VIII THE MOSLEMS OF THE FORMER RUSSIAN EMPIRE AND TURKEY

The Supreme Council, in the course of one of its last sittings, decided in January, 1920, practically to recognise the independence of Georgia,44 Azerbaïjan, and Armenia.

It is deeply to be regretted that this decision came so late, for, considering the circumstances under which it was taken, it seemed to have been resorted to in extremis and under the Bolshevist threat.

It was even announced, then denied, that the Allies were going to send contingents to the Caucasus in order to check the Bolshevist advance towards Armenia, Turkey, Persia, and possibly towards Mesopotamia and India. But under the present circumstances, the Allies were not likely now to get all the benefit they might have derived from this measure if it had been taken long ago; and, on the other hand, this measure was not likely to produce any effect if the new States were not recognised definitely and could not rely on the Allies’ moral and material support.

Since Georgia, Azerbaïjan, and Armenia seemed to have been recognised as independent States, in order to incite them to check the Reds’ advance, how was it that the Republic of Northern Caucasus had not been treated similarly? The reason given by the Supreme Council was that, as the greater part of this State was occupied by Denikin’s forces, it did not think it proper to take a decision about it. The true reason was that the Supreme Council wanted to favour the Pan-Russian general, and it was even rumoured that Koltchak and Denikin had demanded this rich country to be set aside for the Tsar, whom they wanted to restore to the throne.

Out of the 25 or 30 million Moslems living in the whole of Russia, 6 or 8 millions were scattered in the region of the Volga (Orenburg, Kazan) and in the Crimea; they were about 6 millions in Turkistan and 7 millions in the Caucasus region; about 2 millions in Northern Caucasus, 300,000 to 500,000 in Kuban, 600,000 in Georgia, 3,500,000 in Azerbaïjan. Half the population is Moslem in the new Armenian State, for only in two districts are the Armenians in a majority, the Tatars being in a majority in the others. It should be borne in mind that all these Moslems, after the downfall of Tsardom, had turned their hopes towards the Allies, especially England, to safeguard their political independence. Unfortunately neither Great Britain nor France paid any heed to the repeated entreaties of M. Haidar Bammate, then Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Northern Caucasus, or later on to the appeals of the Georgian statesmen.

This omission appears all the more unaccountable if we remember that the Allies, by settling the fate of Armenia on this occasion, encroached upon the Turkish question and confused it with the Russian question, which was already intricate enough; and as it is clear that another obvious reason for the Allies’ decision was to befriend the Moslem populations of those regions, that they might not join the Bolshevist cause, why then had Christian Armenia been included in the aforesaid settlement, while Northern Caucasus had been excluded from it? Of course, it is not to be regretted that Armenia benefited by the Allies’ decision, but it is impossible logically to explain how it came to be included in their measure on account of its close relations with Georgia and Azerbaïjan, when, as a matter of fact, the latter republics want to form a close union with Caucasus. It was quite as urgent, therefore, to recognise the Republic of Northern Caucasus as the other three countries.

Moreover, as the Allies wanted to keep Bolshevism out of Transcaucasia, it seemed obvious that their first measure, from a military point of view, should have been to hold a strong position in the Caucasus Range, whose slopes were being lapped by the Red tide, and to organise its defence.

Indeed, the key to the defence of Transcaucasia lies to the north of the Caucasus Range. Four passes, crossing the mountains from the north to the south, give access to it: the defile of Sukhum; the road leading from Alatyr to Kutaris; the Georgian military road from Vladikavkaz to Tiflis; lastly, the gates of Derbent, along the Caspian Sea. Only the first of these defiles was held by the Georgians; the other three were in the hands of the mountaineers, “the Gortsy”—viz., the Chechens, the Ossetes, the Ingushes, the Kabardians, and the Daghestanians, who make up the Republic of Northern Caucasus. It was easy for the mountaineers to set up a first line of defence on the Rivers Terek and Malka, which constitute a good strategic position, a second line before the defiles, and, should some detachments venture across the latter, they would be quickly stopped by the mountaineers. If, on the contrary, nothing was done, the Bolshevists could easily cross the defiles and destroy the Batum-Baku railway. These tribes, who had displayed so much energy sixty years ago for the conquest of their liberty, had fought against the Bolshevists from November, 1917, till February, 1919; so they had a right to expect the Allies would support their claims.

