smouldering.

Under such circumstances, the Turkish Government tried to crush these revolutionary efforts by military expeditions, and the repression was merciless. A decree of the Government about changes of residence of the Armenian populations included measures for the deportation of Armenians. As the Turks are generally so listless, and as similar methods had been resorted to by the Germans on the Western front, these measures may have been suggested to the Turks by the Germans.

Tahsin Pasha, Governor of Van, was replaced by Jevdet Bey, Enver’s brother-in-law, and Khalil Pasha, another relation of Enver, had command of the Turkish troops in the Urmia area. Talaat sent Mustafa Khalil, his brother-in-law, to Bitlis.

The revolutionary manœuvres of the Armenians and the repressive measures of the Turks, with their mutual repercussions, could not but quicken the old feuds; so the outcome was a wretched one for both parties.

One cannot wonder that under such conditions continuous conflicts arose between the two elements of the population, that reprisals followed reprisals on either side, first after the Turco-Russian war, again after the events of 1895-96, then in the course of the Adana conflict, during the Balkan war, and finally during the late war. But it is impossible to trust the information according to which the number of the Armenians slaughtered by the Turks rose to over 800,000 and in which no mention is made of any Turks massacred by the Armenians. These figures are obviously exaggerated,37 since the Armenian population, which only numbered about 2,300,000 souls before the war throughout the Turkish Empire, did not exceed 1,300,000 in the eastern provinces, and the Armenians now declare they are still numerous enough to make up a State. According to Armenian estimates there were about 4,160,000 Armenians in all in 1914—viz., 2,380,000 in the Ottoman Empire, 1,500,000 in Russia, 64,000 in the provinces of the Persian Shah and in foreign colonies, and about 8,000 in Cyprus, the isles of the Archipelago, Greece, Italy, and Western Europe.

The best answer to the eager and ever-recurring complaints made by the Armenians or at their instigation is to refer the reader to a report entitled “Statistics of the Bitlis and Van Provinces” drawn up by General Mayewsky, who was Russian consul first at Erzerum for six years and later on at Van, and in this capacity represented a Power that had always showed much hostility to Turkey. It was said in it:

“All the statements of the publicists, which represent the Kurds as doing their best to exterminate the Armenians, must be altogether rejected. If they were reliable, no individual belonging to an alien race could have ever lived in the midst of the Kurds, and the various peoples living among them would have been obliged to emigrate bodily for want of bread, or to become their slaves. Now nothing of the kind has occurred. On the contrary, all those who know the eastern provinces state that in those countries the Christian villages are at any rate more prosperous than those of the Kurds. If the Kurds were only murderers and thieves, as is often said in Europe, the prosperous state of the Armenians till 1895 would have been utterly impossible. So the distress of the Armenians in Turkey till 1895 is a mere legend. The condition of the Turkish Armenians was no worse than that of the Armenians living in other countries.

“The complaints according to which the condition of the Armenians in Turkey is represented as unbearable do not refer to the inhabitants of the towns, for the latter have always been free and enjoyed privileges in every respect. As to the peasants, owing to their perfect knowledge of farmwork and irrigation, their condition was far superior to that of the peasants in Central Russia.

“As to the Armenian clergy, they make no attempt to teach religion; but they have striven hard to spread national ideas. Within the precincts of mysterious convents, the teaching of hatred of the Turk has replaced devotional observances. The schools and seminaries eagerly second the religious leaders.”

After the collapse of Russia, the Armenians, Georgians, and Tatars formed a Transcaucasian Republic which was to be short-lived, and we have dealt in another book with the attempt made by these three States together to safeguard their independence.38

The Soviet Government issued a decree on January 13, 1918, stipulating in Article 1 “the evacuation of Armenia by the Russian troops, and the immediate organisation of an Armenian militia in order to safeguard the personal and material security of the inhabitants of Turkish Armenia,” and in Article 4, “the establishment of a provisional Armenian Government in Turkish Armenia consisting of delegates of the Armenian people elected according to democratic principles,” which obviously could not satisfy the Armenians.

Two months after the promulgation of this decree, the Brest-Litovsk treaty in March, 1918, stipulated in Article 4 that “Russia shall do her utmost to ensure the quick evacuation of the eastern provinces of Anatolia. Ardahan, Kars, and Batum shall be evacuated at once by the Russian troops.”

The Armenians were the more dissatisfied and anxious after these events as they had not concealed their hostile feelings against the Turks and their satisfaction no longer to be under their dominion; they now dreaded the return of the Turks, who would at least make an effort to recover the provinces they had lost in 1878.

In April of the same year fighting was resumed, and Trebizond, Erzinjan, Erzerum, Mush, and Van were recaptured by the Turks. After the negotiations between the Georgians and the Turks, and the arrangements that supervened, the Armenians constituted a Republic in the neighbourhood of Erivan and Lake Sevanga (Gokcha).

After the discussion of the Armenian question at the Peace Conference and a long exchange of views, Mr. Wilson, in August, 1919, sending a note direct to the Ottoman Government, called upon it to prevent any further massacre of Armenians and warned it that, should the Constantinople Government be unable to do so, he would cancel the twelfth of his Fourteen Points demanding “that the present Ottoman Empire should be assured of entire sovereignty”—which, by the by, is in contradiction with other points of the same message to Congress, especially the famous right of self-determination of nations, which he wished carried out unreservedly.

The Armenians did not give up the tactics that had roused Turkish animosity and had even exasperated it, for at the end of August they prepared to address a new note to the Allied High Commissioners in Constantinople to draw their attention to the condition of the Christian element in Anatolia and the dangers the Armenians of the Republic of Erivan were beginning to run. Mgr. Zaven, Armenian Patriarch, summed up this note in a statement published by Le Temps, August 31, 1919.

Mr. Gerard, former ambassador of the United States at Berlin, in a telegram39 addressed to Mr. Balfour on February 15, 1920, asserted that treaties for the partition of Armenia had been concluded during Mr. Balfour’s tenure of the post of Secretary for Foreign Affairs and at a time when the Allied leaders and statesmen had adopted the principle of self-determination of peoples as their principal war-cry. He expressed distress over news that the Allies might cut up Armenia, and said that 20,000 ministers, 85 bishops, 250 college and university presidents, and 40 governors, who had “expressed themselves in favour of unified Armenia, will be asked to join in condemnation of decimation of Armenia.” He added that Americans had given £6,000,000 for Armenian relief, and that another £6,000,000 had been asked for. Americans were desirous of aiding Armenia during her formative period. “Ten members of our committee, including Mr. Hughes and Mr. Root, and with the approval of Senator Lodge, had telegraphed to the President that America should aid Armenia. We are earnestly anxious that Britain should seriously consider American opinion on the Armenian case. Can you not postpone consideration of the Turkish question until after ratification of the treaty by the Senate, which is likely to take place before March?”

Mr. Balfour, in his reply dispatched on February 24, said:

“In reply to your telegram of February 16, I should observe that the first paragraph seems written under a misapprehension. I concluded no treaties about Armenia at all.

“I do not understand why Great Britain will be held responsible by 20,000 ministers of religion, 85 bishops, 250 university professors, and 40 governors if a Greater Armenia is not forthwith created, including Russian Armenia on the north and stretching to the Mediterranean on the south.

“Permit me to remind you of the facts.

“1. Great Britain has no interests in Armenia except those based on humanitarian grounds. In this respect her position is precisely that of the United States.

“2. I have always urged whenever I had an opportunity that the United States should take its share in the burden of improving conditions in the pre-war territories of the Turkish Empire and in particular that it should become the mandatory in Armenia. Events over which Great Britain had no control have prevented this consummation and have delayed, with most unhappy results, the settlement of the Turkish peace.

“3. There appears to be great misconception as to the condition of affairs in Armenia. You make appeal in your first sentence to the principle of self-determination. If this is taken in its ordinary meaning as referring to the wishes of the majority actually inhabiting a district, it must be remembered that in vast regions of Greater Armenia the inhabitants are overwhelmingly Mussulman, and if allowed to vote would certainly vote against the Armenians.

“I do not think this conclusive; but it must not be forgotten. Whoever undertakes, in your own words, to aid Armenia during her formative period must, I fear, be prepared to use military force. Great Britain finds the utmost difficulty in carrying out the responsibilities she has already undertaken. She cannot add Armenia to their number. America with her vast population and undiminished resources, and no fresh responsibilities thrown upon her by the war, is much more fortunately situated. She has shown herself most generous towards these much oppressed people; but I greatly fear that even the most lavish charity, unsupported by political and military assistance, will prove quite insufficient to deal with the unhappy consequences of Turkish cruelty and misrule.

“If I am right in inferring from your telegram that my attitude on the question has been somewhat misunderstood in America, I should be grateful if you would give publicity to this reply.”

On February 28 Mr. Gerard telegraphed to Mr. Balfour that in referring to treaties made during Mr. Balfour’s period of office he had in mind the Sykes-Picot compact. After saying that “Great Britain and France could not be justified in requiring American aid to Armenia as a condition precedent to their doing justice to Armenia,” he declared that “Armenia’s plight since 1878 is not unrelated to a series of arrangements, well meant, no doubt, in which Great Britain played a directive rôle,” and he concluded in the following terms:

“Our faith in chivalry of Great Britain and France and our deliberate conviction in ultimate inexpediency of allowing Turkish threat to override concerted will of Western civilisation through further sacrifice of Armenia inspire us to plead with you to construe every disadvantage in favour of Armenia and ask you to plan to aid her toward fulfilment of her legitimate aspirations, meanwhile depending on us to assume our share in due time, bearing in mind imperative necessity of continued concord that must exist between our democracies for our respective benefit and for that of the world.”

Soon after, Lord Curzon said in the House of Lords: “It must be owned the Armenians during the last weeks did not behave like innocent little lambs, as some people imagine. The fact is they have indulged in a series of wild attacks, and proved blood-thirsty people.” The Times gave an account of these atrocities on March 19.

At the beginning of February, 1920, the British Armenia Committee of London had handed to Mr. Lloyd George a memorandum in which the essential claims of Armenia were set forth before the Turkish problem was definitely settled by the Allies.

In this document the Committee said they were sorry that Lord Curzon on December 17, 1919, expressed a doubt about the possibility of the total realisation of the Armenian scheme, according to which Armenia was to stretch from one sea to the other, especially as the attitude of America did not facilitate the solution of the Armenian question. After recalling Lord Curzon’s and Mr. Lloyd George’s declarations in both the House of Lords and the House of Commons, the British Armenia Committee owned it was difficult, if the United States refused a mandate and if no other mandatory could be found, to group into one nation all the Ottoman provinces which they believed Armenia was to include; yet they drafted a programme which, though it was a minimum one, aimed at completely and definitely freeing these provinces from Turkish sovereignty. It ran as follows;

“An Ottoman suzerainty, even a nominal one, would be an outrage, as the Ottoman Government deliberately sought to exterminate the Armenian people.

