J.

Judge, the good, must himself be virtuous, 3. 409 [cp. Pol. 305].

Judgement, the final, 10. 614 foll. Cp. Hades.

Juggling, 10. 602 D.

Just man, the, is at a disadvantage compared with the unjust (Thrasymachus), 1. 343; is happy, ib. 354 [cp. Laws 1. 660 E]; attains harmony in his soul, 4. 443 E; proclaimed the happiest, 9. 580 foll.;
—just men the friends of the gods, 10. 613 [cp. Phil. 39 E; Laws 4. 716 D];
—just and unjust are at heart the same (Glaucon), 3. 360.

Justice, = to speak the truth and pay one’s debts, 1. 331 foll.; 358 = the interest of the stronger, ib. 338; 2. 367 [cp. Gorg. 489; Laws 4. 714 A]; = honour among thieves, 1. 352; = the excellence of the soul, ib. 353:
—the art which gives good and evil to friends and enemies, ib. 332 foll., 336; is a thief, ib. 334; the proper virtue of man, ib. 335; ‘sublime simplicity,’ ib. 348; does not aim at excess, ib. 349; identical with wisdom and virtue, ib. 351; a principle of harmony, ibid. (cp. 9. 591 D); in the highest class of goods, 2. 357, 367 D [cp. Laws 1. 631 C]; the union of wisdom, temperance, and courage, 4. 433 [cp. Laws 1. 631 C]; a division of labour, ibid. foll. (cp. supra, 1. 332, 349, 350, and 1 Alcib. 127):
—nature and origin of (Glaucon), 2. 358, 359; conventional, ib. 359 A [cp. Theaet. 172 A, 177 C; Laws 10. 889, 890]; praised for its consequences only (Adeimantus), ib. 362 E, 366; a matter of appearance, ib. 365:
—useful alike in war and peace, 1. 333; can do no harm, ib. 335; more precious than gold, ib. 336; toilsome, 2. 364:
—compared to health, 4. 444:
—the poets on, 2. 363, 364, 365 E:
—in perfection, ib. 361:
—more profitable than injustice, 4. 445; 9. 589 foll.; superior to injustice, 9. 589; final triumph of, ib. 580; 10. 612, 613:
—in the state, 2. 369; 4. 431; the same in the individual and the state, 4. 435 foll., 441 foll.:
—absolute justice, 5. 479 E; 6. 501 B; 7. 517 E.

Justice. [The search for justice is the groundwork or foundation of the Republic, which commences with an enquiry into its nature and ends with a triumphant demonstration of the superior happiness enjoyed by the just man. In the First Book several definitions of justice are attempted, all of which prove inadequate. Glaucon and Adeimantus then intervene:—mankind regard justice as a necessity, not as a good in itself, or at best as only to be practised because of the temporal benefits which flow from it: can Socrates prove that it belongs to a higher class of goods? Socrates in reply proposes to construct an ideal state in which justice will be more easily recognised than in the individual. Justice is thus discovered to be the essential virtue of the state, (a thesis afterwards enlarged upon by Aristotle [Pol. i. 2, § 16; iii. 13, § 3]), the bond of the social organization, and, like temperance in the Laws [3. 696, 697; 4. 709 E], rather the accompaniment or condition of the virtues than a virtue in itself [cp. Introduction, p. lxiii]. Expressed in an outward or political form it becomes the great principle which has been already enunciated (i. 322), ‘that every man shall do his own work;’ on this Plato bases the necessity of the division into classes which underlies the whole fabric of the ideal state (4. 433 foll.; Tim. 17 C). Thus we are led to acknowledge the happiness of the just; for he alone reflects in himself this vital principle of the state (4. 445). The final proof is supplied by a comparison of the perfect state with actual forms of government. These, like the individuals who correspond to them, become more and more miserable as they recede further from the ideal, and the climax is reached (9. 587) when the tyrant is shown by the aid of arithmetic to have ‘729 times less pleasure than the king’ [i.e. the perfectly just ruler]. Lastly, the happiness of the just is proved to 359 extend also into the next world, where men appear before the judgment seat of heaven and receive the due reward of their deeds in this life.]