Unfortunately, French policy resorted again to the same manœuvre to which it was indebted for its failure on the Baltic coast, and which repeatedly deferred a solution of the Russian question. For the Allies refused to settle the condition of the Baltic States definitely, and even tried to restore Russia to its former state; they even urged the Baltic States, till Yudenitch, Denikin, and Koltchak had been defeated, to carry on the onerous struggle they had undertaken and to make all sacrifices of men and money to capture Petrograd, which they were not eager to do, as they would have merely paved the way to the coming of the Pan-Russian generals.

The Allies made a similar mistake when they indirectly asked the mountaineers of Caucasus, who wanted to be independent, to attack the Bolshevists, but gave them no guarantee they would recognise their independence. Of course, the mountaineers refused to play such a part, for they risked finding themselves confronted one day or another with a Russia that would despise their national aspirations and would oppress them.

The situation could have been saved and the balance between the States on the confines of the Russian Empire could have been restored only by a close understanding of all the Caucasian peoples, after their independence should have been recognised; the representatives of Georgia and Azerbaïjan agreed on this point with the representatives of Northern Caucasus, and these peoples were ready to help each other mutually.

In the course of the last sitting of the Supreme Council to which the delegates of Georgia and Azerbaïjan had been invited, the latter declared “that the mountaineers were brave, that they had constituted some of the best units of the former Russian army, and were bent upon stopping the Bolshevists, but they lacked arms and ammunition.”

Under such circumstances it seemed the Allies could not possibly ignore these peoples’ determination and turn a deaf ear to their earnest request, yet they took no decision.

With regard to the Moslem question this attitude of the Conference, which seemed bent upon ignoring Northern Caucasus, was equally strange, for it was bound to bring about discontent among these Moslem populations. It was the more unaccountable as the Bolshevists, who set up as protectors of these populations, had sent many emissaries among them, who could not but derive profit from the Allies’ attitude. The Bolshevists had, of course, immediately recognised Daghestan a Moslem State.

Nor had the Republic of Northern Caucasus any reason to be satisfied with the attitude assumed by the British mission sent to Baku, for this mission had constantly supported General Denikin, and seemed to endeavour to destroy the economic and political Caucasian union it had formed with Georgia and Azerbaïjan. The only theory which accounts for the British attitude is that the English meant to remain masters of Baku, and to leave the Russians the oil-field of Groznyi in Northern Caucasus, the output of which was already important before the war, and would certainly increase. But they were mistaken in thinking that the petroleum of Groznyi, which was partly used as fuel by the Vladikavkaz railway and partly sent to the Black Sea ports to be sold to Western Europe, was utilised in Central Russia; it is chiefly the petroleum of the Baku area, lying farther south, which is easily conveyed to Russia across the Caspian Sea and up the Volga.

Again, the Allies ought to have taken into account that the troublous state into which the Moslem world had been thrown by the settlement of the Turkish question as it was contemplated by the Peace Conference might have most important reactions in all directions on the populations of the former Russian Empire which now wanted to be independent.

Yet the claims which the delegations of the Republics of Georgia and Azerbaïjan—together with Northern Caucasus—had set forth in January in the course of their reception by the Supreme Council concerning the support they might expect from the Great Powers in case they should be attacked by the Soviets, brought forth no answer; and the Allies adjourned both the question of the defence of the Transcaucasian Republics and the question of their independence.

In consequence of all this, Northern Caucasus soon fell a prey to Bolshevism, and some insurrections broke out in Georgia. The Soviet Government sent a great many agitators to these regions. Then the Red army advanced in two columns, one of which defeated Denikin and crossed the Kuban to invade Caucasus, and the other spread over Kurdistan, whence, after winning over to its cause the Tatar and pro-Russian elements of the neighbouring regions, it extended its field of action as far as Persia and Mesopotamia.

As early as February the Russian Bolshevists concentrated important forces near the northern frontier of Azerbaïjan under pretence of driving away the remnants of Denikin’s army, and after hurriedly getting up a “Soviet Government” at Daghestan, drew near the frontier of Azerbaïjan.

Meanwhile their agents carried on an energetic propaganda at Baku, where the inexperienced Moslem leaders of Azerbaïjan had foolishly left almost all the administration of the country in the hands of functionaries of the old régime or Russian officers who thought that Bolshevism, especially with the national character it had newly assumed, might restore Russia to its former state.