“It would be a disgrace for all nations if the bad precedents of Eastern Rumelia, Macedonia, and Crete were followed, and if similar expedients were resorted to, in reference to Armenia. The relations between Armenia and the Ottoman Empire must wholly cease, and the area thus detached must include all the former Ottoman provinces. The Ottoman Government of Constantinople has for many years kept up a state of enmity and civil war among the various local races, and many facts demonstrate that when once that strange, malevolent sovereignty is thrust aside, these provinces will succeed in living together on friendly, equable terms.”

The British Armenia Committee asked that the Armenian territories which were to be detached from Turkey should be immediately united into an independent Armenian State, which would not be merely restricted to “the quite inadequate area of the Republic of Erivan,” but would include the former Russian districts of Erivan and Kars, the zone of the former Ottoman territories with the towns of Van, Mush, Erzerum, Erzinjan, etc., and a port on the Black Sea. This document proclaimed that the Armenians now living were numerous enough “to fortify, consolidate, and ensure the prosperity of an Armenian State within these boundaries, without giving up the hope of extending farther.” It went on thus:

“The economic distress now prevailing in the Erivan area is due to the enormous number of refugees coming from the neighbouring Ottoman provinces who are encamped there temporarily. If these territories were included in the Armenian State, the situation would be much better, for all these refugees would be able to return to their homes and till their lands. With a reasonable foreign support, the surviving manhood of the nation would suffice to establish a National State in this territory, which includes but one-fourth of the total Armenian State to be detached from Turkey. In the new State, the Armenians will still be more numerous than the other non-Armenian elements, the latter not being connected together and having been decimated during the war like the Armenians.”

Finally, in support of its claim, the Committee urged that the Nationalist movement of Mustafa Kemal was a danger to England, and showed that only Armenia could check this danger.

“For if Mustafa Kemal’s Government is not overthrown, our new Kurdish frontier will never be at peace; the difficulties of its defence will keep on increasing; and the effect of the disturbances will be felt as far as India. If, on the contrary, that focus of disturbance is replaced by a stable Armenian State, our burden will surely be alleviated.”

Then the British Armenia Committee, summing up its chief claims, asked for the complete separation of the Ottoman Empire from the Armenian area, and, in default of an American mandate, the union of the Armenian provinces of the Turkish Empire contiguous to the Republic of Erivan with the latter Republic, together with a port on the Black Sea.

In the report which had been drawn up by the American Commission of Inquiry sent to Armenia, with General Harboor as chairman, and which President Wilson had transmitted to the Senate at the beginning of April, 1920, after the latter assembly had asked twice for it, no definite conclusion was reached as to the point whether America was to accept or refuse a mandate for that country. The report simply declared that in no case should the United States accept a mandate without the agreement of France and Great Britain and the formal approbation of Germany and Russia. It merely set forth the reasons for and against the mandate.

It first stated that whatever Power accepts the mandate must have under its control the whole of Anatolia, Constantinople, and Turkey-in-Europe, and have complete control over the foreign relations and the revenue of the Ottoman Empire.

Before coming to the reasons that tend in favour of the acceptance of the mandate by the United States, General Harboor made an appeal to the humanitarian feelings of the Americans and urged that it was their interest to ensure the peace of the world. Then he declared their acceptance would answer the wishes of the Near East, whose preference undeniably was for America, or, should the United States refuse, for Great Britain. He added that each Great Power, in case it could not obtain a mandate, would want it to be given to America.

The report valued the expenditure entailed by acceptance of the mandate at 275 million dollars far the first year, and $756,140,000 for the first five years. After some time, the profits made by the mandatory Power would balance the expenses, and Americans might find there a profitable investment. But the Board of Administration of the Ottoman Debt should be dissolved and all the commercial treaties concluded by Turkey should be cancelled. The Turkish Imperial Debt should be unified and a sinking fund provided. The economic conditions granted to the mandatory Power should be liable to revision and might be cancelled.

Further, it was observed that if America refused the mandate the international rivalries which had had full scope under Turkish dominion would assert themselves again.

The reasons given by the American Commission against acceptance of the mandate were that the United States had serious domestic problems to deal with, and such an intervention in the affairs of the Old World would weaken the standpoint they had taken on the Monroe doctrine. The report also pointed out that the United States were in no way responsible for the awkward situation in the East, and they could not undertake engagements for the future—for the new Congress could not be bound by the policy pursued by the present one. The report also remarked that Great Britain and Russia and the other Great Powers too had taken very little interest in those countries, though England had enough experience and resources to control them. Finally, the report emphasised this point—that the United States had still more imperious obligations towards nearer foreign countries, and still more urgent questions to settle. Besides, an army of 100,000 to 200,000 men would be needed to maintain order in Armenia. Lastly, a considerable outlay of money would be necessary, and the receipts would be at first very small.

On the other hand, the British League of Nations Union asked the English Government to give instructions to its representatives to support the motion of the Supreme Council according to which the protection of the independent Armenian State should be entrusted to the League of Nations.

According to the terms of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, President Wilson had been asked to act as an arbiter to lay down the Armenian frontiers on the side of the provinces of Van, Bitlis, Erzerum, and Trebizond.

Under these circumstances the complete solution of the Armenian problem was postponed indefinitely, and it is difficult to foresee how the problem will ever be solved.

2. The Pan-Turanian and Pan-Arabian Movements.

The attempts at Russification made immediately after the 1877 war by means of the scholastic method of Elminski resulted in the first manifestations of the Pan-Turanian movement. They arose, not in Russia, but in Russian Tatary. The Tatars of the huge territories of Central Asia, by reason of their annexation to the Russian Empire and the indirect contact with the West that it entailed, and also owing to their reaction against the West, awoke to a consciousness of their individuality and strength.

A series of ethnographic studies which were begun at that time by M. de Ujfalvi upon the Hungarians—all the peoples speaking a Finno-Ugrian idiom descending from the same stock as those who speak the Turkish, Mongol, and Manchu languages—and were continued by scholars of various nationalities, gave the Pan-Turanian doctrine a scientific basis; the principles of this doctrine were laid down by H. Vambéry,40 and it was summed up by Léon Cahun in his Introduction a l’histoire de l’Asie.41 This Turco-Tartar movement expanded, and its most authoritative leaders were Youssouf Ahtchoura Oglou; Ahmed Agayeff, who was arrested at the beginning of the armistice by the English as a Unionist and sent to Malta; and later Zia Geuk Alp, a Turkish poet and publicist, the author of Kizil-Elma (The Red Apple), who turned the Union and Progress Committee towards the Pan-Turanian movement though he had many opponents on that committee, and who was arrested too and sent to Malta.

Islam for thirteen centuries, by creating a religious solidarity between peoples of alien races, had brought about a kind of religious nationality under its hegemony. But the ambitious scheme of Pan-Islamism was jeopardised in modern times by new influences and widely different political aspirations. It was hoped for some time that by grouping the national elements of Turkey and pursuing a conciliatory policy it would be possible to give a sound basis to that religious nationality. But that nationality soon proved unable to curb the separatist aspirations of the various peoples subjected to the Turkish yoke, and then, again, it wounded the pride of some Turkish elements by compelling them to obey the commandments of Islam, to which all the Turanian populations had not fully adhered. The Pan-Islamic movement later on grew more and more nationalist in character, and assumed a Pan-Turkish tendency, though it remained Pan-Turanian—that is to say, it still included the populations speaking the Turkish, Mongol, and Manchu languages.

Without in any way giving up the Pan-Islamic idea, Turkish Nationalism could not but support the Pan-Turanian movement, which it hoped would add the 18 million Turks living in the former Russian Empire, Persia, and Afghanistan, to the 8 million Turks of the territories of the Ottoman Empire.

Owing to its origin and the character it has assumed, together with the geographical situation and importance of the populations concerned, this movement appears as a powerful obstacle to the policy which England seems intent upon pursuing, and to which she seeks to bring over Italy and France. It also exemplifies the latent antagonism which had ever existed between the Arabian world and the Turkish world, and which, under the pressure of events, soon asserted itself.

Indeed, the mutual relations of the Arabs and the Turks had been slowly but deeply modified in the course of centuries.

After the great Islamic movement started by Mohammed in the seventh century, the Arabs who had hitherto been mostly confined within the boundaries of the Arabian peninsula spread to the west over the whole of Northern Africa as far as Spain, and to the east over Mesopotamia and a part of Persia. In the twelfth century Arabian culture reached its climax, for the Arabian Caliphs of Baghdad ruled over huge territories. At that time Arabic translations revealed to Europe the works of Aristotle and of the Chaldean astronomers, and the Arabs, through Spain, had an important influence on the first period of modern civilisation.

In 1453, when the Turks, who had extended their dominion over all the shores of the Mediterranean, settled at Constantinople, which became the capital of the Islamic Empire, the influence of Arabia decreased; yet the Arabs still enjoyed in various parts political independence and a kind of religious predominance.

For instance, the Arabs settled in the north of Western Africa, after losing Spain, became quite independent, and formed the Empire of Morocco, which was not under the suzerainty of Constantinople.

The Arabian tribes and Berber communities of Algeria and Tunis, which had more or less remained under the suzerainty of the Sultan, were no longer amenable to him after the French conquest. The Pasha of Egypt, by setting up as an independent Sovereign, and founding the hereditary dynasty of the Khedives, deprived the Ottoman dominion of Egypt, where the Arabs were not very numerous, but had played an important part in the development of Islam. The Italian conquest took away from Turkey the last province she still owned in Africa. Finally, when the late war broke out, England deposed the Khedive Abbas Hilmi, who was travelling in Europe and refused to go back to Egypt. She proclaimed her protectorate over the Nile valley, and, breaking off the religious bond that linked Egypt with the Ottoman Empire, she made Sultan of Egypt, independent of the Sultan of Constantinople, Hussein Kamel, uncle of the deposed Khedive, who made his entry into Cairo on December 20, 1914.

The Turks, however, kept possession of the Holy Places, Mecca and Medina, which they garrisoned and governed. This sovereignty was consolidated by the railway of the pilgrimage. The investiture of the Sherif of Mecca was still vested in them, and they chose the member of his family who was to succeed him, and who was detained as a hostage at Constantinople. But after the failure of the expedition against the Suez Canal during the late war, and at the instigation of England, the Sherif, as we shall see, proclaimed himself independent, and assumed the title of Melek, or King of Arabia.

On the other hand, the province of the Yemen, lying farther south of the Hejaz, has always refused to acknowledge the authority of Constantinople, and is practically independent. Lastly, at the southern end of the Arabian peninsula, the English have held possession of Aden since 1839, and have extended their authority, since the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, over all the Hadramaut. All the sheiks of this part of Arabia along the southern coast, over whom the authority of Turkey was but remotely exercised and was practically non-existent, naturally accepted the protectorate of England without any difficulty, in return for the commercial facilities she brought them and the allowances she granted them, and in 1873 Turkey formally recognised the English possession of this coast.

On the eastern coast of the Arabian peninsula the territory of the Sultan of Oman, or Maskat, lying along the Persian Gulf, has been since the beginning of the nineteenth century under the authority of the Viceroy of India. This authority extends nowadays over all the territories lying between Aden and Mesopotamia, which are in consequence entirely under English sway.

Moreover, the English have proclaimed their protectorate over the Sheik of Koweit.

Koweit had been occupied by the British Navy after the Kaiser’s visit to Tangier, and thus Germany had been deprived of an outlet for her railway line from Anatolia to Baghdad. The Rev. S. M. Zwemer, in a book written some time ago, Arabia, the Birthplace of Islam, after showing the exceptional situation occupied by England in these regions, owned that British policy had ambitious designs on the Arabian peninsula and the lands round the Persian Gulf.

Since the outbreak of the war, Ottoman sovereignty has also lost the small Turkish province of Hasa, between Koweit and Maskat, inhabited entirely by Arabian tribes.

The rebellion of the Sherif of Mecca against the temporal power of the Sultans of Mecca shows how important was the change that had taken place within the Arabian world, but also intimates that the repercussions of the war, after accelerating the changes that were already taking place in the relations between the Arabs and the Turks, must needs later on bring about an understanding or alliance between these two elements against any foreign dominion. In the same way, the encroachments of England upon Arabian territories have brought about a change in the relations between the Arabs and the English; in days of yore the Arabs, through ignorance or because they were paid to do so, more than once used English rifles against the Turks; but the recent Arabian risings against the British in Mesopotamia seem to prove that the Arabs have now seen their mistake, and have concluded that the English were deceiving them when they said the Caliphate was in danger.

Finally, in order to pave the way to a British advance from Mesopotamia to the Black Sea, England for a moment contemplated the formation of a Kurdistan, though a long existence in common and the identity of feelings and creed have brought about a deep union between the Kurds and the Turks, and a separation is contrary to the express wishes of both peoples.

It is a well-known fact that the descendants of Ali, the Prophet’s cousin, who founded the dynasty of the Sherifs, or Nobles, took the title of Emirs—i.e., Princes—of Mecca, and that the Emir of the Holy Places of Arabia had always to be recognised by the Sherif to have a right to bear the title of Caliph. This recognition of the Caliphs by the Sherifs was made public by the mention of the name of the Caliph in the Khoutba, or Friday prayer.

In consequence of political vicissitudes, the Emirs of Mecca successively recognised the Caliphs of Baghdad, the Sultans of Egypt until the conquest of Egypt by Selim I in 1517, and the Sultans of Turkey, whose sovereignty over the Holy Places has always been more or less nominal, and has hardly ever been effective over the Hejaz.

When the Wahhabi schism took place, the Wahhabis, who aimed at restoring the purer doctrines of primitive Islam, and condemned the worship of the holy relics and the Prophet’s tomb, captured Mecca and Medina.

Mehmet Ali, Pasha of Egypt, was deputed by the Porte to reconquer the Holy Places, which he governed from 1813 to 1840. Since that time the Ottoman Government has always appointed a Governor of the Hejaz and maintained a garrison there, and the Porte took care a member of the Sherif’s family should reside in Constantinople in order to be able to replace the one who bore the title of Sherif, should the latter ever refuse to recognise the Caliph.

Long negotiations were carried on during the war between the British Government and Hussein, Sherif of Mecca, the Emir Feisal’s father, concerning the territorial conditions on which peace might be restored in the East. These views were set forth in eight letters exchanged between July, 1915, and January, 1916.

In July, 1915, the Sherif offered his military co-operation to the British Government, in return for which he asked it to recognise the independence of the Arabs within a territory including Mersina and Adana on the northern side and then bounded by the thirty-seventh degree of latitude; on the east its boundary was to be the Persian frontier down to the Gulf of Basra; on the south the Indian Ocean, with the exception of Aden; on the west the Red Sea and the Mediterranean as far as Mersina.

On August 30, 1915, Sir Henry MacMahon, British resident in Cairo, observed in his answer that discussion about the future frontiers was rather premature.

In a letter dated September 9, forwarded to the Foreign Office on October 18 by Sir Henry MacMahon, the Sherif insisted upon an immediate discussion. As he forwarded this letter, Sir Henry MacMahon mentioned the following statement made to him by the Sherif’s representative in Egypt:

“The occupation by France of the thoroughly Arabian districts of Aleppo, Hama, Homs, and Damascus would be opposed by force of arms by the Arabs: but with the exception of these districts, the Arabs are willing to accept a few modifications of the north-western frontiers proposed by the Sherif of Mecca.”

On October 24, 1915, by his Government’s order, Sir Henry MacMahon addressed the Sherif the following letter:

“The districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and the parts of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo cannot be looked upon as merely Arabian, and should be excluded from the limits and frontiers that are being discussed. With these modifications, and without in any way impairing our present treaties with the Arabian chiefs, we accept your limits and frontiers. As to the territories within these limits, in which Great Britain has a free hand as far as she does not injure the interests of her ally, France, I am desired by the British Government to make the following promise in answer to your letter.

“‘With the reservation of the above-mentioned modifications, Great Britain is willing to recognise and support Arabian independence within the territories included in the limits and frontiers proposed by the Sherif of Mecca.’”

On November 5, 1915, the Sherif, in his answer, agreed to the exclusion of Mersina and Adana, but maintained his claims on the other territories, especially Beyrut.

On December 13 Sir Henry MacMahon took note of the Sherif’s renunciation of Mersina and Adana.

On January 1, 1916, the Sherif wrote that, not to disturb the Franco-British alliance, he would lay aside his claims to Lebanon during the war; but he would urge them again on the conclusion of hostilities.

On January 30, 1916, Sir Henry MacMahon took note of the Sherif’s wish to avoid all that might be prejudicial to the alliance between France and England, and stated that the friendship between France and England would be maintained after the war.

On June 10, 1916, a rebellion broke out at Mecca. At daybreak the barracks were encircled by Arabs. Hussein ibn Ali, who was at the head of the movement, informed the Turkish commander that the Hejaz had proclaimed its independence. On June 11 the Arabs captured the Turkish fort of Bash-Karacal, and on the 12th Fort Hamadie. Soon after Jeddah surrendered, and on September 21 El Taif.

In a proclamation dated June 27, 1916, the Sherif Hussein ibn Ali stated the political and religious reasons that had induced him to rebel against the Ottoman Government. He declared the latter was in the hands of the Young Turk party, that the Committee of Union and Progress had driven the country to war, was destroying the power of the Sultan, and had violated the rights of the Caliphate.

On October 5 the Sherif Hussein formed an Arabian Cabinet, convened an Assembly, and on November 6 caused himself to be proclaimed King of the Arabs.

In November, 1916, he issued a second proclamation, not so lofty in tone, but more wily in its wording, which seemed to lack personality in its inspiration. It began thus: “It is a well-known fact that the better informed people in the Moslem world, Ottomans and others, saw with much misgiving Turkey rush into the war.” He then stated that—

“The Ottoman Empire is a Moslem empire, whose wide territories have a considerable sea-frontage. So the policy of the great Ottoman Sultans, inspired by this twofold consideration, has always aimed at keeping on friendly terms with the Powers that rule over the majority of Moslems and at the same time hold the mastery of the seas.”

He went on as follows:

“The one cause of the downfall of the Ottoman Empire and the extermination of its populations was the short-sighted tyranny of the leaders of the Unionist faction—Enver, Jemal, Talaat, and their accomplices; it is the giving up of the political traditions established by the great Ottoman statesmen and based on the friendship of the two Powers that deserve most to be glorified—England and France.”

He shared the opinion of those who reproached the Turks with the “atrocities committed by Greeks and Armenians”; he called upon them “the reprobation of the world”; and he wound up his proclamation with these words:

“Our hatred and enmity go to the leaders who are responsible for such doings—Enver, Jemal, Talaat, and their accomplices. We will not have anything to do with such tyrants, and in communion with all believers and all unprejudiced minds in the Ottoman Empire and Islam throughout the world we declare our hatred and enmity towards them, and before God we separate our cause from their cause.”

Great Britain later on insisted upon this point—that the question of the territorial conditions with a view to restoring peace had not been dealt with since the beginning of 1916, except in the above-mentioned exchange of notes. In September, 1919, in a semi-official communication to the Press, she emphatically declared that it followed from these documents:

(1) That in the letter dated October 24, 1915, which formulates the only engagement between Great Britain and the Sherif, the British Government had not pledged itself to do anything contrary to the Anglo-French treaty of 1916.

(2) That no fresh engagement had been entered into by Great Britain with the Sherif since the beginning of the negotiations that M. Georges Picot had been directed to carry on in London to pave the way to the treaty of 1916. For the negotiators had met for the first time on November 23, 1915, and the last two letters exchanged in January, 1916, added nothing to the engagements made with King Hussein in the letter of October 24 of the previous year.

Finally, on March 5, 1917, Hussein, now King of the Hejaz, sent an appeal to all the Moslems of Turkey against the Ottoman Government, which he charged with profaning the tomb of the Prophet in the course of the operations of June, 1916.

On October 1, 1918, Feisal entered Damascus at the head of his own victorious troops, but not with the Allied armies, after fighting all the way from Maan to Aleppo, a distance of above 400 miles. By his military and political activity, he had succeeded in quelling the private quarrels between tribes, and grouping round him the Arabian chiefs, between whom there had been much rivalry not long before, at the same time protecting the right flank of the British army, which was in a hazardous position.

Without giving up his favourite scheme, he was thus brought face to face with the Syrian question.

Though the Arabian movement cannot be looked upon merely as the outcome of the arrangements concluded in regard to Syria between the Allies during the war, the latter seem at least to have brought about a state of things which reinforced the Syrian aspirations and encouraged them to assert themselves.

The Syrians had once more taken advantage of the events which had convulsed Europe, and had had their after-effects in Asia Minor, to assert their determination to be freed from Ottoman sovereignty; and now they hoped to bring the Peace Conference to recognise a mode of government consistent with their political and economic aspirations.

The suppression of the autonomy of Lebanon, the requisitions, the administrative measures and prosecutions ordered in 1916 by Jemal Pasha against the Syrians, who wanted Syria to be erected into an independent State, had not succeeded in modifying the tendency which for a long time had aimed at detaching Syria from the Ottoman Empire, and at taking advantage of the influence France exercised in the country to further this aim.

In 1912 M. R. Poincaré, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, clearly stated before the French Chamber that the French and British Governments shared exactly the same views concerning the Syrian question. Yet later facts soon proved that the English policy would necessarily conflict with French influence and try to destroy it after turning it to her own advantage. Simultaneously the Turks saw that the time had come to modify the existing régime.

M. Defrance, who is now French High Commissioner in Turkey, but was then French Consul-General at Cairo, informed the French Government that the Ottoman Committee of decentralisation was of opinion that Syria should become an autonomous country, governed by a Moslem prince chosen by the people, and placed under the protection of France.

On March 11, 1914, M. Georges Leygues again raised the Syrian question before the French Parliament. He maintained that the axis of French policy lay in the Mediterranean—with Algeria, Tunis, and Morocco on one side and on the other side Syria and Lebanon, the latter being the best spheres open to French action on account of the economic interests and moral influence France already exercised there. And the French Parliament granted the sums of money which were needed for developing French establishments in the East.