Within the country an economic crisis on the one hand, and on the other hand the Armenians’ aggressions, in the course of which they had massacred many Mussulmans, especially at Karabagh, had raised a widespread discontent against the Cabinet.

Emboldened by the success of the Bolshevists, who benefited by these disturbances, their local accomplices, some Russian workmen supported by about a hundred Moslem workmen, helped to organise a series of raids. During the night of April 26-27 the northern frontier of Azerbaïjan was crossed at the railway station of Jalama by a Bolshevist armoured train, for the main body of the army of Azerbaïjan had been dispatched to Karabagh and Kasakg to repel an Armenian attack, so that only one armoured train and a few hundred soldiers had been left on the northern frontier. This small detachment could not prevent the advance of the Red forces which followed the train, though it did its duty bravely and destroyed the railway track. On April 27 the Bolshevist forces reached the station of Khatchmaz, where they were greeted by a group of local communists.

At Baku, where the population lived in a state of indifference and passivity, the local communists, encouraged by the advance of the Russian Bolshevists, addressed an ultimatum to the Government, which had declared itself in favour of armed resistance, demanding the resignation of the Cabinet and the handing over of the Government to the revolutionary committee which had just been formed. This ultimatum was enforced by the threat of the bombardment of the town by the fleet of the Caspian Sea.

The Government, which had vainly asked Georgia for assistance, and had proposed to Armenia, before the common danger, to put an end to the hostilities at Karabagh in order to withdraw its troops and dispatch them to the northern frontier, was compelled on April 28 to hand over the power to the people’s commissioners. The members of the Cabinet, against whom the Bolshevists had issued a writ of arrest, hurried away and the communists immediately resorted to their usual methods of terrorism and plunder.

Instead of the “Moslem Brethren” the Bolshevist emissaries had spoken of, the inhabitants of Baku saw some Russian Bolshevists, accompanied by Armenians who had been expelled by the former Government, take possession of the town. As soon as they arrived, the latter arrested all the foreign missions, except the Persian mission. As the national army was detained on the southern frontier by constant Armenian attacks, the invaders dispatched Russian detachments in all directions, to take possession of the entire country. They addressed an ultimatum to Armenia, demanding the evacuation of Karabagh. At the same time Russian forces were sent via Zakatali towards the Georgian frontier. At Baku the Moslem militia was replaced by Russian workmen, and at the same time orders were given immediately to disarm the population of Ganjha (Elisavetpol), where the governor and some notables were arrested and incarcerated.

It is reported that at Ganjha 15,000 Moslems were slaughtered by the Reds.

A correspondent of Il Secolo, on coming back from Caucasus, wrote an article entitled “The East on Fire” on May 25, 1920:

“The information that we have just received from Constantinople, Anatolia, Caucasus, and Persia could not possibly be worse. Bolshevism has won over Caucasus to its policy, and from Baku it is carrying on a more and more energetic propaganda in Persia and Turkistan. The British are already fighting in the latter country with Bolshevism. All this might have been foreseen.

“As it is cut off from Europe and encircled by hostile bayonets, Bolshevism, which originated in Asia, is now spreading over Asia. This does not mean that Caucasus and Asia are ripe for a revolution of the poor against the rich. It would be a foolish thing to say this. In Asia everybody is poor, but nobody starves. In Asia there is no industry, there are no organisations; therefore, there is no socialist movement on the whole. But anybody who has been to Caucasus lately must necessarily have noticed, to his great surprise, evidences of a Moslem Bolshevism headed by Enver Pasha and his brother Noury. The Republic of the mountaineers of Daghestan, the first that joined the Bolshevist movement and made easier the advance of the Reds towards the south, is headed by Enver Pasha. In Azerbaïjan many fanatic admirers of Russia are to be met with.

“And what are the reasons for this? They are many. First, the desperate condition of the new States which came into being immediately after the Brest-Litovsk peace. In Paris the Conference laid down frontiers, but never thought the first thing to do was to put an end to the economic crisis prevailing in those countries. And so an absurd thing happened—wealthy countries living in frightful misery, and issuing paper currency which was of no value on the world’s markets. Typical is the case of Azerbaïjan, which had millions of tons of petroleum at Baku, but did not know where or how to export them.”