About the same time the Central Syrian Committee expressed the wish that the various regions of Syria should be grouped into one State, under French control. Fifteen Lebano-Syrian committees established in various foreign countries expressed the same wish; the Manchester committee merely asked that Syria should not be partitioned. A Syrian congress, held at Marseilles at the end of 1918 under the presidency of M. Franklin Bouillon, declared that for various economic and judicial reasons France could be of great use to Syria, in case the direction of the country should be entrusted to her.

But the establishment of a Syrian State, whether enjoying the same autonomy as Lebanon has had since 1864 under the guarantee of France, England, Russia, Austria, Prussia, and later on Italy, or being governed in another way, was in contradiction to the arrangements made by France and England in 1916. Though the agreement between these two Powers has never been made public, yet it is well known that it had been decided—contrary to the teaching of both history and geography—that Syria should be divided into several regions. Now, the centre of Syria, which stretches from the Euphrates to the sea, happens to be Damascus, and this very town, according to the British scheme, was to be included in an Arabian Confederation headed by the Hejaz.

At the beginning of 1916, the Emir Feisal came to Paris, and, after the conversations held in France, a satisfactory agreement seemed to have been reached.

The Emir Feisal was solemnly received in January, 1919, at the Hôtel de Ville in Paris, and in the course of a reception at the Hôtel Continental, the Croix de Guerre of the first class was presented to the Arab chief on February 4, with the following “citation”:

“As early as 1916, he resolutely seconded the efforts of his father, the King of the Hejaz, to shake off the Turkish yoke and support the Allied cause.

“He proved a remarkable, energetic commander, a friend to his soldiers.

“He planned and carried out personally several important operations against the Damascus-Medina railway, and captured El-Ouedjy and Akaba.

“From August, 1917, till September, 1918, he led numerous attacks north and south of Maan, capturing several railway stations and taking a great number of prisoners.

“He helped to destroy the 4th, 7th, 8th, and 9th Turkish armies by cutting off their communications to the north, south, and west of Deraa, and after a very bold raid he entered Damascus on October 1, and Aleppo on the 26th with the Allied troops.”

On February 6, 1919, he asked the Committee of the Ten on behalf of his father, Hussein ibn Ali, to recognise the independence of the Arabian peninsula, and declared he aimed at grouping the various regions of Arabian Asia under one sovereignty. He did not hesitate to remind the members of the Conference that he was speaking in the name of a people who had already reached a high degree of civilisation at a time when the Powers they represented did not even exist; and at the end of the sitting in the course of which the scheme of a League of Nations was adopted, he asked that all the secret treaties about the partition of the Asiatic dominion of the Ottoman Empire between the Great Powers should be definitely cancelled.

In March, 1919, the Emir went back to Syria, under the pretext of using his influence in favour of a French collaboration. He was given an enthusiastic greeting; but the supporters of the Arabian movement, which was partly his own work, declared their hostility to any policy that would bring about a mandate for Syria.

On March 7 it was announced that a National Syrian Congress, sitting at Damascus, had just proclaimed Syria an independent country, and the Emir Feisal, son of the Grand Sherif of Mecca, King of Syria.

It was reported that a declaration, issued by a second congress that was held in the same town and styled itself Congress of Mesopotamia, had been read at the same sitting, through which the latter congress solemnly proclaimed the independence of Irak—Mesopotamia—with the Emir Abdullah, the Emir Feisal’s brother, as King under the regency of another brother of his, the Emir Zeid.

All this, of course, caused a good deal of surprise in London, though something of the kind ought to have been expected.

In the above-mentioned document, after recalling the part played by the Arabs in the war and the declarations made by the Allies about the right of self-determination of peoples, the Congress declared the time had come to proclaim the complete independence and unity of Syria, and concluded as follows:

“We, therefore, the true representatives of the Arabian nation in every part of Syria, speaking in her name and declaring her will, have to-day unanimously proclaimed the independence of our country, Syria, within her natural boundaries, including Palestine, which independence shall be complete, without any restriction whatsoever, on the basis of a civil representative government.

“We will take into account every patriotic wish of all the inhabitants of Lebanon concerning the administration of their country and maintain her pre-war limits, on condition Lebanon shall stand aloof from any foreign influence.

“We reject the Zionists’ claim to turn Palestine into a national home for the Jews or a place of immigration for them.

“We have chosen His Royal Highness the Emir Feisal, who has always fought for the liberation of the country, and whom the nation looks upon as the greatest man in Syria, as constitutional King of Syria under the name of H.M. Feisal I.

“We hereby proclaim the military governments of occupation hitherto established in the three districts have now come to an end; they shall be replaced by a civil representative government, responsible to this Council for anything relating to the principle of the complete independence of the country, till it is possible for the government to convene a Parliament that shall administer the provinces according to the principles of decentralisation.”

The Congress then asked the Allies to withdraw their troops from Syria, and stated that the national police and administration would be fully able to maintain order.

To some extent the Emir Feisal resisted the suggestions, or at least refused to comply with the extreme demands, of the Nationalists of Damascus and Palestine—whose club, the Nadi El Arabi, played in these regions the same part as the Committee of Union and Progress—for after forming a Government of concentration, he had merely summoned one class of soldiers, whereas the Nationalists in his absence had decreed the mobilisation of several classes, and in agreement with General Gouraud he had appointed administrator of the disputed region of Bukaa his cousin, the Emir Jemil, who was a moderate man. Yet, whether he wished to do so or not, whether he was an accomplice of the leaders or not, the fact is that, after being the agent of England, he became the agent of the Nationalists, who had succeeded in having the independence of the Arabian countries of Asia Minor proclaimed under the leadership of the Hejaz.

Thus it turned out that the foundation of an Arabian State assumed a capital importance at the very time when the future condition of the Ottoman Empire was under discussion.

In the course of the interview between M. Mohammed Ali and Mr. Lloyd George, as the Prime Minister asked him whether he was averse to the action of the Syrian Moslems, who had acknowledged the Emir Feisal as King of Arabia and proclaimed an independent Moslem State unconnected with the Caliphate, the leader of the Indian delegation, after hinting that “this matter can well be left for settlement amongst Muslims,” made the following statement:

“Just as we have certain religious obligations with regard to the Khilafat that have brought us here, we have other religious obligations, equally solemn and binding, that require us to approach the Turks and Arabs. ‘All Muslims are brothers, wherefore make peace between your brethren,’ is a Quranic injunction. We have come here in the interests of peace and reconciliation, and propose going to the Arabs and Turks for the same purpose.

“Quite apart from the main claim for preservation of the Khilafat with adequate temporal power, the Muslims claim that the local centre of their Faith—namely, the ‘Island of Arabia’—should remain inviolate and entirely under Muslim control. This is based on the dying injunction of the Prophet himself. The Jazirat-ul-Arab, as its name indicates, is the ‘Island of Arabia,’ the fourth boundary being the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates. It therefore includes Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia, as well as the region commonly known to European geographers as the Arabian peninsula. Muslims can acquiesce in no form of non-Muslim control, whether in the shape of mandates or otherwise, over any portion of this region. Religious obligations, which are absolutely binding on us, require that there at least there shall be exclusively Muslim control. It does not specify that it should be the Khalifa’s own control. In order to make it perfectly clear, I may say the religious requirements, sir, will be satisfied even if the Emir Feisal exercises independent control there.

“But, since we have to provide sufficient territories and resources and naval and military forces for the Khalifa, the necessity for the utmost economy which has to rule and govern all our claims in these matters suggests that both these requirements may easily be satisfied if the Jazirat-ul-Arab remains, as before the war, under the direct sovereignty of the Khalifa. We have great hopes that if we have opportunities of meeting our co-religionists we shall bring about a reconciliation between them and the Turks. After all, it cannot be said that Turkish rule in Arabia has been of such a character that other Powers are bound to interfere.”

Moreover, he added:

“With regard to the Arabs, about whom you asked me a little while ago, the delegation are not apprehensive with regard to the feasibility of an adjustment between the Khalifa and the Arabs. As I have already pointed out, there is the Quranic injunction: ‘All Muslims are brothers, wherefore make peace between your brethren.’ That is a duty laid upon us, and recently, at the Bombay Session, the All-India Khilafat Conference passed a resolution authorising a delegation to proceed to the Hejaz and other parts of Arabia to reconcile the Arabs and the Turks. Our interest is in the Khilafat as Mussulmans. No population and no territory could be so dear to the Muslim as the Arabs and Arabia. The Turks could not win such affection from us as the Arabs do. This is the land that we want to keep purely under Muslim control. Even if the Arabs themselves want a mandate in that country we will not consent. We are bound by our religious obligations to that extent. Therefore, it cannot be through antipathy against the Arabs or because of any particular sympathy for the Turks that we desire the Khalifa’s sovereignty over the Island of Arabia. The Turks are much farther removed from us. Very few of us know anything of the Turkish language; very few of us have travelled in the Turkish Empire. But we do go in large numbers to Mecca and Medina. So many of us want to die there. So many Mussulmans settle down and marry in Arabia; one of my own aunts is an Arab lady. Wherever we have met Arabs on our journey—we have had no opportunity, of course, of discussing the subject with well-educated people, but—we have asked the class of people we have met what they thought of the action of the King of the Hejaz—‘King’ in a land where God alone is recognised as a king: nobody can ever claim kingship there. They said his was an act that they condemned, it was an act they did not in the least like. They considered it to be wrong; the Arabs spoke disparagingly of it. I do not know to what extent it may be true, but there are a number of people who now come forward as apologists for the Arabs. They say that what Emir Feisal and the Sherif did was to save something for Islam; it was not that they were against the Turks, but they were for Islam. Whether this was or was not the fact, it is very significant that such apologies should be made now. Honestly, we have no apprehensions that we could not reconcile the Arabs and the Turks. This is a question which I think the Allied Council, the Peace Conference, could very well leave the Mussulmans to settle amongst themselves. We do not want British bayonets to force the Arabs into a position of subservience to the Turks.”

Resuming the idea he had already expressed, he concluded his speech thus:

“That can be very easily arranged, and if such a Federation as we dream of becomes a reality—and I do not see why it should not—the Arabs would have all the independence they require. They may claim national independence, but they cannot forget that Islam is something other than national, that it is supernational, and the Khilafat must be as dear to them as it is to us. Even now the King of the Hejaz does not claim to be the Khalifa. When people began to address him as such, he rebuked them, and he published in his official organ, Al-Qibla, that he wanted to be called King of the Hejaz, and not Amir-ul-Mumineen, a title reserved only for the Khalifa.”

M. Syud Hossain declared in his turn:

“We are not opposed to the independence of Arabia. We are opposed to Emir Feisal’s declaration of independence only for this reason—that Arabia, throughout the history of Islam, has up till now remained under the direct control of the Khalifa. This is the first time in the history of Islam that anyone who is not the Khalifa has set up any claim over Arabia. That is why there is, from the Muslim point of view, a conflict of religious obligations with actual facts. We are not opposed to Arabian independence. On the contrary, we wish very much for complete autonomy in that region, but we want it to be in harmony and not in conflict with the Khilafat and its claims. The idea is not unrealisable, as both Arabs and Turks are Muslims.”

Naturally the concentration of the French troops, during the Cilician troubles, had made the action of the Syrian Nationalists popular among the Moslem masses. On the other hand, an anti-Zionist agitation had gained ground in Palestine and quickly developed into a propaganda in favour of the union of Palestine and Syria under one sovereign. All these facts, which point to the existence in Syria of a movement in favour of an independent State, explain how it turned out that the Emir Feisal, who favoured the scheme of a confederate Arabian Empire, was proclaimed King.

General Noury Pasha, sent by the Emir Feisal to London at the beginning of April, handed to the Foreign Office and to the representative of the French Foreign Office who happened to be in that city, three letters written in the Emir’s own hand in which he is said to have asked both Governments to recognise and support the independence of his country, and informed them that the measures taken by the Damascus Congress concerning Mesopotamia merely aimed at putting an end to Turkish anarchy and the riots of Mosul.

The proclamation of the Emir Feisal as King of Syria brought about much discontent in Lebanon.

A meeting was held on March 22 at Baabda, where the General Government of Lebanon resided, to protest against the decision of the Damascus Congress. About a thousand people were present, and the following motions were passed unanimously:

“1. The meeting enters a protest against the right the Syrian Congress has assumed of disposing of Lebanon, of laying down its frontiers, of restricting its independence, and of forbidding it to collaborate with France.

“2. The Congress asserts the independence of Lebanon. In the demarcation of its frontiers, allowance should be made for its vital necessities and the claims repeatedly expressed by the populations.

“3. The Congress considers as null and void the decisions taken by the Damascus Congress concerning Syria, as the latter Congress was never regularly constituted.

“4. The Congress confirms the mandate given to the delegates sent by Lebanon who are now in Paris.

“5. The Congress confirms the independence of Greater Lebanon with the collaboration of France.

“6. The Congress expresses the wish that a Commission consisting of inhabitants of Lebanon will lay the foundation of the future constitution of Lebanon, which is to replace the protocol of 1860.

“7. The Congress asserts the Union of Lebanon and France; the national emblem shall be the tricolour with a cedar on the white part.”

This opposition was supported by the Maronite archbishops of the sanjak of Tripolis, Latakia, Hama, and Homs, who sent a telegram of protest from Tripolis to Syria on March 13. Thus the Arabian movement also met with Christian opposition.

Khyatin Saffita Tabez Abbas, chief of the Alawite tribe, sent the following protest from Tartus to the Peace Conference:

“Without the consent of the Alawite tribes, the Emir Feisal has had himself proclaimed King of Syria. We protest energetically against such illegal proceedings. We want an Alawite Confederation established under the direct and exclusive protectorate of France.”

Of course, it was urged that the Assembly of the Syrian Congress at Damascus included only extremists who worked hand in hand with the Turkish Nationalists; it seems, nevertheless, that it represented the opinions of most Syrians, who wanted to restore the unity of Syria; and their wish was no doubt connected with the wish that was gaining ground to restore the unity of Arabia.

On the other hand, the Anglo-French treaty, which aimed at a partition of Ottoman Arabia so as to balance French and English interests, but disregarded the wishes of the peoples, could not but rouse a feeling of discontent. Moreover, some Anglo-Egyptian agents and some British officers had foolishly supported this movement in order to cripple French influence, feeling quite confident they could check this movement later on and put Syria under their own suzerainty. But they were soon thrust aside by the movement, which had been fostered by them in India and now logically was turning against them.

The Arabs of the interior of Arabia also addressed a proclamation to General Gouraud stating they welcomed the French as friends, but did not want them as masters and conquerors.

The Arabian opposition to France which made itself felt far beyond the boundaries of independent Syria, the difficulties raised by the Emir Feisal in the coast area, and the agitation stirred up by the Damascus Government in Syria since the French troops had relieved the English in those parts in October, 1919, induced General Gouraud to occupy the railway stations of Maalhakah and Rayak, the latter being at the junction of the railway line from Aleppo with the Beyrut-Damascus line leading to the Hejaz. At the same time, by way of reprisal for the capture of Mejel-Anjar in the plain of Bukaa lying between Libanus and Anti-Libanus by the Sherifian troops, he gathered his forces in the rear of that town at Zahleh and decided to occupy all this area, which was within the zone put under French control by the 1916 treaty.

On July 20 the Emir Feisal held a war council at Damascus and issued a decree of general mobilisation.

According to the Memoirs of Liman von Sanders, who commanded the Turkish troops in Syria-Palestine, doubts may be raised as to the Emir Feisal’s straightforwardness in his dealings first with the Turks during the war, and later with both the English and the French after the cessation of hostilities.

“The commander of the fourth army, Jemal Pasha, informed me in the second half of August that the Sherif Feisal was willing to hold the front occupied by the fourth army along the Jordan on his own account and with his own troops, if guarantees were given him by the Turkish Government as to the creation of an Arabian State. According to the Sherif Feisal an important British attack was being prepared in the coast zone, and in this way it would be possible to reinforce the front between the sea and the Jordan with the troops of the fourth army. Through my Turkish brigadier-general I instructed General Jemal Pasha to enter into negotiations with the Sherif Feisal on this point, and I urged Enver to give the guarantees that were demanded.

“I never had any answer from either Enver or Jemal on this point. So I cannot say to what extent Feisal’s offer could be relied upon. According to what I heard from my brigadier-general, I fancy the Turks mistrusted his offer, which they considered as a mere decoy to put our positions along the Jordan in the hands of the Arabs, while the main English attack was to take place in the coast zone or between the sea and the Jordan.”42

As was pointed out by the Journal des Débats, which quoted the preceding lines on July 21, 1920, the opinion of Liman von Sanders was quite plausible; yet the recent events on the French front may also have had an influence on the Emir Feisal. Most likely, if we bear in mind the intrigues he carried on afterwards, his first proposal was a consequence of the German advance on the Western front in spring, 1918, but the Allies’ victorious offensive on the Somme on August 8, 1918, caused him to alter his plans. It is noteworthy that in his proposals he disclosed where the first English attack was to take place. At any rate, both suppositions, which corroborate each other, increase the suspicions that might already be entertained about his sincerity; and, since then he has obviously taken advantage of every opportunity to play a double game, or at least to turn all the differences between the Powers to the advantage of Arabian independence.

We criticise him the more severely, as we fully understand the Arabs’ aspirations. We disapprove of his policy and blame his attitude, because we believe Arabian aspirations cannot be lawfully fulfilled at the Turks’ expense, and the Arabs cannot expect they will safeguard their liberty by supporting the English policy in the East in every particular, especially with regard to the Turks, at a time when India and Egypt are seeking to shake off that policy.

Let us add that the Pan-Arabian movement owes the development it has now taken to Colonel Lawrence’s manœuvres, who diverted it from its original aim to make use of it, and became the Emir Feisal’s counsellor in order to influence him in favour of England. Miss Bell, too, played an influential part in that movement.

Though the Emir was the leader of a movement which, on the whole, was hostile to Turkey, and though he asked for English support, he had no objection to co-operating with the Nationalists, who, being threatened by the Allies, offered their support in order to conciliate him. Thus things had come to a more and more confused state. According to the information given by Le Temps on July 20, 1920, it appeared that as early as January, 1919—

“The Sherifian agents, Noury Shalaan, Mohammed Bey, and the Emir Mahmoud Faour, are working hand in hand with the Turkish Nationalists. The Turkish Colonel Selfi Bey has several times travelled from Anatolia to Damascus and vice versa to carry instructions.

“At the beginning of February, Mustafa Kemal sent an appeal to the population of Anatolia in which he said: ‘The Arabian Government relies or will rely on us.’

“The Sherifian authorities are constantly raising difficulties to prevent the French from sending reinforcements or supplies to Cilicia by rail.”

In view of the exactions of all sorts the Emir Feisal indulged in, such as the capture of revenue lawfully belonging to the administration of the Ottoman debt and the proscription of French currency, to say nothing of such acts of aggression as attacks on French outposts and the closing of the railways, General Gouraud on Wednesday, July 14, addressed to the Arabian chief the following ultimatum, which expired on the 18th:

“Recognition of the French mandate for Syria.

“Liberty to make use of the Rayak-Aleppo railway.

“The occupation of Aleppo and the stations lying between Aleppo and Rayak.

“The immediate abolition of forced recruiting.

“Reduction of the Sherifian army to its effectives of December, 1919.

“Free circulation for the French-Syrian currency.

“Punishment of the authors of crimes against French soldiers.

“Acceptance of the above-mentioned conditions within four days. If these conditions are not complied with, they shall be enforced by arms.”

Syria, too, was in quite a perturbed state, owing to the discontent prevailing among the population and the differences between the various factions which were striving to get the upper hand in the country. Two towns, Hasbeiya and Rashaya, situated on the slopes of Mount Hermon, had rebelled against the Sherifian Government and wanted to become parts of Lebanon.

An important debate began on July 19 in the House of Commons about the condition of affairs in Asia Minor and the possible consequences the French ultimatum addressed to the Emir Feisal might have for British interests in that region.

Mr. Ormsby-Gore (Stafford, C.U.) asked the Prime Minister whether he could give any information regarding the new military action of France in Syria; whether the twenty-four hours’ ultimatum issued by the French to the Arab Government in Damascus was submitted to and approved by the Supreme Council; whether the terms of the mandate for Syria had yet been submitted to the Allied and Associated Powers; and whether His Majesty’s Government would use their influence with the French and Arab Governments to secure the suspension of further hostilities pending the decision of the Council of the League of Nations on the terms of the Syrian mandate. To this Mr. Bonar Law answered:

“The ultimatum had not been submitted to the Supreme Council. The terms of the mandate for Syria have not yet been submitted to the Allied Powers. As regards the last part of the question, His Majesty’s Government, who had for some time, but unsuccessfully, been urging the Emir Feisal to come to Europe to discuss the outstanding questions with the Supreme Council, do not consider that they can usefully act upon the information at present at their disposal, but they are in communication with the French Government on the matter.”

Then Mr. Ormsby-Gore asked again:

“Is it a fact that severe casualties have already resulted from this, and that the French have advanced over the line agreed upon between the British and French Governments last year, and that they have advanced from Jerablus to Jisir-Shugr and from the junction at Rayak; and has he any information with regard to the progress of hostilities in another part of the Arab area on the Euphrates?”

Mr. Bonar Law having replied that he had not received the information, Lord Robert Cecil intervened in the discussion, and asked in his turn:

“Have the Government considered the very serious effect of these proceedings on the whole situation in Asia Minor, particularly with reference to Moslem feeling, and whether, in view of the fact that these proceedings were apparently in absolute contravention of Article 22 of the Treaty of Versailles, he would cause representations to be made to our French Allies on the subject?”

Of course, Mr. Bonar Law could only reply:

“We are in communication with the French Government, but I do not accept the statement of my noble friend that what has happened is against the Treaty of Versailles. It is very difficult for us here to judge action which is taken on the responsibility of the French Government.”

Finally, to Lord Hugh Cecil’s inquiry whether the British Government was bound by promises made to the Emir Feisal, Mr. Bonar Law answered:

“The Government are certainly bound by their pledge. In my opinion the fact that the mandate was given to France to cover that area was not inconsistent with that pledge.”