In July it was announced that the situation of the Moslems in Armenia had become critical, as for the last two months the Erivan Government and the “Tashnak” party had been carrying on a policy of violence and massacres against them. What remained of the Moslem populations had been compelled to leave their homes and property and flee to Persia. The Armenian Government had even appointed a Commission especially to draw up a list of the crops left by the Moslems and the Greeks in the district. At the end of June, in the district of Zanguibazar, about twenty Moslem villages had been destroyed by bombardments and their inhabitants put to death. By that time the Moslem population of Transcaucasia was being attacked both by the Armenians and the Bolshevists.

M. Khan-Khoiski, ex-Prime Minister, and Dr. H. Aghaef, former Vice-President of the Parliament of Azerbaïjan, were assassinated at Tiflis, where they had sought refuge, the former on June 19 and the latter on July 19, by Armenians belonging to the “Tashnak” party, of which the leader of the Armenian Government and most Ministers are members.

This murder of the leaders of Azerbaïjan, who carried on the war against the invaders of their country, served the Bolshevist cause, but aroused much resentment among the Moslems of Azerbaïjan and Georgia, who were exasperated by the Bolshevists’ frightful tyranny and now hated Bolshevism as much as they had formerly hated Tsardom.

The delegation of Azerbaïjan handed to the Spa Conference a note in which they drew its attention to the condition of their country. On the other hand, the members of the former Cabinet made energetic efforts to rid their country of the Bolshevist invasion. For this purpose they sent delegates to Daghestan and Northern Caucasus to plan a common resistance, as Daghestan, the tribes of the mountains of Northern Caucasus, and Azerbaïjan were on friendly terms and shared the same views. By this time a small part of the Red armies still occupied the Baku area, whence the Bolshevists sent reinforcements to the detachments fighting in Persia.

About the same time it was announced that Enver Pasha had been appointed commander-in-chief of the Bolshevist forces advancing towards India, and the Bolshevist troops in Caucasus, Persia, Afghanistan, and Turkistan had been put under his command. In this way the Soviets probably sought to compel England to make peace with Russia at once.

At Tabriz a separatist movement was beginning to make itself felt with a view to bringing about the union of Persian Azerbaïjan, of which this town is the centre, with the Republic of Azerbaïjan, the capital of which is Baku.

All this Bolshevist activity naturally caused much anxiety among those who closely watched the development of Eastern events, for Soviet Russia in another way and with different aims merely carried on the work of Russian imperialism both in order to hold Great Britain in check in the East and to give the whole world the benefit of the Soviet paradise. As the Allied policy with regard to Turkey had roused the whole of Islam, the union of the Bolshevist elements and the Turkish Nationalists seemed inevitable when the question of the future fate of Caucasus should be settled. It was only too much to be feared, after what had just taken place in Azerbaïjan, that Soviet Russia, feeling it necessary to get the start of the Turkish Nationalists, would try to take possession of Georgia now she held Azerbaïjan, as a guarantee both against the hostility of England and against the opposition that might sooner or later arise on the Turkish side. It then appeared that the Turkish Nationalists had come to a merely provisional agreement with the Russian Bolshevists to disengage themselves on the Russian side, and secure their help against Europe, which threatened Turkey; and that, on the contrary, the Angora Government, some members of which are Chechens and Ossetes, when brought face to face with the old historical necessities, would be one day compelled to resort to the old policy of defending the Moslem world against the Slavonic world. For notwithstanding the inherent incompatibility between the minds of these two peoples, the Allied policy, through its blunders, had achieved the paradoxical result of making a Russo-Turkish alliance temporarily possible, and to bring together the Moslems—so unresponsive as a rule to the idle verbiage and subversive tendencies of revolutionists—and the Bolshevist Slavs, who were still their political enemies. And so it turned out that the attitude assumed by the various European Powers in regard to the Turkish problem and the solution that was to eventuate were prominent factors in the future relations between each of those Powers and Asia. Now the Turks, who alone are able to bring about an understanding between the Moslems of Caucasus and those of Asia, are also the only people who can bring about a lasting peace in that part of the confines of Europe and Asia, and settle the relations between those Moslem populations and the West.

Footnote:

44 Since the French edition of this book was published, Georgia was recognised, de jure, by the Supreme Council in January, 1921.