Later on, Mr. Ormsby-Gore obtained leave to move the adjournment of the House in order to call attention to the immediate danger to British interests in the Middle East arising from the threatened new hostilities in Syria. He said that first—

“He wished to criticise vigorously the sins of omission and commission committed by the British Government, and more particularly by the British Foreign Office. Only by a frank and full statement by the British Government would bloodshed be prevented. The responsibility of this country was deeply involved in view of the pledges which had been given to the Arabs before they came into the war, while they were our allies, and above all since the armistice.... It was essential that both the French Government and the Arab Government in Damascus should know exactly what the demands of the British Government were, and how far we were committed and how far we intended to stand by those commitments. The British taxpayer, too, wanted to know how far we were committed. Our pledges to the French were less specific than those to the Arabs. We pledged ourselves to recognise the independence of the Arabs. The British Government were bound by their undertaking to Hussein to recognise the establishment of an independent Arab State comprising within its borders Damascus, Hama, Homs, and Aleppo. Did the British Government communicate these pledges frankly to the French Government? We were responsible for encouraging the Arabs to believe that we were going to stand by them. Were we going to stand by that pledge or not? If not, we ought to tell the Arabs so frankly. It was quite impossible for us to secure the pacification of Arabia, including Mesopotamia, unless Damascus was at peace. French, Arab, and British areas had been agreed upon to last until the permanent settlement was come to, and if there had been a breach of that agreement those who were responsible for the breach ought to be held responsible. Until the mandate for Syria had been approved by the Council of the League of Nations and the new Arab Government in Syria was established there should be no disturbance of the status quo without the willing agreement of all parties. For years the Arabs had been our greatest friends in the East and France our dearest ally in Europe. The outbreak of hostilities between them revealed the bankruptcy of British diplomacy.”

Earl Winterton, like Mr. Ormsby-Gore, took up the defence of the Emir and suggested that Great Britain should act as mediator between France and the Arabs:

“As one who had fought with the Arabs during the war, he resented the idea contained in the suggestion that while it was all very well to use the Arabs during the war, it was not worth while now that the war was over having a row with France for their sake.... Prince Feisal had put his case before the Peace Conference, but the Government, following its usual practice of secrecy, had never allowed the House to hear a word of it or of the considered answer of the Supreme Council. He submitted that the claims that France had to the mandate in Syria were based, and could only be based, on the law of the League of Nations. He was amazed to see in a Northcliffe newspaper that day a reference to ‘the great historical traditions of France in Syria.’ If that suggested that France had any rights in Syria over and above those given by the League of Nations they were coming to a very dangerous argument. It was absurd to treat a people like the Arabs as an upstart people, to be treated in a condescending way by the Allies. The duty of the Government was to make representations at once to both the French and Arab Governments, asking that this matter should be submitted to arbitration, and that the whole case should be made public.”

Finally, General Seely, a former Minister, rose, and owned that under the terms of the treaty with Turkey, France had got a force in Syria, but the whole difficulty lay in the French issuing an ultimatum without consulting Great Britain. According to the three speakers, England was interested in the question, owing to her engagements with the Emir Feisal, and the after-effects which French action might have in Syria and the neighbouring regions.

Mr. Bonar Law, feeling obliged to take into account both the section of public opinion on behalf of which the three speakers had spoken, and the feelings of an Allied country, reminded his opponents, who hardly concealed their unwillingness to approve the arrangements which had just been concluded, that France had the same mandate for Syria as Great Britain had for Mesopotamia, and endeavoured to prove that the situation of England in Mesopotamia was very much the same as the situation of France in Syria. He expressly said:

“The real question before the House was whether the British Government had a right to interfere in a country over which France had duly received a mandate. It was true that, in October, 1915, the British Government had declared they were prepared to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs within those portions of the territories claimed by the Emir Feisal in which Great Britain was free to act, but it was added, without detriment to the interests of her ally France.’ ...

“It was said that the independence of the Arab people was incompatible with the mandate. If so, this part of the Treaty of the Covenant of the League of Nations ought not to have been in, and France ought not to have been allowed to obtain a mandate in Syria. It was also said that what the French were doing was uncalled for; that all that was necessary was to have the status quo. But British troops were in occupation of all the territories, and the British Government came to the conclusion that it was not fair that we should be called upon to bear the burdens of occupation of territories in which later we should have no interest. We gave notice that we intended to withdraw the British troops. The country had therefore to be occupied, and at the San Remo Conference the mandate for Syria was given definitely to the French Government. That was not done behind the back of the Emir Feisal. It was done with his knowledge, and when he was in Paris he himself agreed that there should be a French mandate for that territory.

“We had accepted a mandate in Mesopotamia. Supposing the French Government said to us, ‘You are using force in Mesopotamia, and you are doing it without consulting the French Government. You are breaking the conditions of the proper homogeneity of the Allies, and you should not take steps to repulse the troops attacking you in Mesopotamia until you have come to an arrangement with the French Government.’ The analogy was complete. We were in Mesopotamia for the purpose of setting up not a colony, but an independent Arab State, and, in spite of that, we were attacked by Arabs all through Mesopotamia. Our answer to the French would be that the mandate for Mesopotamia had been entrusted to us, and we claimed to deal with the country in the way we thought right. It was said that this action of the French Government was contrary to the whole spirit of the mandate and an independent Arab State. That was not so. In the ultimatum to which reference had been made a passage occurred which he would quote. Acceptance of the French mandate was one of the conditions. ‘The mandate,’ it is stated, ‘will respect the independence of Syria and will remain wholly compatible with the principle of government by Syrian authorities properly invested with powers by the popular will. It will only entail on the part of the mandatory Power co-operation in the form of collaboration and assistance, but it will in no case assume the colonial form of annexation or direct administration.’ The French Government told us they were acting on that principle, and was the House of Commons really going to ask the British Government to say, ‘We do not accept your assurance, but we ask you to allow us to interfere with you in the exercise of your authority’?

“The mandate having been given, it was clearly no business of ours to interfere unless some action had been taken so outrageous that we had a right to say that it was not in accordance with the Peace Treaty and would not be accepted by the League of Nations or any other independent body....

“Had we that justification? He thought we had a right at least to assume that the French Government had something of a case for the action they were taking. He had the actual words in which the French described the necessity of their taking this action. They pointed out that a large number of French soldiers had been massacred by Arabs. They did not say that the Emir Feisal was responsible for that—he did not think the Emir was—but that whether it was due to his responsibility or want of power to prevent it the situation was one which the French Government could not allow to continue. With regard to the railway, on which they said they depended absolutely under present conditions for the support of their forces in dealing with the rebellion of Mustafa Kemal in Cilicia, they complained that they had tried over and over again to get from the Emir the use of that railway for the purpose of the supply of their troops, but had failed. They said that that was a condition of things which they could not allow to continue if they were to be responsible for the mandate. He thought that was a very good case.”

On Lord Winterton exclaiming: “Then the French have a mandate for Damascus! But neither the Arabs nor the Supreme Council have ever admitted such a mandate,” Mr. Bonar Law, on behalf of the Government, answered:

“They had been in communication with the French Government on that point, and their reply was to this effect: ‘There is no intention of permanent military occupation. As soon as the mandate has been accepted and order has been restored the troops will be withdrawn.’

“A great deal had been said about the claims of Emir Feisal. No one would recognise them more readily than His Majesty’s Government. They knew that he and his tribesmen did gallant service in the war, but he asked the House to remember that but for the sacrifices both of the French and ourselves, there would have been no possibility of King Hussein having any authority in his country....

“They met him over and over again in London and Paris, and when the question came of giving the mandate, on two occasions the British and French Governments sent a joint invitation to the Emir Feisal to come to Europe and discuss the question with them. The Emir Feisal was not able to come for one reason or another on either occasion; but he did say that no case of any ally or anyone in connection with the Peace Treaty was considered more thoroughly than his, or with more inclination to meet his wishes. The House must be under no misapprehension. There was great trouble in the Middle East. Arab fighting would add to that trouble, and what happened in Syria must have reflex action in Mesopotamia. If it was assumed, as some hon. members were ready to assume, that we in Mesopotamia were pursuing solely selfish aims with no other object, and if they assumed that the French were pursuing imperialistic aims in Syria with no other object, then, of course, the case was hopeless. There was no Frenchman who had shown a broader mind and a greater readiness to grasp the position of other people than General Gouraud. In any degree to reflect upon the French Government in this matter was a very serious thing.”

The time seemed very badly chosen indeed for such a debate in the English Parliament, as Mr. Winston Churchill, War Secretary, had just informed the Commons that important reinforcements coming from India had recently been dispatched to Mesopotamia, and the Commander-in-Chief had been given full powers to take any measures the situation might require.

It was the policy of England in the East which stood responsible for such a state of things. Though the bulk of public opinion in France was averse to any military action in the East, either in Syria or in Turkey, yet France was driven to fight, as it were, by England—though both Governments were supposed to act jointly in the East—in order to prevent her ally from undermining her influence. Such was the outcome of England’s ill-omened policy, who first had supported the Arabian movement and now seemed to forsake it, and thus had roused all the East against Europe through the resentment caused by her attitude towards Turkey and Persia. Perhaps England was not very sorry, after all, that France should divert against herself part of the Arabian forces from the Mesopotamian front, where the British effectives were insufficient in number.

M. Millerand corroborated Mr. Bonar Law’s statements before the French Chamber, disclosed some of the agreements made with England, and apologised for being unable to say more; he also declared England had officially recognised she had no right to meddle with Syrian affairs; and finally declared that whoever should feel tempted—he meant the Emir who had just submitted to General Gouraud’s ultimatum—to oppose France to Great Britain in Asia Minor would now know it would have France alone in front of him. And yet if one day Great Britain rules over Mesopotamia, she is not likely to give France a free hand in Syria.

Just at the same time—on July 20—the Cairo correspondent of The Times wrote that he understood the King of the Hejaz had telegraphed to Mr. Lloyd George how surprised and disappointed he was at the French policy in Syria, and asked him to interfere. King Hussein also declared he could not exert his influence on the Emir Feisal’s brothers or prevent them from coming to his help.

The English Government circles, on the other hand, seemed at last inclined to favour a scheme that would put Syria and Mesopotamia, respectively under the sovereignty of the Emir Feisal and the Emir Abdullah, under a French mandate in Syria and a British one in Mesopotamia. But the Daily Express of July 17 seemed apprehensive lest the French expedition aimed at overthrowing the Emir Feisal and replacing him by the Emir Said, who had been expelled from Syria during the British occupation. Let it be said, incidentally, that the Arabs of the Emir Feisal possessed 100,000 rifles, the very arms taken from the Turks by the English and left by the latter in the hands of the Arabian leader.

General Gouraud’s ultimatum had naturally been accepted by the Emir Feisal, but a few days after its expiration, and so military action had been started. General Gouraud, according to his communiqué, had, on July 22, at the Emir’s request, stopped the column that was on its way from Zaleh to Damascus. Feisal had alleged that his answer had been sent in due time, but untoward circumstances had prevented it from coming to hand the appointed day.

The French General had consented to give him the benefit of the doubt and halt his troops on certain conditions, one of which was that his soldiers should not be attacked. Now the French column that guarded the country between Homs and Tripolis, some distance to the east of the post of Tel-Kelah, was attacked by Sherifian regulars. Under these circumstances, and to prevent another attack which seemed to be preparing between Damascus and Beyrut, the southern French column that guarded the railway in case of an attack coming from Damascus, dislodged the Sherifian troops whose headquarters were at Khan-Meiseloun, in the mountain range which divides the plain of the Bukaa from the plain of Damascus, and thus the way was open to the latter town.

France, who otherwise would not have been obliged to fight in order to maintain her influence in Syria, was compelled to do so by the policy in which she was involved. But this policy, which drove her to inaugurate a Syrian campaign at the very time when by the side of England she enforced on Turkey a treaty that no Turk could accept, might have brought about, as Pierre Loti said in an article of the Œuvre, July 22, “the death of France in the East.”

Even the Christians43—the Armenians excepted—wished the French to leave Antioch in order to be able to come to an understanding with the Moslems who maintained order in the four great towns of Aleppo, Hama, Homs, and Damascus, occupied by the Sherifian troops. A delegation of eight members representing the Christian element wanted to go to France, but the Patriarch of Lebanon handed General Gouraud a protest to be forwarded to the French Government; he inveighed against what he called “the shameful conduct of some members of the administrative Council of Lebanon,” and charged them, just as they were about to leave for Europe, with receiving important sums of money from the Emir Feisal to carry on an anti-French propaganda. After this protest, they were imprisoned by the French authorities: all of which shows the state of deep unrest then prevailing in Lebanon and our utter lack of reliable information from the East.

On July 23 a French column entered Aleppo, after a skirmish north of Muslemieh, and a reconnoitring body of cavalry which had pushed on as far as Homs bridge was greeted by some Sherifian officers, who informed them that the Sherifian troops had left the town. On the 25th, in the afternoon, the French troops entered Damascus without encountering any resistance. A new Government was formed after the downfall of the Sherifian Government, and General Gobet formally notified them on behalf of General Gouraud that the Emir Feisal was no longer King of the country. He demanded a war contribution of 10 million francs on account of the damage done by the war bands in the western zone; general disarmament should be proceeded with at once; the army should be reduced and converted into a body of police; all war material should be handed over to the French authorities, and the chief war criminals tried by military courts. All these conditions were, of course, assented to by the new Government, who expressed their sincere wish to collaborate with the French.

The Emir Feisal, who had come back to Damascus, was requested to leave the country with his family. He set off to England soon after and sought to meet Mr. Lloyd George at Lucerne.

Without considering the future relations between Lebanon and Syria or turning its attention to the future mode of government of Syria and its four great towns Damascus, Hama, Homs, and Aleppo, the French Government decided to restore Greater Lebanon. M. Millerand informed Mgr. Abdallah Kouri, Maronite Archbishop of Arca, president of the delegation of Lebanon, of this by a letter dated August 24, 1920. The new State was to extend from the Nahr-el-Litani, which flows along the frontier of Palestine, to another State, called “Territoire des Alaonites,” or, in Arabic, Alawiya, coming between the Lebanon and Antioch, and to the crests of Anti-Libanus, including the Bukaa area, with the towns of Rayak and Baalbek. The ports of Beyrut and Tripolis in Syria were to enjoy local autonomy, but to keep in close connection with the new State. Beyrut was to be the seat of the new Government; Tripolis and its suburbs were to be grouped into a municipality. In this way Greater Lebanon would have recovered all its former territories, as it was before 1860, in conformity with the promises made by M. Clémenceau and confirmed by M. Millerand, and with the claims set forth in 1919 at the Peace Conference by the delegates of Lebanon.

Was it not a mistake in Syria, a country over which France had a mandate and where the proportion of Moslems is three to one, to start with a policy that favoured Lebanon and consequently the Christians? The question was all the more important as the discontent brought about by the Powers’ decisions was far from subsiding in these and the neighbouring regions.

Indeed, the Ansarieh tribes, living in the mountainous regions to the east of Antioch and Alexandretta, and in the Jebel Ansarieh between Latakia and Tartus, which had persistently kept aloof from us in the past, made their submission after the downfall of the Emir Feisal, and several Ansarieh chiefs—Ismail Pasha, Inad, and Ismail Bey Yaouah—accepted the conditions imposed on them. Yet dissatisfaction was still rampant in the Hauran area, and the train in which ed Rubi Pasha, the Syrian Premier, and other Ministers were going to Deraa was attacked on Friday, August 20, at Kerbet-Ghazeleh by Arabian bands. Ed Rubi Pasha and Abdurrahman Youssef Pasha were murdered. The railway line was recaptured later on, but the contingents sent to Deraa had to fight with Arabian bands at Mosmieh.

Farther north, in the part of Cilicia entirely occupied by Kemalist troops, Colonel Brémond, commanding a group of 3,000 to 4,000 men consisting of French troops and native recruits, after being blockaded at Adana for six weeks, had to sign a truce in August because he was short of water, and the provisioning of Adana could only be ensured by establishing a base in the former Roman port of Karatash. Mersina, where the French had enlisted all the Armenian and Greek manhood, was also besieged and blockaded, except along the coast where a French warship overawed the rebels. Lastly, Tarsus, the third place occupied by French troops, was in the same predicament, and was cut off from the other two towns. Under these circumstances whoever could flee sailed to Cyprus, and the few boats which called at Mersina took away crowds of fugitives.

In Mesopotamia the situation was quite as bad, and everywhere the Arabs evinced much discontent. In the zone of the lower Euphrates and Lake Hamar, as well as in the Muntefik area, many disturbances occurred.

The Sunday Times of August 21, 1920, in an article in which the attitude of the British Government was severely criticised, wondered whether it was not too late to atone for the mistakes of England, even by expending large sums of money, and concluded thus:

“Would it not be wiser to confess our failure and give up meddling with the affairs of three million Arabs who want but one thing, to be allowed to decide their own fate? After all, Rome was not ruined when Hadrian gave up the conquests made by Trajan.”

The Observer too asked whether a heavy expenditure of men and money could restore the situation, and added:

“The situation is serious; yet it is somewhat ludicrous too, when we realise that so much blood and money has been wasted for a lot of deserts and marshes which we wanted ‘to pacify,’ and when we remember that our ultimate aim is to impose our sovereignty on people who plainly show they do not want it.”

The diversity of creeds among the various Moslem sects had also, from the beginning, imperilled the unity of the Arabian world within the Ottoman Empire by endangering its religious unity. By the side of the Sunnis, or Orthodox Moslems, the Shia—viz., the rebels or heretics, belonging to a schism which is almost as old as Islam itself—recognise nobody but Ali as the lawful successor of Mohammed. According to them, the title of Caliph should not go outside the Prophet’s family, and his spiritual powers can only be conferred upon his descendants; so, from a religious point of view, they do not recognise the power of the other dynasties of Caliphs—for instance, that of the Ottoman Sultans. As Ali, the Prophet’s son-in-law, was killed at Kufa in Mesopotamia, and as Ali’s sons, Hassan and Hossein, were also massacred at Kerbela, near the ruins of Babylon, together with some of their descendants who had a lawful right to the title of Imam, Mesopotamia is looked upon by the Shia as their Holy Places.

Many wealthy Persians, to whom the worship of the members of Ali’s family has become a symbol and who consider their death as a religious sacrifice, have their own coffins carried to Mesopotamia that their bodies may lie in the holy necropolis of Kerbela or of Nejef, to the north-east of Mecca and Medina; and as a great many Arabs of Mesopotamia are still Shia, this schism practically divides the Persian world from the Turkish world.

But though the Persians, who have never recognised any Caliph, and for the last thirteen hundred years have been waiting till the Khilafat should revert to the lineal descent of Ali, the Prophet’s son-in-law, to acknowledge a Caliph’s authority, do not recognise the Ottoman Caliphate, yet their monarchs do not seek to deprive the Sultan of his title of Caliph to assume it themselves.

So their case is entirely different from that of the people of Morocco, who do not recognise the Ottoman Caliphate because their own sovereigns, as descendants of the Prophet, profess they have an hereditary right to hold the office of Caliph within the frontiers of their State.

The Shia faith has even spread as far as India and the Sunda Isles; and so the opposition between Shia and Sunnis may play an important part in freeing Mesopotamia from the Turkish influence of Constantinople.

Yet the English occupation has been so bitterly resented in Mesopotamia that the Shia Mujtahids, or imams of Nejef and Kerbela, have lately asked for the restoration of Turkish sovereignty over these towns, where are the two famous holy shrines of Islam. Moreover, the controversy on the question whether the Sultans of Turkey have a right to the Caliphate, because they do not belong to the tribe of Koreish, in which the Prophet was born, seems to have come to an end among the Moslems, or at least to have been laid aside in view of the present events.

Moreover, the Prophet, when he advised the Faithful to choose his successor in the tribe of Koreish, does not seem at all, according to the best Moslem authorities, to have wished to confer the supreme spiritual power for ever upon a particular section of the community related to him by ties of blood, and to have reserved the Caliphate to this tribe. It seems more likely that, as Islam at that time had not yet given birth to powerful States, he chose this tribe because it was the best organised and the strongest, and thus considered it as the fittest to maintain the independence of the Caliphate and defend the interests of Islam. Besides, within half a century after the Prophet’s death the Caliphate passed from Mohammed’s four immediate successors to the Omayyids for the reason indicated above, and in contradiction to the theory of lineal descent. It is obvious that, had Mohammed been guided by family considerations, he would not have merely given the Faithful some directions about the election of his successor, but he would have chosen one of his relations himself to inherit his office, and would have made it hereditary in the latter’s family.

The Wahhabis, who are connected with the Shia, are likewise a political and religious sect which was founded in the eighteenth century in Nejed, a region of Central Arabia conterminous with the north of Syria. The Wahhabi doctrine aims at turning Islam into a kind of deism, a rational creed, looking upon all the traditions of Islam as superstitions, and discarding all religious observances. Since the assassination of Ibn el Rashid in May, 1920, the present leaders of the Wahhabis are Abdullah ibn Mitah and Ibn Saud, over whom the Ottomans have a merely nominal power.

When King Hussein planned to join the Hejaz and Nejd to Syria, Ibn Saud refused to let Nejd fall under the suzerainty of the King of the Hejaz, who was powerful merely because he was supported by Europe and because Syria is a rich country. Most likely the religious question had something to do with this conflict. In August, 1919, the Wahhabis, who had asked the Emir Ibn Saud for his support, suddenly attacked the troops of the sons of the King of the Hejaz which were in the Taif area, and defeated them at Tarabad. The Wahhabi Emir gained a few more victories, and was about to threaten the Holy Cities when the rising of the Orthodox Moslem tribes compelled him to retreat.

So the hostility of the Wahhabis, whose independence was threatened by the Sunnis of the Hejaz, whom they look upon as heretics, still embittered the dissensions in the Arab world.

It has been asserted that this Wahhabi movement was at first started by the Turks, which would not have been unlikely at a time when it was Turkey’s interest to divide Arabia in order to raise difficulties to the Allies after the Sherif’s treason; but now it was no longer her interest—and it was beyond her power—to stir up an agitation.

The Ishmaelites, who laid waste Persia and Syria in the eighth century, and played an important part in the East till the twelfth century, have also broken off with the Shia.

Lastly, the Druses, who inhabit the slopes of Lebanon and the greater part of Anti-Lebanon between Jebeil and Saida along the Mediterranean, profess the creed of the Caliph Al-Hakem, who lived at the beginning of the eleventh century. They had withdrawn to Lebanon and long repelled the attacks of the Turks, whose suzerainty they acknowledged only in 1588. In 1842 the Porte gave them a chief, but practically they have remained almost independent. They have often fought with the Maronite Christians living to the north, especially in 1860, and there is still much hostility between them.

Moreover, all Moslem communities, without exception—whether the communities governed by independent national sovereigns such as Afghanistan; or by sovereigns owing allegiance to non-Moslem Powers such as Egypt, India, Tunis, Khiva, Bokhara; or the communities living under a non-Moslem rule, as is the case with those of Algeria, Russia, and also India and China—give their allegiance to the Sultan as Caliph, though they are always at liberty to refuse it. Even the Moslem communities of Algeria and Tunis, which are connected with those of Morocco by their common origin and language, and live close by them, do not deem it a sufficient reason to recognise the Emir of Morocco as Caliph that he is a descendant of the Prophet.

An even more striking argument is that the community of the Hejaz, which rebelled against Turkish sovereignty during the war and has made itself politically independent, still maintains its religious allegiance to the Sultan; and the present King, Hussein, who is the most authentic descendant of the Prophet, and who rules over the two holiest towns of Islam, Mecca and Medina, soon after the armistice addressed the Sultan a telegram of religious allegiance drawn up in the most deferential terms. The possession of Mecca and Medina being one of the attributes of the Caliph, and these towns having a great religious and political importance owing to the great annual pilgrimage, King Hussein might have taken advantage of this to dispute with the Sultan the title of Caliph. England had strongly urged him to do so, but King Hussein obstinately refused. Then the British Government, giving up all hope of bringing about the transference of the Caliphate from the Ottoman dynasty to another sovereign, concluded a secret alliance with Vahid ed Din.

Considering the intricate situation in the East due to the variety of races and religions, and the movements of all sorts by which the populations of those countries are swayed, it seems most unwise to increase the general restlessness by a vain intervention of the Powers, and to dismember what remains of Turkey in Europe and Aria Minor, a dismemberment which would necessarily have violent repercussions throughout the deeply perturbed Moslem world. Though the recent movements of emancipation in the East to a certain extent meet the legitimate wishes of the peoples and have somewhat cleared the situation in Asia Minor, yet it is obviously most perilous to infringe upon the Sultan’s sovereignty, to endeavour to drive away the Turks into Asia, and to set up a kind of fictitious official Islam by compelling the Moslem peoples of the East to give up their cherished independence and submit to an Arab imperialism which would soon become British imperialism. At the present moment all the Moslem elements are determined to unite together against any enemy of their liberty; and all Moslems, without any distinction of creed or race, might very well one day flock to the standard of a bold leader who should take up arms in the name of Islam, in order to safeguard their independence.

These movements, and many other similar ones, were encouraged and strengthened by the development of the principle of nationalities and the support given to it by Mr. Wilson, who was bent upon carrying it out to its strictly logical consequences, without paying heed to the limitations imposed by the present material and political conditions. But we do not think it is true to say, as has been urged, that the assertion of the right of self-determination of peoples was the initial cause of these movements. The movement in favour of the rights of nationalities originated long before Mr. Wilson’s declarations, which merely hurried on this powerful movement, and also caused it to swerve somewhat from its original direction.

This movement, on the whole, seems chiefly to proceed—though other factors have intervened in it—from a kind of reaction against the standardising tendency, from a material and moral point of view, of modern Western civilisation, especially the Anglo-Saxon civilisation, and also from a reaction against the extreme unification aimed at by russifying the numerous peoples living within the Russian Empire. Modern civilisation, having reached its present climax, has aimed—and its political and social repercussions have had the same influence—at doing away with all differences between human minds and making the world homogeneous; thus all men would have been brought to live in the same way, to have the same manners, and their requirements would have been met in the same way—to the very great advantage of its enormous industrial development. Of course, all this proved an idle dream; human nature soon asserted itself, amidst the commotions and perturbations experienced by the States, and a reaction set in among those who hitherto only aimed at enslaving various human groups, or linked them together politically in a most artificial way. Then the same feeling spread among all those peoples.

All this enables us to see to what extent this movement is legitimate, and to know exactly what proportions of good and evil it contains.

It rightly asserts that various peoples have different natures, and by protecting their freedom, it aims at ensuring the development of their peculiar abilities. For let us not forget that the characters of peoples depend on physical conditions, that even the features we may not like in some peoples are due to the race, and that if, by blending and mixing populations nowadays these features are modified, they are generally altered only from bad to worse.

But this principle is true only so far as it frees and enables to shape their own destinies peoples who have distinctive qualities of their own and are able to provide for themselves. It cannot be extended—as has been attempted in some cases—to States within which men descending from various races or having belonged in the course of centuries to different nationalities have long been united, and through a long common history and a centuries-old co-operation have formed one nation. This is one of the erroneous aspects of Mr. Wilson’s conception, and one of the bad consequences it has entailed.

The eviction of the Turks from Constantinople, which the British wished for but which they dared not carry into effect, does not thwart the scheme of the Turkish Nationalists; it can only bring about a reaction of the Moslem populations against foreign intervention, and thus strengthen the Pan-Turanian movement. Though this movement cannot carry out all its aims, the eviction of the Turks obviously must urge those populations to constitute a State based both on the community of religion and the community of race of its various elements, and from which all alien ethnic elements would be expelled—viz., Slavs, Armenians, Greeks, and Arabs, who were all an inherent source of weakness to the Turkish Empire. This new State would include Anatolia, Russian Azerbaïjan, and Persian Azerbaïjan, the Russian territories in Central Asia—viz., Russian Turkistan, Khiva, Bokhara—the whole of the region of the Steppes; and towards it the Tatar populations of the Volga, Afghanistan, and Chinese Turkistan would necessarily be attracted.

As to the Arabs, the Turks have never been able to gain their friendship, though they have done their best to do so, and have drawn but little profit from the money squandered plentifully in their vast deserts. And the Russians have always stood in the way of an understanding between Turkey and the Arabian territories, because it would have benefited the cause of Islam and therefore would have hindered both their own designs on the territories of Asia Minor and the ambitions of the Orthodox Church. Yet to the Turks as well as the Arabs—and even to the Europeans—it would be a great advantage not to injure the understanding and goodwill that Islam engenders among these peoples, since its creed has both a religious and a political aspect.

The maintenance of this Islamic union has been wrongly called—in the disparaging sense of the word—Pan-Islamism. Yet its ideal has nothing in common with such doctrines as those of Pan-Germanism, Pan-Slavism, Pan-Americanism, Pan-Polism, Pan-Hellenism, etc., which are all imperialistic doctrines aiming at territorial conquests by military or economic means, and also by the diffusion of their own religious creeds and the extension of the influence of their Churches. While Pan-Germanism aims at the hegemony of the world; while Pan-Americanism wants to control the whole of America; while Pan-Slavism wishes to gather together all the Slavonic elements—which is defensible—but also means to supplant the old civilisation of Western Europe, which it considers as “rotten,” and to renovate the world; while Pan-Polism, which has not such ambitious aims, merely seeks, like Pan-Hellenism, to conquer wider territories in order to restore Greater Poland or Greater Greece—Islam, which does not try to make any proselytes, has no other ambition than to group all Moslem elements according to the commandments of the Koran. Yet, Islam having both a political and a religious purpose, a Pan-Islamic concept might be defensible, and would be legitimate from the Moslem point of view, whereas it cannot be so from the Christian point of view. Pan-Catholicism, on the contrary, is an impossible thing, because Christianity does not imply a political doctrine, and is distinct from temporal power—though such a doctrine has sometimes been advocated. For in the doctrine of monarchy, especially in France, religion has always been held merely as a help, a support, and the monarch, though he has often been a defender of the Faith, has never looked upon his power as dependent on the Papacy or bound up with it. Islam, however, does not want to assert itself in, and give birth to, a huge political movement—a Pan-Islamic movement in the imperialistic sense of the word—aiming at constituting a huge theocratic State, including all the 300 million Moslems who are now living. But there is between all Moslems a deep moral solidarity, a mighty religious bond which accounts for their sympathetic feeling towards Turkey, and owing to which even the Moslem inhabitants of countries which have lost their independence still earnestly defend and jealously maintain the privileges and dignity of the Caliph.

So it is a mistake to speak of the ambitious designs of Islam, and the mistake has been made wilfully. Those who profess such an opinion are Pan-Slavic Russians who want to deceive public opinion in the world as to their true intent, and thus prepare for territorial annexations, because Pan-Slavism is the enemy of Islamism. As this Pan-Slavism has always been, and is still more than ever, a danger to Europe, it is the interest of the latter, in order to defend its civilisation, not to fight against Islamism, but even to support it. This necessity has been understood by many Catholics who have always been favourable to Turkey and by the Mussulmans, which accounts for the long friendly intercourse between Moslems and Catholics, and the Moslems’ tolerance toward the devotees of a religion which, on the whole, is in complete contradiction to their own faith. On the other hand, Islam appears as counterbalancing Protestantism in the East, and it seems the future of thought and morality and of any culture would be endangered if the 60 million Indian Moslems and the 220 million Indian Brahminists, Buddhists, and the members of other sects ever listened to Mr. Lloyd George and were connected with Protestantism.

Moreover, King Hussein, in the course of the audience that he granted in July, 1920, to Prince Ruffo, the leader of the Italian mission to Arabia, before his departure, after saying that the Moslem world resented the hostile attitude of the Powers towards the Sultan of Constantinople, declared that the Moslems are not actuated by any feeling of conquest or proselytism, but simply claim the right to preserve their independence.

Footnotes:

36 Hayassdan, July 6, 1915; No. 25.

37 We are the more anxious to correct these figures as in 1916, at a time when it was difficult to control them, we gave about the same figures in a note to the Société d’Anthropologie as to the demographic consequences of the war. We then relied upon the documents that had just been published and on the statements of the Rev. Harold Buxton.

38 Le Mouvement pan-russe et les Allogènes (Paris, 1919).

39 The Times, March 15, 1920.

40 H. Vambéry. Cagataische Sprachstudien (Leipzig, 1867); Etymologisches Wörterbuch der Turko-Tatarischen Sprachen (Leipzig, 1875); Das Turkenvolk (1885).

41 Léon Cahun, Introduction à l’histoire de l’Asie, Turcs et Mongols, des origines à 1405 (Paris, 1896).

42 Liman von Sanders, Fünf Jahre Türkei, pp. 330-331.

43 Le Temps, July 21, 1920.